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ABSTRACT
Sir Josiah Child’s activity in the councils of the East 
India Company was motivated by his interest in shipping and 
made possible by his great wealth and the organisation of 
the Company* The period of his activity was one of crisis 
for the Company because of threats to its trade.
Its main business was the transport of Indian goods to 
TSurope by the sea route and it had a legal monopoly of the 
use of this route. To develop its trade, therefore, it had 
to attract goods to its shipping and so had to maintain 
entrepots in India. These, in Child’s time, were involving 
the Company in oivio and political responsibilities. They 
could only be maintained, developed and defended by the Com­
pany with its permanent joint stock.
In the last quarter of the seventeenth oentury the Com­
pany faced a threefold problem. The entrepots were threatened 
by the growing anarchy in India, the monopoly was threatened 
by interloping and the Company was attacked in England by 
business rivals and opponents of the royal prerogative to 
Which it owed its existence. To survive this crisis the Com­
pany threw in its lot with the Crown and in return gained an 
extension of its powers, Which enabled it to deal with its 
enemies; and these powers remained part of its structure 
henceforward. It emerged from a defensive action with a 
’polity1 in India.
Child’s writings on trade, politics and the community throw 
some light on the part he played in this crisis and on the 
nature of the polity with which the Company emerged from it.
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INTRQDUOTIGI
Sir Josiah Child, who was 'bom in 1630 and died in 1699, * 
lived In a time of expanding economy and through a great 
debate. These two factors conditioned his life and activi­
ties and they cannot be divided. In the seventeenth century, 
projects like fen drainage, colonial enterprise and foreign 
trade were inextricably bound into the fabric of political 
life. In its early days the East India Company recognised 
this by making one of the qualifications for the office of 
Governor membership of Parliament.
Politically the decade 1679 to 1689 was one of revolu­
tion. Both Charles II and Janes II aimed at the establish­
ment of as powerful an executive as Louis XIV and his pre­
decessors had established in France. The control of the 
purse by Parliament was a permanent barrier to this and the 
peculiarly unrealistic way in wfcich Parliament voted money, 
always leaving the Grown in arrears and unprotected by the 
modem device of supplementary estimates, made the Crown 
dependent upon corporations and even individual capitalists 
for credit. In this way the latter were drawn into politics 
and took a side by granting or withholding loans.
The Parliamentary opposition, the Country Party, strove 
to prevent the King from gaining absolute power and from 
establishing the Roman Catholic faith and, tfhile it was not
V
1. "The Uoiipany lent £17*0,000 to CharlesT>otv^enl66£ and T &FS. 
See Hunter, Kistozy of British India. II, 188,184,185, for 
the financial transactions oY the Company and the Crown.
*£•
directly interested in foreign affairs, suspected that the 
success of Charles1 schemes depended on the support of Louis 
XIY. The opposition realised that Louis1 power oould he 
limited by the successful opposition of the Dutch to his 
plans for European conquest and therefore advocated English 
intervention in the war. But the degree to which the Country 
Party’s views on foreign policy were limited by its home 
policy is shown by its refusal to vote supplies for the war 
which it so constantly advocated. When, in 1677, Charles had 
an army of 20,000 men prepared for the war, the Country Party, 
fearing its employment at home, made common cause with Louis 
and refused supplies to maintain and use this foroo.
The Country Party directed its policy to the exclusion
of the Catholic James, Duke of York, from the throne. In 1679
and 1680 Exclusion Bills were passed through the Commons and
rejected by the Lords. This was the result of a oaapaign of
stumping the country, from itfhieh there probably emerged the
modem party system. At all events the names of vVhig and Tory
are first found at this time. This desperate campaign was
almost successful, and a contemporary might expect that even
after 1681, Exclusion might yet be achieved. The alternative,
put forward by the more moderate section of the opposition, was
a Bill of Limitation© Which should limit th© prerogative of a
Catholic monarch. Since Parliament was seeking to exclude, or
limit the prerogative of, the king, it was, no less than
Charles, seeking to upset the compromise of 1660 and so pur­
suing a revolutionary end.
It so happened that the TSast India Company had reached 
a crisis in its affairs at the same time. The expending 
economy had led the Company to seek its investment in terri­
tory where it would need to protect Itself, and its very 
prosperity had raised up business rivals.
A rapid rise in the demand for Asian textiles after the 
Restoration was probably the basic cause of the expansion of 
the Companyfs business and this led the Company to concen­
trate on the East Coast and Bengal trade. Hunter gives 
figures nfriioh demonstrate the prosperity of the Company in 
the seventies and eighties. In the decade 1676 to 1685 the 
profit was £963,659 and three sales in 1684 disposed of 
£1,800,000 worth of goods. At the same time the Company was 
borrowing heavily, £550,000 in 1681, and in 160£ was raising 
money secretly on the personal securities of its directors.
Its reputation in the City was so high that its stock stood 
at 300 in 1681 and rose to 360 In 1683 and yet it lacked 
ready money.3*’ This can be partly explained by the fact that 
it took a long time to get a return on its investment; but it 
is also an indication that the overheads wore abnormally high.
These high overheads can be explained in three ways. In 
the first place the Company was being forced to maintain 
larger establishments in India outside the territory of the 
Moghul Emperor. Even within the Empire the Moghul was oaa3tog
1. W.IIunter, TTiryfrory of British India, 11,277,278, and Ct.Bk.
33 , P . 3 5 .
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to be able to protect the trade* So the Comp&ny was involved 
in the maintenance costs of Madras and Bombay and the factories 
dependent on them and also in heavy bribery in Bengal. 
Finally, at home, the prosperity of the trade was attracting 
rivals into the field. Since the monopoly of the Company was 
established by law and these rivals could find allies among 
the textile interests at vome in changing the law, and since 
the Company’s charter was issued under the royal prerogative 
which was being assailed in Parliament, the Company had to 
enter politics to maintain the status quo.
Indeed the Company needed to do more than maintain the 
status quo and defend its charter* The solution to its three­
fold problem really lay in a new Charter Which would give it 
authority to treat its servants in India and the inhabitants 
of its towns as its subjects to prevent them assisting their 
trade rivals and to make the growing administrative responsi­
bilities of the Company easier to meet* It needed powers to 
protect its monopoly by legal processes, not only in Sngland, 
but in Indla,and to conduct, and break off, negotiations with 
country powers in its own right*
Since its enemies were strong in Parliament and in the 
councils of the Vvhlgs, the Company had no hope of a Parlia­
mentary charter and its monopoly could only be maintained and 
its powers increased by the royal prerogative. This could 
not survive the exclusion of a king by Parliament, since the 
latter would then hold the ultimate power in the state, nor
-5-
was it lilcely that a Protestant monarch would regain the 
powers lost by a Catholic. T*e Company, therefore, was drawn 
into the revolutionary struggle on the side of Charles II.
Phis thesis deals with the development of the Company 
during this revolutionary period. It is an attenpt to inter- 
pret the policy of the Company and to identify Child’s 
actions in connection with it. I have divided the work into 
two ports - the first a consideration of Sir Josiah Child and 
his background, and the second an interpretation of the 
policy of the Company between the years 1670 and 1690. Since 
Child is irrevocably linked with the policy of 'Dominion in 
India1, the second part is an attempt to see what was meant 
by these words and why it was sought and how far it m s  
attained.
In a few instances only is it possible to soy with oer- 
tainty that such and suoh a policy was Child’s and in a few 
more is it possible to infer his authorship. His contem­
poraries seem to have been certain of his domination of the 
Company, but were lamentably vague in detail. It appeared 
to me that there had been little enquiry into his career 
before entering the Company, or into the source of his wealth, 
so I have first examined a possible motive for his interest 
in the Company and methods by which his control could have 
boon established or maintained. Ho appears to have been con­
cerned in shipping in a variety of ways and it v^ as probably 
this which interested him in the Company and gave him the
-6-
money that he needed for his purposes.
In the first chapter, therefore, I have set out what oan 
he known of his life story up to his first election to the 
Court of Committees and discussed the shipping concerns of 
the Company at that date. I have made some suggestions as to 
how he may have used his wealth to control the policy of the 
Company, and this has necessitated some discussion, largely 
hosed on circumstantial evidence, of the working of the Court 
of Committees.
In addition to his work as a shipping entrepreneur Child 
found time to write a hook of considerable merit on what oan 
he called political economy1 and eontimed to engage in 
writing, largely polemics, throughout his career, These 
writings, apart from two small collections of letters, are 
his most authentic remains. His writing, hoth academic and 
polemical, appears all of a piece. It embodies, if not a 
coherent set of ideas, an attitude of mind towards political 
and economic matters, so I have discussed this body of writing 
as a Whole and sought to relate it to the political background 
and the affairs of the Company. I have also sought to dis­
cover something of his place and importance in this field, 
because a true picture of Child must portray him as something 
more than a business man and intriguer. Ho was, said 
Macaulay, Tan ingenious and reflecting man1*
The next section I have devoted to shipping. I have 
tried to trace some line of policy in the Company^ shipping
affairs and to drtiw some tentative conclusions about the 
relationship between the Company and the owners of the ships 
that it hired, Since CT^ ild was a shipowner and because the 
profits of the business probably arose from the private 
trade concessions, this chapter forms a link botwoen the 
two sections into Which this study falls.
I have begin the section on Dominion with a discussion 
of tve nature of tve monopoly and the pattern of the private 
trade concessions. X have not attempted a history of inter­
loping but I have indicated the nature of the threat Whioh 
the Interlopers offered to the (Jopipeny and the Shipowner*, 
and I have tried to that it m s  this threat which led
the Gompany in the first place to seek powers Which would 
form the foundation of Dominion.
It was not the Interlopers alone, however, who led the 
Company to seek powers of government. The &rowtv of the 
trade sad the Whanging conditions in the subcontinent raised 
ot^er problems at the same time, Which called for a similar 
solution. Again I have made no attempt to tell the Whole 
story of the Company during the relevant years, but have 
rather concentrated on a number of incidents ^  ich seem to 
throw light on the development of policy and with which a 
connection with Child can be traced. The episodic nature of 
tvis chapter is indicated by sub-^c&ding and three relevant 
side-issues have been dealt ^ith in appendices.
Finally 1 have tried to draw some conclusions from W*at
—fl­
are really five conoantrio abuuias and bring back Child, 
who inevitably la pushed into the bao&ground in a scene 
where the aot ion ranges 30 far over Europe and Asia, on to
the aantre of the stage.
SIR JGSIAH CHILD AMD THE EAST INDIA COMPANY
CHIxJ) AND THE COMPANY 
As of many seventeenth century prople, we have only 
glimpses of Child. Many of these glimpses are at second hand 
and few of them reveal a likeable character. To Defoe he was 
fthe original of stockjobbingEvelyn dismissed him rather 
casually as a fnew moneyed man*. His name and reputation vuere 
known to seamen before the mast in East Indiamen. His wealth 
was proverbial and his intrigues and nepotism were discussed 
by members of Parliament and pamphleteers. Weavers who saw 
their livelihood threatened by the import of Indian textiles 
in 1696 paid a tribute to his reputation for power by rioting 
outside his home at Wanstead, having demonstrated without 
success at the House of Commons and East India House. This 
demonstration was broken up by the thrifty means of having
the pressmasters in attendance to carry off the ringleaders
2
to useful service in the Royal Navy. *
His effigy in Wanstead Church is of a fleshy man, and 
looking at it with this last story in mind, one oan see a 
coarse, vigorous face with a touch of the unconscious humour
of selfishness tempered by a sense of duty. A portrait by
3
Kneller was sold at the artist’s death" ’and has disappeared. 
One wonders why Child did not buy it and whether he did not
1. D.Defoe, The Anatomy of Exchange Alley, p.13.
2. W.Foster, East India House, p.73.
3. Catalogue in the possession of the National Portrait 
Gallery.
wish to appear with the dripping hands and startled effemi­
nate face of contemporary portraiture.
Only in his writings is some of t^is unfavourable 
impression removed. Ho wrote well, both to express his own 
ideas on trade and as a sx^ oJcesman of the East India Company, 
and his style is sufficiently vigorous to be recognised in 
tho correspondence of the iilast India Company When he toolc up 
hie life work.1*
His father was Richard Child, a London merchant with 
interests in the trade of the East and Vest Indies. He was 
High Sheriff of Bedfordshire in 1640 but seems to have been 
buried in insufficient style to please his son, who had an 
inscription placed in HacJcney Church ffor the father of the 
wealthy, wise, notable and prosperous East India merchant,
Sir Josiah Child1.
B om in 1630, Child first appears in 1654 in Portsmouth 
along with his brother John, and is variously described as 
Victualler, Deputy Treasurer to the Fleet and Agent to the 
Havy Treasurer. He was, in fact, a merchant who held govern­
ment contracts in connection with the Havy. In 1654 he 
married Hannah Boate - the first of three wives - daughter of 
Mr. Edward Boate, Master Shipwright of Portsmouth, who had 
been appointed in 1644 one of the 1 Commissioners and Master 
Shipwrights for the felling of the timber of Delinquents for
1. Dr. Ahmed Khan has noticed this similarity and discussed it 
in his East India Trade in the Seventeenth Century.
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the use of the Navy1. Hie first marriage was into the family
of a man engaged in the same kind of business as himself. He 
may have been interested in shipbuilding at this time and he 
was certainly concerned in purveying stoi^ es and money to the 
Navy and merchant captains. Some idea of the range of his 
business at Portsmouth can be seen in a letter from the East 
India Company in 1659, in which he was asked to buy and ship 
in the Success beef, peas, biscuits, butter, cheese, French 
brandy and ’good eating oil1 and to deliver to Captain Thomas 
Fleets fifty pieces of eight with which to buy provisions at 
St. Jago for their plantation at St. Helena.
Child was admitted burgess of Portsmouth in 1655, elected 
Alderman in 1656 and Mayor in 1658, While his brother repre­
sented the borough in Parliament. They seem to have boen good 
Commonwealth men. Child was married according to the civil 
process by the Mayor; and in 1662 both brothers were expelled 
from the corporation by the Parliamentary Commissioners, for 
suspected disloyalty. Child sat in the Ihrliament of 1659 for 
the borough of Petersfield and, from his fate in 1662, it would 
seem probable that he opposed the Restoration, for many good 
Roundheads took this opportunity to rehabilitate themselves.2*
He then moved to London and there he seems to have out­
lived or lived down his reputation in the next three years, 5>r
1. Cal. Ct .Mins.. 1658-60, pp.350,385.
2. W. Oates, "illustrated History of Portsmouth, p.100. See
also Ch i Id rs~ "entry in C.S.fT
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in 1665 he was in partnership with a certain John Shorter, 
supplying masts for the Royal Navy. The State Xapers provide 
a picture of Child’s activities in the sixties. There are 
bills from him and Shorter and another partner, William Woods, 
for masts and the freight of ships. There is a request for 
protection for a ship sailing for timber to New England, of 
the affairs of Which colony he was later to claim an intimate 
knowledge. His father-in-law, Edward Boate, appears to have 
been in the same business in London, for there is a request 
from him, in the State Papers, for the road from the town of 
Woolwich to the docks to be improved, to facilitate the pass­
age of his timber.
p
Child’s name also appears in victualling contracts. *
This activity is especially interesting because in this con­
nection we learn something of his relations with the Court. 
According to Pepys, Child was a protege of Clifford and Buck­
ingham and in 1668 he was apparently intriguing to oust, with 
their help, the victualling contractors. He was unsuccessful 
that year, probably because the Duke of York was against him. 
In the following year, although the Luke was still against him, 
he was brought in as a commissioner. This was probably 
beoause Sir Denis G-auden, with whom the Navy Board was very 
satisfied, could not carry on alone without being paid.^*
1. Cal.St.Papers (Dom.),1666-67,pp.390.572. Fox-Bourne,
English Me rcV ants',' p. 232.
2. Cal.St .Papers (Item. ), 1668-69. p.231.
3. Pepys, Diary, VllI,106.112.265.267.
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His associates on the commission were all active in poli­
tics as well as in business. This throws an interesting light
on the political background to Child’s commercial life. In 
1671 he was in partnership with the Gaudan brothers, Thomas 
Lyttleton and William Ashburnham. Later Thomas Papillon came 
in place of Ashburnham. Lyttleton, Ashburnham and Papillon 
were all members of Parliament. Although they were not to 
remain associated in politics, When the great division arose 
ten years later, it is interesting to see a group of business 
men, who were in Parliament, associated in a government con­
tract.1'
Child bore no great reputation among the high Tories.
Pepys records the Luke of York as ’speaking hardly against him1
and Captain Cox fdid second the Luke, saying he was talked of
for an unfair dealer wit^ masters of ships about freight’. He
was defended, however, by Sir Thomas Lyttleton, ’very foolishly
and hotly’, saying ’presently that he never hoard an honest
2
man speaking ill of Child’.
Suspicion of Child would seam to be justified. In 1673, 
ho, Lyttleton and the Gaudens secured a clause in their con­
tract allowing them to export, duty free, tiny surplus victuals. 
By virtue of this clause the partnership exported to the
1* Cal.Treasury Books, 1671,p.1123. For lyttleton and Papillon 
see entries in L.H.B. There is a monograph on Papillon - 
A.P.W.PapiELon, Thomas Papillon of London, Merchant. Ashburn­
ham is Sir Lenny Ashbumham,' Baronet Tcr'eate d* T6 6 lT and M.P. 
for Hastings. See G.S.J. The Gauden brothers v/ere victuaLLaas 
and frequently occur in Pepys’ Liary and correspondence.
2. Pepys. Liary, VIII,301.
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Barbadoes 40 tuns of beer and 60 tons of bisouit with 60 tons
of beef and pork. In June of that yeur the Gaudens dropped
out and Child, Lyttleton and Papillon carried on alone. In
December they refused to deliver any more victuals until they
wore paid and tho Gaudens took over the contract again. Child
and Papillon, thoroupon, applied for a licence to export the
victuals they thon had in stock, in spito of the fact that the
now commissioners were prepared to buy their surplus. In faot
a licence was refused, but it waB an attempt at sharp practice
which explains Pepys1 view that Lyttleton’s defence of Child
was ’foolish1.^ *
A story in lighter vein reveals another facet of his
Charaoter at this period. He was the owner of St. Botolph’s
Wharf and Lion Quay, near St. Magnus Martyr, and here he was
engaged in an amusing dispute with some shopkeepers in Lower
Thames Street, who objected to his refusal to allow shoppers
to alight at this steps, for apparently it was tho custom to
alight at any stops and walk through the wharf. Child solved
the problem by removing his steps. Characteristically, he
2.seems to-have published a pamphlet on the dispute.
In 1673 Child joined the thirteen-year-old Cavalier Par­
liament as M.F. for Dartmouth and in the same year bought 
Wanste&d House. He went to ’prodigious cost’, remarked Evelyn, 
’in planting walnut trees and making fishponds in that barren
1. Cal.Treasury Books. 1672-75,pp.100,148,160,431.
2. Gufldhali Add.Ms., 537 and the curious pamphlet The State 
of the Case, a copy of which is in tho Guildhall Library.
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spot1.1* The estate and the seat in Parliament may mark a
landmark in his career, his arrival into t*>e ruling class,
o
which was to he consolidated five years later with a baronetcy. 
In 1676, as we shall see, he was out of favour with the King 
over a victualling dispute and there is no apparent reason 
for his return to favour. The baronetcy may have been for ser­
vices in Parliament or it may have been a means for the finan­
cially hard-pressed King to raise the £600 odd normally paid 
in foes.
His marriages, too, suggest increasing social dirtinction. 
His second wife, Whom he married in 1663, was a twenty-year-old 
widow, Mary Stone, daughter of William Attwood of Hackney. In 
1676 he married Emma, widow of Francis Willoughby, a Worcester­
shire gentleman, and daughter of TTenry Barnard, a Turkey mer- 
chant, described as of Stoke, Bridgonorth and Aconby. •
He began to invest in the East India Company in the seven­
ties. It has been suggested that he took the opportunity of 
buying the stock in the slump of the Plague year, but it seems 
that he did not begin to buy until 1671. Tho first Adventurers1 
Lint in Which he appears is that of 1675, When he hold £12,000 
of scrip and thi3 sum oan all be accounted for between the 
years 1671 and 1675. The purchases are interesting because 
they are abnormally largo and probably show a determination to 
dominate the Company. To qualify as a Committee, or, as we
1. Evelyn, Diary, p.440.
2. G.E.C.
3. 3.E.(J.t
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should say today, a director, a shareholder had to hold £1*000
worth of stock, and many of them held little more than that.
In the General Court, or shareholders1 meeting, a member had 
one vote for every £500 of stock. In 1675, when Child held 
£11,000 of stock, Sir Joseph Ash held stock to the value of 
£2,500, Sir Samuel Barnardistone £2,550, Thomas Papillon £2,250 
and the nearest rival of Child was Sir Nathaniel Heme with 
fiS.350.1'
In 1674 Child became a committee and remained one to the 
end of his life, with the exception of the year 1676. He was 
not re-elected that year owing to royal displeasure, due, 
according to Child, to the refusal of himself and his partner 
Papillon to supply any more victuals to the Navy until their 
bills, amounting to some £80,000, had been met. The King, 
however, accused them of supplying ’mean and 3tinking’ beer. 
Certainly the bills had not been met twenty years later and in 
any case, as we have seen, Child was back in royal favour
sufficiently to be created baronet in 1678 and had been re-
2
elected a committee in 1677,
On election as a committee his reputation or his ability 
or perhaps Just his willingness, in an age when no successful 
merchant gave his full time to any one undertaking, brought him
1. See the Cal.Ct.Mins. for the appropriate years and the 
Adventurers’" Lists in Home Misc. 1 and 2 for the holdings 
of Child and his colleagues.
£• Ct.Bk.29.pp.245 ff..Ct.Bk.3Q.pp.1 ff. See Khan, The East 
India Trade in the Seventeenth Century, p.194, for a dis­
cussion o7~the victualling dispute 7
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a great deal of administrative work. In 1674, for example,
he was one of committees selected to dispose of money for the 
Company1s service; he was to approach the Dutch East India 
Company for the release of Samuel Baron; he was to attend the 
English Commissioners for the Treaty Marine with the Dutch; 
and he was co investigate charges against the chaplain of 
Bantam. In 1675 he became a member of the powerful Committee 
of Letters which drafted directives to the agents in Asia.1*
At this point we can see the pattern of his life taking 
shape. It was as a shipowner and as a person interested in 
building and equipping ships that he came to the East India 
Company, and muob of the Company’s policy during the next 
twenty-five years can perhaps be explained on the hypothesis 
that shipping was Child’s main interest. Perhaps Child was 
the founder of shipping interest of the East India Company 
rather than of the Indian Empire.
The condition under which such an interest could be 
founded was the inauguration of the permanent Joint stock in 
1557. Hitherto the ventures had been kept separata with 
separata subscribers’ lists, and there was constant friction, 
increased by the primitive book-keeping of the Company, over 
the assets and liabilities of each set of shareholders. The 
shipowners made contracts with the separate groups (and the 
payment of freight came out of the particular adventure for 
which tho 3hip was hired.
!• Oal.Ct.Minutes.1674-76.p.v.
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The choice of ships was limited. They had to he above
average. fOne built*, it was said, fof the force and strength
of those in the Kast India trade v/ill serve well thirty years 
in any other trade1, whereas tve Company nevor used one above 
seven years in the early days. At first the ships had been 
owned by the Company for the various groups of Adventurers, 
and built with the aid of a government subsidy in the form of 
a rebate on the customs. This worked out for the Company at a 
coot equal to a freight of £31 per ton, and so, very early in 
the Companyfs history, in 1607, enquiry was made for 1 substan­
tial ships well manned and armed, victualled and furnished, to 
be freighted at £30 per ton1. The freight probably worked out 
at less, and by 1687 half the ships were hired. During the 
Interregnum the practice of hiring ships rather than building 
or buying was established. Because of the lack of permanence 
in the early stocks, the 3hips were hired for one voyage only; 
but v/hen the permanent 3tock was established, this arrangement, 
which could have been satisfactory to neither the Company nor 
the owners and commanders of the ships, could be modified.
These three parties were mutually dependant, for if an overall 
shortage of 3hips gave some advantage to the owners, the build­
ing of a ship to the exacting requirements of the 2ust India
trade was an undertaking not to be embarked upon without some 
hope of the ship being taken up.
1. Danvers, Introduction to the Marine Records, pp.ix ff. The 
calculation of the cost of the owned ships "is C.jS. Fayle's. 
See his Short history of tho World1 s Ohipping industry.p. 162.
The commanders had not only to he good sailors hut
honest men. Sot only did they have complete control of the 
ship mid, despite the checks and concessions of the Company* 
the cargo during the long voyage, hut they normally repre­
sented the owners of tve ship in negotiations. Whon a ship 
v,ob in the market, it m s  often the commander Who got a
number of owners together and acted for them.
Tho position of the commander is indicated by the 
earliest developments after 1657. It was laid down in 1658 
that the oommtindor of a ship freightad by the Company rmst he 
acceptable. If he was himself negotiating he had to satisfy 
the Company that not only his ship but ho himself we© reHabla 
If another owner was negotiating the name of the commander 
had to be submitted and accepted as such. And in 1659 it was
to Captain Millett that the Committees guaranteed that, if he
and his friends built them a suitable ship, they would give 
her employment before all others on as good terms as possible^ 
In this we oan see the beginning of a panel of commander© 
who ware not permanent employees but by virtue of thoir
acceptability and connection with the ships, were likely to 
be re-employed and this would be likely to enhance their repu­
tation in shipping circles. The need of suitable ships with 
acceptable commanders lad to the practice of taking up ships 
time and again and by 1663 it was recognised that the ships
1. For tho position of the commander of an last India Company 
ship, see 1.5. Sutherland, | lendon Merchant, pp.90-100. 
Also Carre, Travels, p.679 n."
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were hired for a number of voyages. In that year the Compare
announced its intention of 1 encouraging* the building of ships 
suitable to its needs, by promising them employment on favour­
able terms* since tenders were not coming in fast enough aming 
to the Dutch War and the demands of the Navy. Ships of 500 
tons with three deck© ware to be given a bounty of 20s. a ton 
on the freight of the first two voyages* and no ship of three 
docks was to be considered superannuated until ©he had done 
rixteen years1 service and no two-decked ship until she had 
done fourteen.^**
It wo© with the shipping concerns of the Company in this 
posture that Child began M s  pt»rohase of scrip. The direction 
of the Company had also boon modified by the inauguration of 
the permanent Joint stock. Previously the only element of 
continuity lay in th© of floors of tho Company. Hot only were 
tho privileges vested legally in the governor and Company.but 
because the interest of the mtoribers lay in a single voyage* 
the Governor, Who was serai-permanent in his position* presid­
ing over the meetings of the separate groups of Adventurers 
Viho subscribed the capital, in fact directed the import* ex­
port and shipping policies. After 1657 tho element of con­
tinuity lay in the stock. The constitution was amended, per­
haps with that suspicion of personal power which was charac­
teristic of the age, to give more apparent power to the 
General Court. Ho Governor or Deputy was to hold office for
1. Sec Danvers* Introduction to the Marine Records, p.ix*
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more than two years* and eight of the twenty-four Committees
vjere to resign in rotation every year. As isually happens 
with constitutions planned to share office widely through 
an organisation, direction tended to fall to those prepared 
to serve. Committees resigning were usually re-elected; and 
the democratio nature of the constitution was limited by the 
property qualification for a Committee already noted. Never­
theless, the constitution was kept to the letter and Child 
oould never hope to wield the powers of the three Governors 
before 1658, who held office between them for fifty years.***
Another development of the permanent joint stock was the 
growth of committees in the modern sense, They probably 
arose from the practice during the seventeenth century of 
delegating certain duties to groups of directors. Then we 
find the formula of referring a question to fthe Committees 
formally appointed for that purpose1, and it was in those 
small groups that decisions v^ ere taken. In the latter half 
of the seventeenth century, those groups hardened into stand­
ing committees.
The Committee of Letters has already been mentioned and 
some idea of the scope and political implications of its work 
can be seen in a minute of 1668, which instructed ?the Commit 
tec for Writing Letters to meet on Wednesday afternoons to 
prepare rules for the good government of Bombay and draw up 
instructions for Captain Basse and other masters of ships Who
1. Hunter, History of British India, I, 143 ff., 150.
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are employed In trading from place to place* in the Bast1.1*
From 1683 t^e practice arose of aj^pointing from time to 
time a Committee of Secrecy to deal with political and confi­
dential matters. Of the first two such committees recorded, 
Child was a member. The first was appointed in 1683 to deal 
with the situation Which arose from the loss of Bantam to the 
Butch .and the second in the following year to deal with Keig- 
win’s Rebellion. '* In each case the committees consisted of 
throe persons, two of whom wore the Governor and his Deputy, 
and there were no precise terms of reference. Gn these occa­
sions the Court of Committees gave the widest discretion to 
the members and presumably exercised no supervision over their
deliberations and accepted their decisions.
.6
In the first case tho committee m s  called upon to make 
a political decision of great consequence, for vtfiile its pri­
mary duty was to issue instructions to the Company’s servants 
and the captains of its ships, it also had to decide What was 
to be done in this now situation, with the last stronghold in 
the 8oice Islands gone. By implication at least the committa 
must have taken the far-reaching decision to concentrate the 
Company’s attention upon the Indian mainland.' *
In the case of Keigv;infs Rebellion the decisions which
the committee was called upon to take could have been as far-
1. Cal.Ct.Min., 1668-70, p.95.
2. Ct.Bk.33, p.13ft and Ct.Bk.34. p.4.
3. For a discussion of this committee see the article by C.H.
Philips in the Bulletin of the School of Oriental and 
African Stud lesV lfro. lo Cl$4b)
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reach ing and the negotiations v^ioh it had to undertake were
extremely delicate. What is interesting about; both the com­
mittees is that in an emergency the directorate of the Com­
pany was prepared to accept the consequences of the decision 
of a few men.
A Committee of Shipping is first mentioned in 1658 and 
appears to have been a permanent institution, dealing v;ith 
freight and the taking up of ships. Later, decisions on 
private trade were added to its duties and with the outbreak 
of the French war in the reign of William III, when the pro­
tection of ships v;as a constant responsibility, the same 
people who composed the Committee of Shipping arranged con­
voys as a Committee of Secrecy.'1'*
In 1695 the practice arose of recording in the Court
2Book a list of committees and their members.'* In that year 
there were nine committees, the largest of which was that of 
Shipping and Private Trade with sixteen members and three as 
a quorum. This committee and those of Buying Goods and Writ­
ing Letters appear to have been the policy-making bodies; the 
others had largely executive and auditing functions. In this 
year Child was only upon the Committee for Writing Letters 
and that is peihaps the measure of the importance of that 
committee.
The method of election of these committees is not clear,
1. Miss L.S. Sutherland discusses the Committee of Shipping
and Secrecy in her book, A London Merchant, p.89 n.
2. Ct.Bk.37, p.4.
largely because the word committee m s  in transition between 
meaning a person and meaning a body of people. It can be 
assumed, however, that the Court of Committees, elected by 
the General Court, appointed the committees.
The committee system would favour the development of 
personal power within the Company, since it would take policy 
making away from the Court of Committees as a whole, rather 
as in looal government today, where the Whole body of a coun­
cil ratifies decisions taken by members in oonuuitteo. For 
example, in 1677, regulations governing the number of boys to 
be carried on freighted ships were laid down in the form of 
a ’report from the shipping committee1.1.
In the seventeenth century the system was experimental, 
fhe functions of a committee might be extended, for example, 
as we have seen in the ca3e of shipping. New committees migjtfc 
be formed and others discontinued. Furthermore, members of 
the Court sat on more than one committee. Ihis overlapping 
ana the experimental nature of the system would allow the 
steering of matters into the appropriate hands since questions 
were referred to committees as they arose. Although this pos­
sibility strikes a twentieth century reader of the Court Book, 
there is no proof that things happened in this way.
Child certainly had associates on the committees. From 
1681 to 1696 he was associated with Jeremy Sambrook^hnd Sir
1. Cal.Ct.If ins., 167 7-79 , p.117.
2. For the Sami)rook family, see W. Foster, Kast India House.
Benjamin Bathurst.1* The latter was a capitalist in close
touch with the Court, serving for sone time as Treasurer to 
the Duke of York, Whose shares in the Company, incidentally, 
were held in Bathurst’s name. He was an Alderman of London, 
put in during the suspension of the City’s charter, and was 
later Lord Mayor. It was he who m s  the connection between 
Whitehall and Leodenhall Street. The nows of Keigwin’s rebel­
lion, for example, was brought to India Fouse by him and he 
was named with Child and Sambrook in the committee of secrecy 
to deal with the matter.
After the Revolution, Bathurst, like Child, v.as less pro­
minent for a time, until he became Deputy Governor in 1695. A 
new figure came into prominence at the Revolution, 3ir Thomas 
Cooke. We oan guess something of Child’s relations with him 
from the annoyance expressed in Child’s will at the marriage 
between Sir Josiah the second and Cooke’s daughter. Child 
made it a condition of his son’s inheritance of the property 
at Wanstead that Cooke should pay into the estate the value 
of the house and lend. Cooke was Child’s creature rather 
than his associate. . He was a goldsmith who through Child’s
1. For an outline of his career, see Beaven, Aldermen of the 
City of London. 11,110. He was a capitalist tfho provided
credit for the Crown, e.g. it was proposed by Dartmouth 
that he should provide credit for the evacuation of Tangier
(H.F.0.!>e.rtmouth.1.84). His joint account with Anthony 
Upton in Chflif’s Branch of Glyn Mills Bank would reward 
investigation. It shows that he was concerned in the Italian 
and African trades but throws no light on this story, in 
which ! feci that he is an important but elusive character
2. For this association on committees, see Ct.Bk.34, pp.£,16, 
78,147.
agency supplied the Company with bullion.1* He became rioh
but it is probable that he became prominent after the Revo­
lution because of his previous obscurity. TTe was something 
of a political go-between, 'and it is possible that he had 
some such role in Child *s entourage, although there is no 
evidence of this. At all events it can be seen even from 
his rather evasive evidence given in the Parliamentary pro­
ceedings of 1695 how completely he wan dominated by Child, 
and in the latter*s attitude to him we can see reflected 
something of the contemptible creature portrayed by Macaulay. 
Just as Child had his contacts in the political world
in England and his associates in committee, so he had his
4
executive agents in India. It has been suggested * that he 
chose them for their friendlessness so that they should owe 
their position to him alone. Certainly John Child was an 
orphan, brought up in India, with an uncle, an obscure Mr* 
Goodler, as hig sole contact with the directorate. TTe owed 
his advancement to Child, who incidentally persuaded the Com­
pany to pay for his baronetcy end looked after his son Caesar 
after vis death* Hut it was rather that he viewed independ­
ence in any form with suspicion. The tradition of the Company
1. Ct.Bk*35,p*95.
2. He brought about the reconciliation between Papillon and
the Tory Lord Mayor, Sir William Pritchard. See A*F.tV. 
Papillon, Thomas Papillon, p.38.
3. Bxn-fflination ol Sir Thomas uOQke, 1*0. Tract 268.
4. By R. & 0. Straohey in Keigwin's Rebellion. This book
gives a good account of John Child*
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was, as it was of the Counoil of Trade and Plantations, to
give detailed instructions for action six thousand miles awss 
It seems that neither Child nor the Company at large looked
for cornmorcial any more than political initiative. The Court 
of Committees controlled the investment and merely wished for 
despatch in carrying out instructions. Child was a firm ex­
ponent of this view and opposed the appointment of Thomas 
Pitt,''for example, who was tireless in exploring new avenues 
of trade. In the circumstances, however, it was natural to 
prefer subservience to initiative, since the shareholders 
were in the hands of the agents in India. Independence and 
initiative might lead to traffic with interlopers and too 
much energy being devoted to private affairs.
Sir Streynehom Master was dismissed as the result of an 
exasperated reply to a nagging letter from home. Tie was well 
connected and had served the Company with distinction before 
being appointed Agent in Madras. Although not Child’s oisataan, 
Child had been instrumental in securing his appointment and 
was prepared to trust him. Yet when Master broke the rule of 
the Company, Child wrote ambiguously that his vote for the 
dismissal fwas not from any unkindness to you, for'I no more 
intended thie change when I wrote last to you than I did the 
changing of ray wife1. This was an amiable but firm intimation 
that agents were not to concern themselves with policy, even 
if they were friends of the Committees whose business it
1. A.F.'i/. Papillon, T omas Papillon. pp.38 ff.
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was . ^ *
Within Bast India House itself Child had what h© clearly
considered a perfect executive. Hobert Blackborne, the
Secretary of the Company, was in his complete confidence.
From very unimportant duties, he was promoted to take over
2
the writing of letters to India in 1576 and from that date 
it may he assumed that Child played a part in the arrangements, 
thenceforward he appears to act as a modern company secretary 
attending Committees, putting information before the Court 
and receiving instructions. In a changing Court he v;ao per­
manent, and it is not unreasonable to assume that in execut­
ing and interpreting policy he would he in a position to 
initiate it. Of his early dealings with Child we have no 
record, hut in 1692 there began a correspondence which will 
be dealt wit* below and Which shows Child guiding the policy 
of the Company from Wanstaai through Bl&okborne.
Another interesting fact about Blackborne is that on a 
salary of £100 a year he became a very considerable investor 
in the Company. He held £1,725 worth in 1691, £4,790 in 1694 
and £4,100 in 1695. In 1691, too, he began to hold stock in
1. Master, Diaries,1,127. It is a pity that so few of the 
letters that Child and Master exchanged have survived, 
since it seems clear that Master was appointed with Child's 
approval to give effect to a definite policy and that he 
was well knovm to Child. His administration will be dis­
cussed in the section on Dominion. She 'nagging letter* 
will be found in Letter Boole VI, p. 249. Actually his dis­
missal arrived only four days before he was due to lay 
down his charge.
2.W.Foster, Bast India House.p.86. Blaokborne held office 
from 1666 until his death' in 1702.
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trust for the Company, holding £1,900 worth in that year*
Each year the amount increased until 1695, itfoen he held in 
this way £92,535 worth of stock***• There is ro apparent 
reason for this. It was no part of his normal duties and it can 
only he assumed that this stock was to be used kb a source of 
voters in the General Court to bring in men of straw or to be 
used as bribes. This would indicate that Blaokborne was the 
trusted agent of Child or of a controlling group in the Compear 
The permanent joint etock not only allowed a long term 
policy to develop in respect of shipping and gave a more 
modem fern to t*o Company, but also facilitated investment 
in the factories in India. Those were, of course, a longterm 
investment Which the turnover scarcely balanced and as the 
trade increased it would be reasonable to issue more stock* 
This would perhaps have upset the control of the Company,which 
as wo have seen, was ultimately based on the size of holdings. 
The Company was therefore subject to recurrent financial 
crises which were usually net by s^ort term loans on the 
security of the common seal. In order to borrow at three per 
cent, in the City, the Company had to keep its money at six 
months call and appears to have done that and to have been 
regarded as a good borrower. Kevertheless, to maintain this 
reputation it would need ready money. It has to be remem­
bered, too, that the value of the monopoly lay in the Com­
pares utility to control the flow of goods on to the market,
Home Mis.l.p.93* Home 4is.2»pp.2.49.97*
V
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and to do this it had to hold up 3ales at times, for it had 
competitors in certain commodities. The very real assets 
were largely invisible in the City of Juomlon, being building, 
stock and connections in India. In 1682, for example,£10,750 
had to be raised in a great hurry by coining bullion and by 
individual directors raising what they could on their own end 
the Company’s security* Child, in the chair, swore the Court 
to secrecy on this occasion, but the true state of affairs 
could not be concealed indefinitely and in 1691-2 Parliament 
called on the Company to furnish proof of its solvency. Child 
and Sir Thomas Cooke, the Governor, gave security for £100,00) 
find the remaining £544,OoQ which the Company claimed as afiBets 
was mode up by smaller guarantees from individual committees;?*• 
Ihe3© instances show that the directors, in spite of the need 
for ready money, refused to take the obvious step of issuing 
more stock, whiOh they could auite well have done. It is 
probable, however, that this necessity was an opportunity for 
Ghild. His own income was reckoned at £20,000 a yoar and the 
money he could dispose of not only made the Company beholden 
to him but, by removing the necessity for a new* issue, allowed 
him to licauiro and keep a control over its affairs.
In 1693 Ghild wrote to the Secretary asking for payment 
presumably for freight, and added significantly, fl hope it is 
sufficient that I leave such a great capital stun to serve their
occasions1.^ * This shows how vital Childfs investment was to
1. CtVBk*33 M .3 S'. jgfT~ “  ~  ’ ' “
Home Mis.40. p*133.
the Company. In the same letter he justifies himself for
not talcing more shares in shipping, on whidh the Company was 
apparently relying# This letter is an indication of Child’s 
position in the Company*
Certainly in the crisis for the Company that followed 
the devolution, when the support of the House of Stuart was 
withdrawn, Child increased vie holding. His £12,000 worth 
held in 1675 would be doubled by tve boims issue of 1676 to 
£24,QG0 vyorth; but in 1691 the value hod increased to £51,000* 
In 1694 he held £37,877,10.0. while his wife held £20,000 in 
trust for her sons. In 1696 he dropped his personal holding 
by £10,000 and in the lust year of his life it was £4,000 and 
his vife’s trust money was down to the same a m o u n t . I t  
would not appear from this that his holding for his family 
was an investment to provide for thorn, but it would seem to 
be like his own end Blackborne1s trust holding, a part of his 
controlling interest,
Unfortunately we have no correspondence of Child until 
the nineties, but there is enough evidence to show his domi­
nance of the Company. It is important to rod ire that he 
held no official r)Osition except membership of the Committee 
of Writing Letters, All correspondence seems, however, to 
have been referred to him. The earliest letter is from 
November, 1692, and is about twelve ships which William III
1* loae Mis*2, pp.7,19.
2. xhe .letters are to be found in MS3. Hawl. A > 303, in the 
Lodleian Library and in Home UisT'foY ppri21-169 in the 
India Office library.
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had requested aa a loan for the Havy. Child, writing ffor
yourself1 on t^e outside of the paper, informed Blnckbome 
that the Company should agree to this but stipulate that the 
ships must bo returned, four in January and t*'0 rest in 
March* TTe said the transaction was quite safe, for ’His 
Majesty is very knowing in Bast India affairs’*
In this correspondence, Child was always outwardly 
deferential to the Governor and his colleagues* lie talks of 
troubling tve committees’ and writes, ’as I ought not, so I 
will not make any agreement without the Governor’s and the 
committees1 consent’* It may not have been outward form.
Tfis power In this was after all constitutional as a member 
of the Committee for Writing Letters. Ye was very thorough. 
*Te wrote, ’I return you all the Company’s letters with draft 
answers to be altered at the Committees’ pleasure*. When, 
however, he wrote, ’I send you the draft of t^e two letters 
to purport you desire that the Committees may correct 
m as they please’, it looks as if he and Biackbome had 
laid their heads together to Initiate or modify some policy. 
The same would seem to*be true when Child wrote, ’I return 
you t^o Conpojiy’B letters (in) which I observe no mistakes... 
and is now corrected and as I dictated it ... but you will 
reform it in all copies’.
More revealing still is the following: ’I send the en­
closed to you (but to be perused by yourself only) to save 
myself the labour of a longer letter and I entreat you, after
• 33*
you have perused it, to seal it and deliver it to the 
Governor1. He went on in this letter, 'in the meantime, as 
soon as it is convenient, introduce the bearer to the com­
mittee of buying goods to make his contract fresh1•
The bearers of these letters were often in Child’s con­
fidence. There are references to Captain Heath and Mr.
Gngley, both connected with shipping, carrying messages. Mr. 
Ongley was on one occasion entrusted with a verbal amplifi­
cation of an instruction in a letter.
From this correspondence it appears that Child planned 
the routing of the ships each year and, to a large extent, 
the cargoes, although this would not seem to be within the 
scope of the Committee for Writing letters. fIf the wind 
keep out of the way9» he wrote, 'and the Committees see fit, 
I am for ordering our four Coast and Bay ships to depart 
presently by the North passage1. He went into such details 
as the wine casks from Cadis, pointing out that because of 
the lateness in the year they must go to Bengal and back to
Fort St. George and so 'every cask must have three iron
hoops at each end'.
it should not be thought that Child was deliberately 
keeping the control of matters in his own hands against the 
will of his colleagues. Most of them were men of affairs 
who valued his opinion, based as it was upon some twenty 
years' experience. Probably they left his a fairly free 
hand. Certainly, during the French war, the 'secret comnibbceF
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was instructed to ask his advice about the letter which the 
contains of the Corapany*s ships were to open at sea*1* This 
appears to have been a genuine consultation, for Child 
wrote of speaking to the Governor before writing it.
He maintained political contacts for the Company* One 
transaction of this nature was that of the Duke of Bolton*8 
lead. Child1 s cousin Holt* who was in the House of Commons, 
told him that fthe Duke took it very ill that he had heard 
nothing from the Company about buying his lead*. Child wrote 
off to Blaokborne telling him to get in touch with Holt*
This appears to have been neglected, for the Duke wrote to 
Child direot to complain that his agent attended to sell it 
but was put off. Child wrote that *My .Lord Duke has been 
the Company*© friend and I hope we shall keep him so1, for 
vhe is a warm man on any side he takes ... He has about two 
hundred tons of lead in town and if we buy that 1 suppose it 
will content him*•
These letters date from t^e period of his maximum hold­
ing in the Company and after 1695, when he began to withdraw 
his money, there are indications that perhaps his influence 
began to wane. He suffered two defeats on the poliey to be 
pursued with regard to the Interlopers. He wrote to Blaok­
borne regretting his colleagues* decision to buy the Inter­
lopers 1 ships and was bitterly opposed to the appointment of 
Thomas Pitt to the Company*s service, calling him *a ruffling
j&$L*jyS£.37, p*45.
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iniaoral man* and claiming that the General Court was on his 
side. In 1693 applications for work had been sent to him 
for marginal comment and his nomination or condemnation 
appear to have been enough to decide the matter.1*
He may have relaxed his financial control because his 
faculties were failing or because he was tired. The last 
letter, sfhiobhas to do with the routing of ships, ends: fthe 
captain of the Mocha Merchant is a discreet brisk man and 
fittest to be the admiral of this little fleet ... his name 
I do not presently remember*. He may have wished to devote 
himself entirely to his shipping concerns. TTe may have been 
proved wrong in his policy to prevent interloping and so his 
colleagues rejected his advice.
At all events he suffered his sole recorded defeat in 
the Court of Committees and it took place at t^e time when he 
began to withdraw his money. This suggests that his dominance 
was financial and not personal. Two men who brought in Pitt 
were Ongley,' *his erstwhile confidant, and Thomas Cooke, his 
protege. He seems to have inspired neither love nor loyalty.
1. A.F.&. Papillon, Thonas Pqgl!Ion»p»Q8. H.Tule, Introduc­
tion to Hedges* Diary. ill,xxxlll.
2. Samel Ongley, merchant tailor and speculator. From the 
Transfer Books it would appear, from the frequency of his 
purchases and sales, that he was first interested in the 
Comptaiy as an investment. later he was a Committee. He i® 
mentioned by Child in letters and was entrusted with verbal 
message®. He had shares in ships. He become Pitt*® agent 
in the country itfhen the latter was in Hadras. See H. Ytile, 
Introduction to Hedges* Diary. Ill.lxiv,lxviii.
The third volume of the Hackluyt edition of Hedges*
Diary consists of a collection oi documents made by Sir 
Henry Yule for a biography of Thomas Pitt.
Perhaps he did not move in oiroles inhere these qualities 
are much esteemed and, indeed, in reading those letters 
there emerges only one endearing trait in his character - 
the rigour of his attacks on four furious, hrainsiok 
adversaries1•
CHILD AS A WRITER
The problems whioh seventeenth century writers on 
eoonomio matters faoed were largely those of foreign trade.
In the previous oentury England had oeased to be a country 
traded with by more advanoed neighbours and took her own 
initiative in a number of trades. This ohange was as revo­
lutionary as the emergence of Holland as a sovereign state. 
Both England and Holland faoed the same problems - sea power, 
plantations, population and bullion - and in both countries 
trade was regarded as an instrument of policy and economics 
were bound closely to politics. The political and oorameroj^ uL 
success of Holland, more and more apparent throughout the 
seventeenth oentury, was much on the minds of English writers.
Their writing was speculative in an age When there were 
no statistics and these speculations were directed towards 
stimulating government action, since in the seventeenth oen­
tury the merchants had not achieved the same predominance in 
the state that had been achieved in Holland. In fact, the 
difference between England and Holland was that in the forma1 
country a sovereign state had turned its attention to trade 
while in the latter a merchant oligarchy had set up a state. 
In England the state was strong and power was shared unequaUy 
between the Grown and the country gentry, While in Holland 
the state was a loosely federated republic in Whioh the mer­
chants were supreme.
It was this political situation which was the background
to English mercantilism and coloured the thinking of mer­
cantilist writers upon English problems. Of these the most 
obviously political was that of seapower. It had been 
demonstrated in the previous century that the survival of 
this country's independence was due to the command of the 
sea approaches, and that the Royal Navy was incapable of 
maintaining that command without the aid of what we should 
call the merchant navy. The state did not maintain trained 
men in time of peace but expected to draw crews from among 
merchant seamen and fishermen. The Navigation Ordinance of 
1651 recognised this and by protecting shipping in faot 
placed the obligation of providing a navy upon the merchants 
in return for a monopoly of incoming and colonial shipping - 
as the landowners of the Middle Ages had provided an army 
in return for political power.
Plantations, or colonies, were much bound up with sea­
power, v/hioh protected and nourished them. They, in turn, 
v/ere regarded as means of building up shipping; almost as 
terminal points in practice runs. No-one doubted the com­
mercial value of colonies but there was some anxiety as to 
whether they drew off too many people from the mother country.
This question was insoluble without statistics and was 
confused by unanswered questions within the mother country.
j
In an expanding economy hands were needed and yet there was 
unemployment due to local conditions. This led to reflection
upon population and upon the Poor Law.
Finally there was the long controversy over bullion*
Was it wealth, or a form of goods, or a source of wealth?
It boiled down to the question whether or not bullion 
should be exported.
All trading and colonial nations faoed these problems. 
There were also some specifically English ones. While mer­
chants were seeking government action for the benefit of 
trade, they were also urging the benefits they brought to 
the state. They were Justified in this since they provided 
the bulk of the national revenue. Apart from the customs, 
the traditional source of muoh of the Grown7s income, they 
provided credit - ready money - in return for privileges.
It was this whioh made the question of monopolies a 
particularly delicate one in this oountry. It was born in 
the struggles of the sixteenth century when the Crown needed 
credit, and, if possible, credit within the country. The 
great chartered companies were the only sources and in order 
to draw the necessary capital had to offer the security of a 
monopoly. In the early days of the seventeenth century,with 
the Crown kept short of money by Parliament and in any case 
spending its money in advance, the practice of turning to 
chartered companies persisted and developed. Not only was 
the original monopoly of the East India Company continued 
beyond the original term of fourteen years, but any projector 
Who found a way of increasing the revenue become entitled to 
a remuneration. A monopoly was supposedly the reward of a
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discovery, either of a process or a route, whioh was of 
benefit to the nation. A man, however, Who proposed to in­
crease the royal revenue by registering itinerant musicians 
or innkeepers did not come within this category. Neverthe­
less, under the early Stuarts he would receive a monopoly 
of the registration, and a percentage of the fees. This 
vexatious and lucrative interference with liberty, and the 
notion that the Crown wqb thereby evading parliamentary 
supervision gave monopolies a bad name. The practice of 
granting monopolies for reasonable purposes for a term of 
usually fourteen years had not been questioned save by 
interested parties, and the Parliamentary policy was to con­
tinue them for oversea trading but not for home production.
Seventeenth century writers had, too, to consider 
changing habits and demands. At a distance of two hundred 
years it is easy for us to see t*at wool was no longer a 
staple, but it was a much cherished illusion that England^ 
prosperity was bound up with wool. This led to prejudice in 
favour of a trade, Which, by the nature of its markets,could 
export wool, and against a trade Which brought in other 
fabrics.
Child dealt with all these matters and his writings fall 
into two groups. There is first foe Pis course of Trade, the 
first version of Which appeared in 1665 and was expanded in 
1668, dealing academically with these matters, and there are
later occasional publications, in which he was writing as
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the spokesman of the East India Company.
Much of the contemporary economic writing was narrowly 
polemical. That is to say, either the ideas put forward 
were those of a group of people whose fortunes were depend­
ent upon the acceptance of those ideas, or they arose not 
from reflection upon the whole scene hut upon particular 
events. The theme of much of the vjork seems to be a dis­
cussion of what was the most profitable trade, or what was 
the most profitable policy to pursue in any particular trade.
Child, however, said more than once that this was the 
wrong approach. fThe enquiry Whether we get or lose does 
not so much deserve our greatest pains as how we may be sure 
to get1. He said that he would not neglect the gaining of 
ten pounds through his anxiety as to how to make a hundred.1. 
This attitude is not only sound common sense but makes pos­
sible a study of economics as opposed to a polemic on trading 
policy. Child, starting from this point, was able to reflect 
upon the whole scene and draw some general conclusions.
The Discourse of Trade has a nineteenth century sound to 
it, largely because it was written in an age of controls that 
had outlived their usefulness. The export of bullion, essen­
tial not only to the East India Company but to traders with 
the Baltic and Levant as well, was illegal, but was lioensed 
annually by the Privy Council; the Elizabethan Poor Law and 
the Act of Settlement made immigrant labour, essential in any
1. Discourse of Trade (ed.1696), p.152.
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community not exclusively agricultural, an object of sus­
picion to the Parish authorities. The corporate towns were 
not prepared to shed their exclusiveness in the interests of 
the national economy. The Corporation and Five Mile Aots 
did not visualise a townsman as an economic man but as mem­
ber of a religious, homogenous community dependent on itself 
for its perpetuation. Business men, too, felt a need for a 
greater supply of money. Restrictions on the export of 
bullion were partly directed towards preventing a scarcity 
of this fvital moisture1. But What was really needed was 
credit. Credit is nn essential stimulus to expanding trade, 
yet the rate of interest was regulated by government end 
stood at 6 per cent. Banks, Which were to play such a vital 
part in the Industrial Revolution, were as yet non-existent.
The book was the product, too, of an age of civil war 
and varying success in foreign policy, When men were in con­
siderable doubt whether prosperity were increasing or not.
Child believed, quite rightly, that prosperity had in­
creased in the first half of the oentury, and his problem was 
to maintain and accelerate this increase. Actually, What he 
meant was that the economy had expanded and he asked himself 
how this expansion could, be continued. His short answer was 
to increase the circulation of poople and money - labour and 
capital. Like so many of his contemporaries he argued from 
the economy of Holland. The Butch could borrow at home at 3 
per cent, and lend in England at six. Not only were they
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making on easy profit tut the interest paid was a loss to 
the nation, Just as the Jews were forbidden to lend to eadh 
other, so the Dutoh were wise to lend abroad. The low inter­
est at hone inoreased their turnover. Dutch sugar bakers 
could buy Barbados sugar in England and make a bigger profit 
than their opposite numbers in London because of their 
larger turnover. Further, since they oould normally get no 
more than 4 per cent, for their money, capitalists in Holland 
would work for small returns. The Shite herring industry, 
Which normally gave a return of 5 per cent., had fallen into 
their hands because they were prepared to work it, while 
Englishmen Who could get 6 per cent, on their money from 
usury, were not. Low interest would not only allow men to 
get the money to start or increase production, but would 
foroe man to work or buy land with their money. It would 
make sons follow their fathers and prevent the fathers retir­
ing, since they would find it more profitable to work than 
live on investments. *
Trade needs labour as well as capital, and to investigate 
the working population, Child turned his attention to the 
Poor Law. Trevelyan quotas Gregory King's estimate that 
nearly & million people occasionally received relief and 
points out that shame at receiving it was rare. The Eliza­
bethan Poor Law was not harshly administered. Child said
1. Discourse of Trario (1696),pp.168 ff. The original pamph­
let ox i66f), out of which his book grew, was very largely 
concerned with the subject of interest.
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that not one Justice in twenty would have a pauper whipped
back to his own parish, but the fact remained that each 
parish was resiJonsible for its own poor. Since every immi­
grant was a potential drain on the rates, no matter vfoat his 
contribution might be during his working life, parishes took 
security from newcomers and so discouraged the mobility of 
labour. That, said Ghild, was all very well before England
waB • a place of trade1 and needed hands. Not only workers
%
but paupers should be encouraged to settle, even it it meant 
an initial outlay, ffor the resort of the poor to a city or 
nation, well managed, is in effect a conflux of riches to 
that city or nation and therefore the subtle Dutch receive 
and relieve and employ all that come to thorn1. He discussed 
this good management. •He that gives to any in want1, he 
said, fdoes well, but he that gives to employ and educate the 
poor, so as to make them useful to the nation, in my judgment, 
does better1. He advooated unions of parishes with a cen­
tralised authority for the Poor Law, as in fact were set up 
in 1834. But this central authority was to be a chartered 
corporation, originally elected by the City of London but 
self-perpetuating. It was to have some such title as the 
•Fathers of the Poor* and each union of parishes was to have 
a similar body to administer the rate and set tho poor to work. 
He made a number of suggestions of activities to help the 
work, including a petty bank to encourage thrift and a scheme 
of assisted emigration to the colonies. There should be no
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religious test in order to secure as wide support as possible
and no patent should stand in the way of the poor working. 
These two suggestions are interesting. The bodies were not 
doing the work of government but were administering the 
fruits of Christian charity efficiently. All the government 
had to do was to prevent any vested interest interfering with 
tho work.1*
The subsequent history of tho Poor Lav; shov/s Childfs
shrewdness. He saw that pauperism must bo dealt with because
it was wasteful of manpower and that the system was rendering
labour immobile. It was not for another century, until the
accelerated development of industry made this obvious, that 
2
Adam Smith * was able to denounce the system with effect. It 
is interesting to compare the provisions of the Poor Law 
Amendiaent Act of 1834 with ChildTs notions and see the depths 
of the roots of nineteenth oentury action in seventeenth cen­
tury thought.
At the end of his life, Child practised vdiat he had 
preached, ne wrote in a latter of his 1pleasant but unprofit­
able country business1 and urged on the Company the buying of 
Halstead woollens, saying •two hundred pieces ... is a small 
proportion of 150,000 and a smaller encouragement to a cloth­
ing town of above a thousand families, so that I must still 
hope that the Company will take a greater proportion of them’.
1. Discourse of Trade (1696), pp.89 ff.
£• In the Introductory Discourse to The Wealth of Nations.
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And to the (Governor he wrote '... I was not well pleased 
with the slight return I had from the Committee of Shipping 
concerning their buying so small a proportion of Halstead 
goods1. It was a charity and interest in a place Where he 
had an estate, he added, that prompted him to write thus.^*
If the Poor Law was a brake on the flow of labour the 
Company was the stimulus to the flow of capital. The Com­
pany as Child knew it was also a Tudor institution and he 
examined about a hundred years1 experience of it. He recog­
nised that the formation of a regulated or Joint stock com­
pany was the obvious way to raise capital in the early days 
of foreign trade but he thou^t the time had come to re-exam­
ine the system. 'Limited companies', he concluded, 'are not 
enough to preserve and increase a trade'. He instanced the 
Russia and Greenland Companies, with firm charters established 
by Act of Parliament, Which had lost their trade. On the 
other hand, the Butch, with no Eastland Company, did ten 
times the trade that the English did with theirs. 'And for 
Italy, Spain and Portugal, Where we have no companies, we 
have yet full as much, if not more trade than the Butch' •
'In any part of Christendom', he concluded, where normal 
diplomatic relations were possible, trade can best be oanied 
on and increased 'Where all His Majesty's subjects have equaL 
freedom to trade'
1. MSS Rawl. A.303.
2* Bisoourse of Trade (1696), p.105.
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Where, however, merohants have to operate far from home 
where there existed no stable or unified government with 
which the English government could treat, companies were 
necessary# In trade with the East Indies and Africa, mer­
chants had to negotiate with whom they could and had to main­
tain agents with quasi-diplomatic functions. To defray this 
cost some levy was necessary and merohants needed a monopoly 
to compensate them for the expenses of the trade. They 
should therefore be incorporated - either as individual mer­
chants each paying a levy into a regulated company, or into 
a Joint stock company out of the capital of which the costs 
should be met. He favoured the latter, since regulated com­
panies tended to be exclusive and defended their exclusive­
ness by alleging the dangers that in their councils, the 
opinions of amateurs among the shareholders in a Joint stock 
company might outweigh the professional wisdom of merohants. 
Child answered this very typically: anyone with money in­
vested, he argued, would look after it to the best of his 
ability.'1'*
Child considered that the primary function of a company 
was political, but to fulfil that function it must raise 
money. Indeed, its secondary function was the raising of 
capital, or, looked at from the national point of view, sti­
mulating its flow. For this purpose he regarded the Joint 
stock organisation as the better. High 'fines* on admittance
1, Piscourse of Trade (1696), pp.109-112.
-48-
and exclusiveness would frustrate this purpose. lie urged 
again the following of the example of the Butoh. In their 
East India Company everyone with money to invest was admitted, 
'even Jews1.1* It was indeed the joint stock company that 
effected in this country the alliance between rentiers' 
capital and enterprise in foreign trade.
Since when he started writing Child was mainly concerned 
with shipping as a victualler, purveyor of dockyard stores and 
a managing owner, it is likely that his section on the Naviga- 
tion Acts would be interesting and authoritative. He again 
started with a discussion of the Butch system. They had no 
need of a navigation act, but he defended the English law.
Low interest, a high degree of capitalisation and full 
employment in Holland would soon take our 'navigation trade' 
off us if it was not protected. The cost of ship-building in 
this country was high. Flyboats of three hundred tons cost 
£1,300 to £1,400 in Baltic and Scandinavian countries and 
£2,200 to £2,400 in England.
He advocated keeping colonies 'in dependency upon their 
mother countries1, that is, restricting the colonial trade to 
English and colonial ships, and suggested the existing law 
should be extended to Ireland. He was prepared to agree that 
this was a hardship, but all colonial powers did the same and 
the protection of shipping was vital to England as an island. 
Some encouragement to shipping was essential for defence, and
1. Blsoourse of Trade (1696), p.105.
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protection was more efficient than a subsidy* Like all his 
contemporaries he regarded shipping primarily from the point 
of view of defence.1-
He was against the protection of wool. The acts Which 
still protected it were useless, in his view, and if they 
could be enforced, would be dangerous. He regarded English 
policy on wool as too rigid. The trade would flourish with­
out protection but with more variety in the industry. It 
was no good concentrating on the manufacture of 'strong, 
substantial (as we call it) Loyal cloth1, but the English 
should imitate the Butch who 'make the worst an well as the 
best of all manufactures that we may be in a capacity of 
serving all markets and all humours'. The enemies of the 
trade were high interest, lack of hands and religious intol­
erance. What the trade needed was not protection but free­
dom to manufacture what would sell, how, when and where the 
manufacturers would 'of any length except staples like Col­
chester Bays', Which should 'be allowed the honour of a 
public seal'.2*
Looking back on this book through Child's subsequent 
career, one approaohed the subject of colonies with parti­
cular interest. He viewed the economies of the mother coun­
try and the colonies as a unity, needing hands and stock. 
These must come in the first instance from the mother country.
Discourse of Trade (1696), pp.113 ff.
2. Ibid, pp.145 ff.
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It is oharaoteristio that he regarded population as the most 
important factor. It was thought, at this time of statis­
tical ignorance, that colonies depopulated the mother country. 
Child resorted to the Bills of Mortality and Captain Craunt’s 
Observations to refute this. Before the Plague there were 
more people in England than before the colonisation of America 
and the TCity of London repairs its population once in two 
years’, he argued. He said that what depopulated a country 
and so ruined its prosperity was religious intolerance. He 
instanced the expulsion of the Moors and Jews from Spain and 
pointed out that religious disturbance had driven many of the 
American colonists out of England in any case. The Pilgrim 
Fathers went first to Holland, for example, and would have 
stayed there but for the opportunity of settling in America. 
Of some American colonists Child had no great opinion. War, 
brawling and venereal disease would have taken a considerable 
number who had been saved for useful lives by the existence 
of the plantations.
In another section he enlarged upon this danger to popu­
lation and prosperity from religious intolerance. *A11 men 
are by nature alike, as I have before demonstrated and Mr. 
Hobbes has truly asserted, how erroneous soever he may be in 
other things. Fear is the cause of hatred and hatred of 
separation from, as well as evil deeds to, the parties and 
governments hated when opportunity offers’. Jews should be 
encouraged to settle in England as they were in Holland and
Italy. 1 Their subtlety and thrift1 were needed and they 
fwould remain with their fortunes1. Similarly* if the popu­
lation was to he kept at home* dissenters would have to he 
tolerated by law. In the oaso of Spain, Whioh had peopled a 
greater empire than the English, •contending for uniformity 
of religion hath contributed ten times more to the depopula­
tion than all the American plantations1.
However, the plantations, ’at first furnished and after­
wards successively supplied from their mother kingdom1, did 
take population and, people being riches, fthe loss of people 
to the mother kingdom, be It more or less, is certainly a 
damage except the employment of these people abroad do cause 
the employment of 30 many more at home; and that cannot be 
unless the trade is restrained1. If English products were not 
protected, the Dutch, because of their low interest and low 
customs, would undersell the English. 1 Before the Navigation 
Acts1, there were ten butch ships to the Barbados to one English,
The best customers for the English were the southern
colonies, whose products differed from those of England and
whore there was a large slave population to be fed and clothed.
New England, on the other hand, had similar products to the
mother country and the only ones needed at home were masts,
furs and ^rain oil. Furthermore, the New .England colonies had
a shipping industry and took the products of the Spanish
colonies to Europe without landing in England and paying duty
there.________________
1. Discourse of Trade (1696),p.140.
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This was What the Interlopers were to do in India at the
end of the century and in t*ese views of tf e unity of trade 
through shipping we can see a unit: between theory and prao- 
ties. Nor did Child separate the economic and political. He 
saw t^at at some time something would have to be done about 
Hew England - •some reformation In our correspondency of 
trade1 - and it v#ould re uire ’great tenderness’. He was to 
s^ow that ’tenderness’ in building Institutions in the commu­
nities in India, for he meant by tenderness not coddling but 
treatment as members of a community.^*
Finally, he concluded that the rivalry between European 
po’ ers in the colonial field lay not in sotting up colonies 
but in trading with them. While the Dutcv would reap the 
benefit of any colony whose trade was not protected, Dutch 
colonists could not injure the English, nor would t*oee of 
any other po*«r. Child did not regard the Dutch as very able 
colonists for they tended to rely on conquest and trade rather 
than on exploiting the total resources of a territory. Full 
employment, low interest and religious toleration would make 
men reluctant to leave Holland and, in fact, he cited adver­
tisements for English settlers for Curaeos and Tobago. He 
wrote rather superficially about the Dutch in the East Indies: 
’what they do in the East Indies being only by war, trade and
1* Davenant, who was writing at the end of the seventeenth 
century end who quoted Child with approval, west further 
and advocated meetings of deputies under a High Commis­
sioner, on the model of the Scottish Parliament.
the building or -fortified towns and o&stlea upon the sea coast 
to reaoiva the sole ec&aieroe of the land with the people which 
tbij timfrttarri not by clearing, breaking up the ground and 
planting us the Sjgliah have bone. Tha unglish, of course, had 
done nothing of the icj.no In the ^asi India* tut only la Amor- 
ieu. An we ah all see, too, while vhilu sought the develop the 
existing oomuerox&l resources of the iZigliuh factories, ha did 
nothing; to or eat a wealth by sue one of inoreusee production.** 
i.o can now understand bhild1 u oontrilatxon to the grout 
controversy of his ag* - the nature of a favourable balance of 
t r*-uo. Ills seat ion on this natter is in the nu turo of a sum* 
mi«£ up of his vie*e. The 2*oraaal conception of a favourable 
balance us a preponder&nea of exports over imports he regarded 
as a rough gaice, not wholly accurate, it is important to 
realise that Child was onl^ a limited free trader. Thera were 
Be free adaftS at phis time and ha accepted throughout his 
career the basic uasumptions ol mei-ouniiiiaa anu builienlsi*. 
Bu* ha realised that it was impossible to tell whether a par­
ticular policy wpb being carried out or not, or whether or ret 
there ^us a favourable balance of trade. The only figures
available ware the customs returns which were unreliable and
*
almost inoemprshensibla •*
There factors ani* his doctrine of all covet* all lose,
1. inc Biaqouras of Trade vld*6), pp.lVb-BwO.
g. gee fpo roTy Origins of Free Trade in W. Anhle\, Surveys,
; • issorlo'Mno ^oonoiiic. for a Alseaaaicn of Free Trade 
fleas' W  "this peri o#T
made him empirical in hie approach. fThe beet and mor*t cer­
tain discovery ... la to be wade from tva increase or diminu­
tion of our Pippin# and tradet for if our tr&de n^d shipping 
diminish vh at ever profit particular new may the nation
v7 '. * tedtyloactV regarded th* profit or Inna of parti­
cular trades as unimportant an* turned M s  attention to «n- 
gulrc fbos we may be sure to gat1* ^e repeated M s  previous 
rmc^etiona for increasing the number of people in production 
and dtstritmtion# bot* by doing m ?  with restrictions within 
the country and by attracting nronle in, by making naturali­
sation easy, a~d bv religions toleration, ^e repeated hie 
urgnments that investment should be encouraged and various 
brr>os on tvc circulation of money should be toTren off. A law 
should be p&need for allowing bills of debts to be transferred 
nd circulated as a hind of private currency, ^ovemraent 
could help by paying its debts end consulting merchants more. 
The export of raw wool should be prohibited end the export of 
manufactured wool encouraged. The plantation trade and the 
import of naval stores Should be crtirelv in gvtgllWIt Whips.
ifter these rather disconnected suggestions, he proposed 
tvree criteria for trades to be encouraged. Mrst in import­
ance were tvoce Which led to the export of manufactured goods; 
second, tM^c which brought In manufactured ^oods for improve­
ment, end finally those which furnished commodities for other 
trades, A way of encouraging these would be to pay back the 
full custom, instead of half, on re-exported goods.
His proposals all required actiow by government, whose
business it was Ho make trade eas„ and necessary1. aorohsrrte 
should do their part by making it in the interests 1 of other 
nuuxoii^ to trade with us? by selling cheaply ana trading 
honestly. The government should allow the import of foreign 
ru*. material* but prevent as fur as possible the iaport of 
muauf&cfcured goods. *Jhnt he wee really saying oob that the 
welfare of the community required work and the export of the 
fruit* of what work utl government should see that conditions 
favourable to that should prevail. It is clear that he 
regarded the free flow of labour and capital within the coun­
try us being important to tlo export trade eoid only in that 
Wi*y us beneficial to the oomiuniby. He did no« regard heme 
ooiojusjption as of ory benefit at all.
it was, perhaps, natural, In an age when tr^do sioant by 
and large the sale of costly goods to the few rather than 
cheap goods to the many, that the hone market s* ould be 
neglected and that economic policy should bo conceived in 
terras of power. It took a far greater population, ard mass 
production, to reveal the benefits of circulating money with­
in the community. iJvcm the early exponents of laisees fair*
took op their position because of the ’national* advantage*
-
of free *;rode.
He did not ooanit hiiaself oa the nature of wealth. 
Although he final: believed that prosperity was bound up with
1. yrsauurso of Trade (1636), pp.lok-173*
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export ing goods, he nevertheless insisted on the importance 
of the colonial and Asian trades and they were both detri­
mental from the bullionist point of view, The Asian trade 
was dependent on the export of precious metals,since India 
and the East Indies had no use for English goods and the 
colonies were prohibited from exporting except to the mother 
country and so could earn no foreign currency at all. But 
his insistence on the . Importance of England as an entrepot 
as an excuse for importing, would argue a belief in a cash 
balanoe as a sign of a favourable balance of trade.
The subject of the export of bullion was befogged in 
the political situation at the end of the seventeenth century 
The wars and rumours of wars made responsible statesmen 
anxious to be £ible to defray the costs of on army and navy. 
The principal item of government expenditure was the armed 
forces, and it had to be met in cash. At the bacJc of men’s 
minds there wa3 always a fear of a lack of money. Davenant 
justified his contention that ’trade is, in its nature, free, 
and finds its own channel and best directs its own course’ by 
pointing out that the export of bullion had not prevented this 
country from fighting the Butch War or the War of the League 
of Augsburg, and that foreign trade built up shipping which 
enabled us to fight at sea. He saw the point of the bullion­
ist case. ’The scarcity of money in a long war makes any
export of bullion thought a great griovanoe of which in a^iet 
times we should not be sensible
tV^BargnantY -Pi'gcourge un fubllc x in Works—
(ed.1775), IT75T7 ------------ ------  -----
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But party politics also entered into the question* 
Davenant, looking bade twenty years, recalled that fthis over­
balance mas made use of maliciously by some who had a mind to 
disturb and defame the government9*1* The Country Party, 
emerging at a time Vhen the alliance of Charles II and Louis 
XIV seemed to endanger liberty, was antagonistic to France* 
Manufacturers, with whom the leaders of the Country Party had 
strong connections, wen concerned with Colbert*£ almost pro­
hibitive tariff against English goods, put on in 1667* By 
about 1673 the disadvantages of trade with France provided a 
strong argument and the Country Party was able to play upon 
the fear of overbalance.
The King, on the other hand, having received Tonnage 
and Poundage for life, saw in the customs a source of non- 
Porllamentary income and continued trade with France was in 
his interest. The Tory Party had therefore to Justify 9 over* 
balance9 or belittle its effects*
In 1678 the Whig Party carried their point and the im­
port of French goods was prohibited* This Act was not 
repealed until the accession of James II brought a Parliament 
predominately Tory, and a system of high, but not prohibitive,
p
duties m s  substituted for a complete ban* ’ In the interval 
between 1678 and 1685 the East India Company had become a
1* Davenant, Discourse of Public Bcvnnue and Trade in Storks 
II, 148*
8* For this aspect of the political background to economic 
theory see 6*H. Clarke, The Dutch Alliance and the ar 
affiteHrt Frenoh Ti;&dq.
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Tory corporation and its political opponents and commercial 
rivals revived some arguments against it that had teen used 
against the Frenoh trade*
Child then reiterated his arguments and answered 
specific points as the spokesman of the Company. Xt is 
interesting to notice that suoh of Child's polemical 
writing is a restatement of his original theses.
The East India Company was subjected to two waves of 
attack. The first in about 1680 drew Child's Treatise Con­
cerning the 3a~t India Trade in 1601, a re-isnue of The 
Discourse of Trade and a pamphlet by him, signed 'FhitopatriW 
and entitled 4
aasL. India Trade is the most Rational of all Foreign Trades* 
This attaok probably arose from a decline is the prosperity 
of English manufacturers from the war-time boom conditions on 
the conclusion of peace between Franco and Holland. Manu­
facturers of woollen goods soon found allies among bulliontota 
Who were anxious to blame any foreign trading company Which 
exported precious metals and among Whigs Who were anxious to 
attaok the royal prerogative. It is probable that the agita­
tion was also against the Turkey Company, but that body
adrlotly joined the hunters to avoid being hunted.1,
2
In Parliament, Henry Follexfen, 'a Whig, opened an 
attaok on three grounds. First, the navigation to India was
1. See Soott. The Constitution and Finance of Joint Stock 
Coav&nlcg to'Tyg^s p ^ - f e g :  f g m ' H s ^ s ^ n T g n E h T s  
attaok.
£- =“« 1IW  W^lo-ary „f Tl.tlom q
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safe and no longer a new discovery. Since it m a  no longer 
a new discovery it no longer justified a monopoly. Secondly, 
the Company exported bullion. Thirdly,it was a monopoly and 
therefore evil. This speech was very typical of the Whole 
campaign, in its allianoc of politioal and economic theory 
and its emotional appeal in a commercial debate. An attack 
on a monopoly in 1681 was as sure of a response as an attaok 
on means testa today* Gthex speakers in the debate accused 
the Company of 'spoiling' the Italian and Flanders trades by 
importing cheaper Indian silks and calico and it was alleged 
that by importing raw silk it would put the Turkey Company 
out of business and so prevent the export of English cloth 
which that Company carried on.1*
The issue broadened in end out of Parliament. very 
facet of the Company came under scrutiny and every activity 
was attacked. In the battle of rival pressure groups - the 
Turkey Company, the importers of Flemish and Italian textiles 
and English wool manufacturers against the Company - many old 
battles were re-fought, and the very wildness and variety of 
the charges compelled a discussion of every aspect of English 
trade. For example, the Turkey Company attacked the Joint 
stock organisation in the name of free trade and the estab­
lishment of English craftsmen in India in the name of protec­
tion in the same pamphlet and wound up by alleging that the 
East India Company was not exploiting its Charter territory
1. This debate is recorded in a Collection of Papers relating 
to the East India Trade in 1.0.' Tract So.gfin.
to the full.3-*
In this controversy Child was forced to commit himself 
on tha subject of bullion. Silver end gold, ha now daoided, 
were commodities and could 'in many oases be exported with 
as much national advantage as any other commodity ... Ho 
nation was or will be considerable in trade that prohibits 
tha export of bulliorf.8*
But the controversy is chiefly interesting because it 
led to an examination of the Joint stock organisation* Child 
very quickly dealt with the fundamental grievance of the 
opponents of the Company - that it was a business rival. 
Naturally companies competed, he said, but businessmen can­
not be the best Judges of national advantage. He did not 
claim that the Bast Indian was the only beneficial trade but 
urged that each trade should be Judged by the criterion of 
whether or not it was ’national' - ’as it relates to the 
profit or loss of the kingdom’.3*
On this issue he was defending the Bast India Company 
against the Turkey Company - a Joint Stock against a Qegu- 
lated Company. There was no question of the value of a com­
pany as such. The political reasons were taken for granted 
and he had to argue on financial grounds on a matter of 
organisation. A Joint stock was governed by a'mixed assembly 
of noblemen, gentlemen and merohants because the capital cams
(1681),pp.1-3.fur _£gn 
sc Concerning the Sast ,
from many sources, whereas a regulated company was a partner­
ship of merchants. The strength and value of the Joint stock 
organisation really lay in its association of capital and 
enterprise, since investors need not take any active part in 
the administration of the company.1* On the other hand, the 
Turkey Company required its members to be legitimate merchants 
and oiti^ens of .uondon who were actively engaged in the trade. 
The cost of the political functions of the Company wore met 
out of ’fines1 or subscriptions paid by the members, over 
whose business activities the company exorcised no Jurisdiction.
The Turkey Company had also ciuimed that the Sast India 
Company had too little capital to carry on its trade in the 
great area of its charter and that it had too few shareholders 
who wore, in any case, not experienced merchants. They 
argued that the small number and the inexperience .of the 
shareholders in a stock that had lasted twenty-four years 
gave too much power to a cabal. This was true, and the domi­
nation of this group depended on the constitution of the Com­
pany with voting power cased on the &Xzo of holdings and with
a financial qualification for a seat on the Court of Commit­
tees, in their second point the Turkey Company had struck at 
the basis of Child’s power and influence.
He conceded that the small number of shareholders was a 
valid criticism and suggested that, while as a matter of prin­
ciple the shareholders could do what they liked with their
own, the time was ripe to issue more scrip.
1. Scott, Constitution, etc., p.145.
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In fact steps had “been taken in 1676 to bring this about.
The stock then stood at 280 and it was thought that a new 
issue might help to secure a Parliamentary charter and 
strengthen the monopoly. In that year, in ord3r to bo fair 
to existing shareholders who had only paid up 50 por cent*, a 
bonus issue of 50 percent* was made. The new issue v;ould not 
hare terminated the original stock of 1657 bub would have 
allowed more people in. However, this issue was delayed, 
presumably while the Company waited for the political situa­
tion to become more clear, and beforo it was made thero arose 
a conflict within the Court of Committees and the question 
was shelved in 1681. Child, who was then Governor, and a 
majority of the directors, were moving towards the Tory camp, 
at a time when political opinion was hardening, since it was 
coiisidored the best form of insurance for the monopoly. A 
minority of the directors, Whig in sympathy, led by Papillon, 
the Deputy Governor, sold out. That there was no fundamental 
difference on economic policy is shown by a book, either 
written by Papillon or issued with his blessing in 1679, called 
The Hast India Trade being a Host profitable Trade* The 
writer agreed with Child both in his attitude to the joint 
stock organisation and his favourable estimate of the Companyh 
prosperity and benefit to the kingdom. He could see no 
alternative that would keep Indian prices down, preserve the 
Company1 s position against the Dutch, and maintain it in face 
of the divided political power in India*
1. See e.g. The East India Trade, etc*, pp.4,5,6,9,11.
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In fact the conflict was political. Hot only did Child 
and Papillon agree on organisation, hut also on the matter 
of the monopoly. It seems that the breach occurred in the 
course of a debate in the Court of Committees on a petition 
to the King for a proclamation against the Interlopers# 
Papillon submitted an additional clause to this petition, 
signifying the Companyfs willingness *to put a conclusion to 
the present stock and in the meantime lay open a book of sub­
scriptions for all that will adventure in a new one*# Childfs 
comment on this was fthis clause is brou^it in to do a mis- 
ohief*.1.
It was indeed. Undoubtedly Papillon was prepared to 
protect the monopoly, While the stock lasted, by any means 
that came to hand. The stock would have to last another three 
years in any case, since that period of notice was necessary 
by law. He was not prepared, however, to see the Crown per­
manently strengthened by the support of a wealthy corporation 
and a new stock was the only way to change the direction of 
the Company.
It was at this point that Child started again, on behalf 
of his fellow Committees, the annual present of 10,000 guineas 
to the King, and this provides some juBtification for
o
Papillonfs suspicions.
In view of the contemporary political strife in the City,
1# A.F.W. Papillon, Thomas Papillon. pp#82,83.
2. Ct.Bk.33. p.161.
-64-
it appears that Child1 s writing at this time has two aspects. 
First there was a defence of the actions of the East India 
Company in detail and at large on ffree trade1 principles, 
Which was reasonable, agreed by his fellow directors and con­
sistent with his theories. There was also a certain amount 
of hedging on the subject of the stock. He was prepared to 
extend it in return for a Parliamentary charter, provided 
that the extension did not interfere with the directorate or 
with the political power of the Company. That is to say, he 
would issue more of the Corapanyfs shares to be bought on the 
market; he would not wind up the stock and allow a new one to 
be created. And he would only issue more shares in exchange 
for a Parliamentary charter. In fact no shares were issued.3** 
It was unlikely that this concession would produce a 
Parliamentary charter, and in any case, Parliament did not 
meet from 1681 to 1685. Since Parliament was the main instru­
ment of the Whigs, their pov;er was nullified during the per­
sonal rule of Charles II and the controversy died down. The 
Company used the time to proceed against the Interlopers in 
©astern seas and against the Moghul Emperor in India. Unfor­
tunately for the Company, their defeat at the hands of the 
Moghul coincided with the fall of James II.
With the Whig victory the controversy re-opened with 
increased bitterness on the part of the Turkey Company, due to 
the increased import of raw silk by the East India Company
1. See, for example, The discourse on Trade (Qspeolallr the 
East India Trade (1681) and Treatise Concerning the East
IMla Trade (1681).
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sinoe about 1680. Raw silk accounted for about three quar­
ters of the Turkey Company1s imports and its alliance with 
the enemies of the East India Company became real. Previously 
it had probably Joined in the hue and cry to avoid being
hunted.
The Levant Company was, by about 1696, suffering not 
only from the capture of the silk trade by its rivals, but 
from the consequences of the theories of its allies. In 1693 
the obligation had been placed upon the East India Company, 
in its new charter, of exporting English goods to the value 
of £100,000 annually. This meant the Company had to buy more 
cloth than it had a possible market for in India and there­
fore transported a great part to Persia, Where they again 
«
came into competition with the Turkey Company, Whose factors 
usually supplied that part of the world with draperies.
There was considerable rivalry for the trade of the caravan 
routes which was the obvious vent for woollen goods.1*
The political attack on the Company still went on and 
was envenomed by its association with the fallen dynasty and 
a certain ruthlessness during its period of immunity. The 
use of martial law, the treatment of the Interlopers, the
1. This situation is reflected in a number of works of the 
nineties. See especially Reasons for Passing a Bill For­
bidding the Home ConsumptTon of Ir'l'lan SlI^ Ti^ i'W. pp. ' 
Iff,'19. and T.S., fee Profit and~ljoi¥Jof the East India
Trade (1700), p.lff+r Letter to a friend (l6$£).pp.£,7.ff. 
See Wood, TIistor:/ of the Levant Company, pp. 102,103,115,
for the Levant Company’s situation.
domination of Child and his associates and the insufficiency 
of its stock all came under attaok. Child replied to these 
points in 1691 in the Answer to Ail Material Objections, a 
pamphlet which is almost entirely a vindication of himself.
It deals with large holdings, with the treatment of the 
Interlopers and the St. Helena rebels and contains an assur­
ance •on the word of honest men1 that the Company had suffi­
cient capital for its undertakings. His justification of the 
Company*s policy was the practice of the Dutch: ‘Where the 
Company have executed one man the wiser Dutch executed many 
hundreds1. Similarly, the Dutch allowed large holdings and 
had single shareholders holding more stock than any one man 
in the English Company.
During this decade Child issued an abstract of the pass­
ages of the Discourse of Trade Which dealt with East India 
affairs with some new matter on, for example, martial law, 
called A Discourse of Trade (Especially the East India Trade). 
His original Discourse of Trade and Papillon*s East India 
Trade a Most Profitable grade were reprinted. However, 
Macaulay is probably right when he said that during the nego­
tiations for the new charter and the floating of the new com­
pany, the weapon of the old company was bribery rather than 
argument. The old company had the better case but was in a 
reactionary and privileged position which robbed its spokesmen
Answer, etc. (1691), pp.1-4.
For the political attaok on the Company see Reasons Against
Grafting and Splicing (1690), pp.5,6.
of the initiative in putting it. The real issue was Who 
should have the monopoly. Those Who wished to take it from 
the Company had to argue against monopoly in general and 
defend an obsolete oommeroial organisation, the regulated .
The weakness of*the position of the Companyfs opponents
is seen in two instances. The real object of attaok was the
2.joint stock of 1657, and so muoh of the argument was against 
joint stook in general. Yet the Interlopers were organised 
on a joint stook basis, every voyage being a separate stook 
as had been the oase with the Company in its early days. And 
the new Company, when it was formed, was made a regulated 
company in deference to the professed views of its supporters. 
Permission was, however, given for members to form joint 
stocks within it and for joint stocks to join as corporate 
bodies. In fact, all the trade which the new Company did 
was done by joint stocks.
This struggle of pressure groups, however, made men 
think again about the economic principles that they held and 
Davenant, in summing up the controversy, lifted economic 
writing out of the rut of polemic. He was an admirer of 
Child, but his approach was more academic since he had no 
practical experience of trade. He was, however, Commissioner
1. Child deals with some of the current arguments against
Joint stock organisation in Treatise Concerning the last 
India Trade, pp.21.23.
2, The writerof A Brief Abstract of Creat Oppressions and 
Injustices (168$}", admits this, p.4.
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of the Exoise and later Inspector General. What statistics
on commerce there were at thi3 time were at his command and 
therefore his views are relevant to a Judgment of Child’s work.
In 1698 Davenant wrote of the East India Company that 
after it had flourished for thirty years, fnot long since, 
either because their charter had its foundations only in the 
regal power or fear of hindering home production or of export­
ing bullion1 and perhaps ,some ill government in their 
affairs, this trade has been looked on with an evil eye by 
some people1. He went on, ffew great things being able to 
bear a narrow search, subsisting more by fame and credit than 
by real strength, their weak parts were presently discerned, 
till at last the validity of their charter came to be called 
in question; upon Which the interlopers, presuming, gave them 
disturbance both at home and in India’. That is a good sum­
mary of the preceding twenty years. Davenant discussed most 
of the points raised in the controversy but said little new. 
He did not question the theory of the balance of trade, but 
claimed that the East India Company, by exporting bullion, - 
had not produced an adverse balance. Had it done so, he said, 
this country could not have survived the French wars without 
becoming bankrupt,-**•
He believed that the popular support for the opponent© 
of the Company, which, incidentally, was not to translate
1. Davenant^ Discourse on Public Revenue and Trade, Works
itself into any great share capital for the General Society,1* 
was largely due to a quirk of human nature which makes men 
•unwilling to be restrained from the exercise of any power 
they are certain never to make use of1. He saw that the 
forts and territorial possessions were an integral part of 
the trade and that the value of the trade could not be judged 
by contemporary needs and performances, The forts were not 
only a protection against Indians and European rivals but 
were an insurance against the Company being ousted in the 
civil war that would undoubtedly break out on the death of
g
Aurungzeb, and the forts were the property of the Old Company. *
He stressed the need of a long term policy. The pepper 
trade, for example, was not important in itself. What was 
important was to prevent a Dutch monopoly in pepper. Simi­
larly, he urged a long term policy to diminish the export of 
bullion, about which, despite his •liberal* views on the 
balance of trade, he was not altogether happy. He pointed 
out that the Dutch had shown that it could be lessened by 
building up the ooastal trade in Asia, but that this would 
mean a smaller profit for the Company.
To Davenant the essential thing for the trade was a sure 
foundation for the future which the joint stock of 1657 could 
provide. The towns belonged to the old Company and it had 
built up a coastal connection. Any new company would have to
1. C/imbrid^e History of India, V, 98.
2. Davenant, Discourse on Public Revenue and Trade. Works.
II, 130 ff.
-70-
take over the assets of the old or build Its foundations 
afresh***
Reading bavenant’s comments on the situation, we can see 
the rightness of Child1 s position and his policy, and that as 
a writer he was more than the spokesman of a particular 
interest* The rearguard action that Child fought for the 
existence of the Company was really a struggle for continuity* 
The Joint stock created in 1657 had driven the trade success­
fully for the first time and had adapted Itself to changing 
needs* If the trade was ’national1, bringing wealth to the 
nation, then its assets should not be dissipated. Not only 
was a Joint stock essential to maintain these assets, finan­
cially, but the particular stock must endure for political 
reasons*
It remains to assess the value of Child’s work as an 
economic writer* Like all writers on all subjects he was 
bound both by the circumstances of his time and the tradi­
tions of his subject. It is doubtful Whether Child and his 
contemporaries could be called economists at all. Those 
writers who dealt with What may be called, in a kind of con­
venient shorthand, economic matters, were really putting 
forward a few disconnected ideas on trade and politics.
In the seventeenth century trade was largely concerned 
with luxuries. Production of necessities was, broadly speak-
1. Bavenant, Piaoourae on rufrUo Revenue and Irade, Worfcft. 
II, 141 tt.
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ing, a local affair and necessities tended to last. A family 
might keep an iron Settle for a lifetime and have it repaired 
on occasion by a tinker. H.G. Wells records that at the end 
of the nineteenth century ho did not remember a piece of new 
furniture in his parents1 home. Lack of population and pur­
chasing power therefore called for large profits to be taken 
from a few customers. This explains the medieval fear of 
production which was largely thought of as being for export. 
Importing was frowned on In the seventeenth century.
The ship-building industry affords an interesting example 
of this attitude of mind. The Import of raw materials was 
often necessary and throughout this period of the encourage­
ment of English ship-building, timber and other stores wero 
regularly brought in from Baltic countries. The import of 
ships, however, which would have saved freight and tonnage, 
was strictly discouraged. The political wisdom of this was 
proved by 5tnglandfs maritime success, but from a strictly 
economic point of view it was bad business. A modem 
economist might say that this system was good because it 
created employment and therefore purchasing power, but the 
seventeenth century motive was really political.
Child did not emancipate himself from the contradiction 
of pursuing an economic policy for a political reason and his 
work is most interesting When he advocates means to the con­
ventional mercantilist end. Merchants could give the state
1. K.Keokscher, Mercantilism, II, 127.
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power by pursuing National1 trades andt to do this, they 
required a free flow of money and labour. This insistence 
on a free flow has given him the reputation of being a modi­
fied and premature free-trader. In fact, this insistence 
was the fruit of reflection upon the out-of-date restrictions 
of the administrative system of the collapsed medieval social 
order. lor example, the administrative Unit of the Poor Law 
was the parish, which was natural before England Tbecame a 
place of trade1; and the regulated company was the develop­
ment of the medieval partnership of ’legitimate1 merchants 
Jealously guarding their ’mystery’.
He was as far from the laissez-faire attitude to the 
state as he was from that attitude to foreign trade. The 
state hud a vital part to plsy - to ’make trade easy and 
necessary1. But perhaps he did glimpse a nev* facet of the 
individual’s social environment. He gave a place in economic 
thought to the contemporary statistical interest in popula­
tion. lie was interested theoretically in people as members 
of a labour force and in practice in India as operators of 
an entrepot. From this interest there may have emerged some 
notion of the individual, not only as a member of a state, 
but as a member of a community. Another aspect of this was 
his insistence on religious and racial toleration. The Dutch 
had bencfitted from this principle and Child saw the read­
mission of the Jews into England and the results of the Test 
and Corporation Acts, Ho hod lived through a period of
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religious strife and was to see the results of the French 
policy of religious discrimination culminating in the Revo­
cation of the Edict of Uantos. Since toleration was a means 
of building up population of workers and capitalists, it 
follows that the community Which Child envisaged was one of 
economic men. He nowhere stated this explicitly in his work; 
hut ho did express, in this connection, a certain guarded 
approval of Hobbes’ views and this conception of man in the 
community wus certainly the logical outoome of the breakdown 
of the medieval homogeneous towns during the next two oenturiea
I have found no proof of any direct influence on any 
other economic writer except Davenant; but some indication of 
his importance can perhaps be got from the fact that The 
Discourse of Trade was reprinted four times during his life, 
fho printing of 1668 was a new enlarged edition from the 
short pamphlet published in 1665. It was translated into 
French in 1754 and a new edition was brought out in 1775. He 
appears to have been sufficiently read for writers of econo­
mic history text books to have adopted his word ’regulated* 
to describe companies other than those in joint stock.
It can be argued that Child occupied a place in the 
transition from mercantilism to free trade. But it must be 
realised that this transition scarcely existed. Both theories 
had a common first premise - that economic policy should be
1. The term for a regulated company was simply *a company*
and a joint stock company was a special kind of company.
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a policy of power and that the state and the merchants were 
partners. Neither Child nor Davenant would even go so far 
as Hume and pray for the good estate of the economy of their 
neighbours; but Davenant held that trade found its own level 
and Child held that the factors of production should be 
mobile within the borders of the state. They did not follow 
their arguments to the conclusion. The criteria itfhieh Child 
proposed to Judge whether the balance of trade ?ms favour­
able or not would lead logically to HunieT>a dictum that money, 
like water, finds its own level. He did not follow his argu­
ment to its logical conclusion because, probably, one tends 
to accept the premises of ore's own time and even of one's 
opponents in argument. He v/as, too, obsessed with the exam­
ple of Holland, and oould not see, as Hume could, that her 
early economic predominance had not by itself maintained her 
political power against powerful neighbours once th©2r too 
embarked on a policy of commercial expansion*
In fact Hume, in his Sssay on Jealouey in Trade>^ * said 
that the only commercial states that ought to dread the 
improvements and industry of their neighbours were such as 
the Dutch, 'who ... flourish as only being brokers and fac­
tors and carriers of others1. The seventeenth century* 
suecoS3 of the Dutch cast a glamour over Child and his con­
temporaries* They did not see that, for tho Dutch, theirs 
was the only policy of survival. And in any caso, as far
1* Hume, ias3ays, Literary, tloral and Political (Routledge), 
p.197. v
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as Child was oonoemod, his business was broking and carry­
ing and therefore he sought to understand and emulate the 
Dutch political economy.
His Taluo really lies in his being a gifted exponent 
of the seventeenth century point of view. He tried to 
explain the success of the Dutch and did not quite succeed. 
But ho applied the lessons which he learned in observing 
Dutch practice to iSnglish conditions, and he did that very 
shrewdly# When ho said that government should make trade 
feasy and necessary1t he was advocating the some integration 
of the merchant community into tho fabric of the state that 
existed in Holland. Perhaps it vms the real contribution of 
the mercantalists that they brought this about, not as 
economic theorists, but as practical men who worked not so 
much from statistics as from watching ships in the dooks and 
talking to each other about trade. Child named his chief 
book very aptly - it was a discourse of trade.
4
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CHILD AHD SHIPPING 
Since the importance of shipping and the interdependence 
of shipowners and the Company has been frequently mentioned 
in this thesis, it is relevant to assemble what material 
there is for a history of the Company’s shipping concerns at 
this period. Muoh of it consists of inference from circum­
stantial evidence, hut the attempt is worth making since the 
business of all East India Companies v;as really carriage. 
There was little rise in the production of India as a result 
of tho activities of European trading companies, and their 
real object wan to attract the coastwise and export trade of 
Asia to their ships.1*
Carre had it on the authority of one of the Company’s 
commanders that ’as all their principal wealth is drawn from 
this great sea trade, there are several directors and men 
interested in the East India and Levant Companies who ovm 
private ships and have them on half shares with the captains 
of these vessels or the heads of places where they trade* 
They succeed wonderfully in their business and so muoh both 
England and the trade of the two companies (benefit) as it is 
all done in their name1. Carre added that one of the ten 
ships he was discussing belonged to the Company.
This was the London or London Merchant, which had been
1. V. .JiOriand, ffrom Akbar to Ayungaeb* pp*81,86.
2. Carre, Travels (e&.ffawocttT,PpTffi7.679»634. But see A.C.
wood, History of the Levant Comp an:/, p. 210. According to 
this work, although ships were frequently re-employed, 
there is no sign of shilling ring and interested parties 
were not allowed to vote on the taking up of ships, in
the Levant Company.
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commissioned with tho Heturn in 1667. In 1669 the George had
been purchased and in the same year the Company made a con­
tract with Mr. Johnson * to build a ship for them to hire. He
received an advance of 2500 and a further contract was made
2.lor ’the sheathing arid whatever else was necessary1.
There are indications that those transactions were to 
oblige owners. The great obstacle that shippers hud to sur­
mount was the actual building of the ship. The expanding 
economy and the protection of the Navigation Acts would give 
him a return once the ship was built. Childt it will be 
remembered, considered Navigation Acts necessary in England 
but not in JIollnn&, because there interest was low. In his 
first work he pointed out that in England the rate of inter­
est on the money borrowed to lay the keel of a ship might be 
6 per cent., while the return on normal shipping business 
was 12 per oent.c#
The transaction with Johnson is also probably indicative 
of the nature of the shipping shortage. There is no recorded 
bargain about the use of the ship. Presumably she was to be 
used exclusively by the Company until the debt was paid. It 
would appear that either the Company was a source of credit 
or that in could rely on Johnson finding no other employment
1. This was Henry Johnson, later Sir Henry and a Committee of
the Company.
Qal.Ct.Mins..1668-70. pp.v,161,21G.
3. 5.:::. F .y lo, Short History of the florid Ship £iy; Indus tryjxEfl. 
Child, Brief Ob e e rvations conceml'ng Trade"and lnterest
on Money, 'and' 'biscourse on ffrade (lb9b), ppVll'g ff.
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eo profitable for bis ghip. It is unlUcely that the Company 
would just oblige Johnson with no thought of its own advan­
tage so it would Boom that the trade at this time m e  held ty? 
for lack of suitable ships, the only profitable employment 
for which was the Sast India trade. With an increasing num­
ber of ships, the trade oould expand and appear profitable to 
other shipowners. So the Company alternated between com- 
poting for ships and preventing ships which it oould not em­
ploy being used by merchants Who wished to enter the trade.
The transaction was also, perhaps, symptomatic of the 
period of transition that the shipping Industry had reaohed. 
In t^o Middle -Ages merchants had owned ships and used them 
for the delivery of their own goods; in tho modern world the 
industry is a service, providing carriage in exchange for 
payment. Bearing in mind that the structure of the industry 
was in a state of flux at tho end of the seventeenth century 
may help to explain the relationship between the shipowners 
and the Company. By contact with a single and complex mer­
chant like the East India Company the shipowner gained free­
dom of action, a source of credit and a steady customer. The 
Company' gained a supply of chipping on convenient terms.
The difficulties which faced a shipowner are very well 
set out in the Parers of Thomas Bowry. In 1704 Bowry, with 
six associates, projected the building of the liary Galley. 
Tho ship was to bo valued at 13,000 and the cargo at another 
13,wQ* for she was a permission ship. £aoh of the six was
to deposit 25 per sent, of his s*>are in Bank of Borland 
arid deliver fsuch notes to Bowry for the use of the intended 
voyage1. Bowry was credited with £3,0UQ on condition he 
provided the ship at hia own charge* £5 per cent* of the six 
subscriptions yielded £756, which Bowry used for laying the 
keel* The cost of this was £732*5*0* and a piece of plate 
worth £30* in 1704 and 1705 he borrowed a total of £025 on 
bottomry and by 1706 had collected a total of £1,6&0 from his 
partners* Ihese two sums would just about meet the bills of 
££,646*9*10* incurred in building and fitting the ship* Cargo 
oaid Hcono©© cam© to £1,106, of which £206*13*4. was a per­
centage due to Bowry for managing the voyage* The cargo was 
worth £900 and presumably Bowry found that, in addition to 
£215*1.6* insurance premium on the outward voyage* No member 
paid his share in full*
Joseph folson was a shareholder who sailed as Captain*
He paid up under half hie share of one-sixth, payiiig £410 out 
of £1,000, and he assigned half his perquisite of 4 per cent* 
of the gross sale of the homeward cargo for £15o* It is not 
apparent where Bowry got his £900 from and the *£iole transac­
tion shows the difficulties that beset shipowners. Converse­
ly , it shows the possibility of profit. 2 per cent* of the 
gross sale of the cargo was valued at £150 and this would be 
a conservative estimate sine© it was a security for a loan*
It was in fact estimated that an outlay of £4,052 would yield 
a gross return of £7,500* fhese hopes were, however, dis~
**0 0 —
appointed, for the Mary was taken by pirates on her first
voyage and was presumably a dead loss except for the £1,250 
for which she was insured.^*
From other sources wo can gain some insight into the 
wording of shipping finances. We got some glimpses, for 
example, from the ledgers of Blackwell1 s, a firm of gold-
2.omith3 who operated a bank until the stop of the Exchequer* 
In 1664 the owners of the Ivoyal Charles had an account there 
^nd fo art eon of them deposited ££f5GG in amounts of £100 and 
££00, The captain does not appear to have contributed and it 
can bo assumed that £1UC represented 1/32 share and that he 
was credited with seven of those. He had enough, as we can 
see from Bowry1 $ papers, to fit up his ship. Prom the 
account of the owners of tho Catharine in the some year, we 
can got some idea of the percentage profit, for two owners 
had paid into the bank their dividends, which amounted to 
£37,10*0, each. Bven assuming that tho voyage lasted two 
years, this was a fair profit on a hundred pounds, repre­
senting 18$ per cent, per annum.
Confirmation that £1QG was the usual cost of 1/32 share 
can ba found in the will of Samuel Moyer, proved in 1682, in 
Whioh he left to his son a number of shares, including ’1/32 
of a ship now building for Captain Dyke in Sir Koxiry Johnaorite 
dock for which £1UG has already been paid1. Moyer incident­
1
2
TV. Papers of Rosass Bowg (Haokluyt Sooiety),pp.l85,
130 ffT 150-157, 195 ff.
Now in the possession of Glyn Mills Bank*
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ally disposed of shares in three other ships in the service 
of the East India Company.1*
A shareholder's income from the ship ease in part from 
freight, and in examining the fluctuations in the rate we 
can see some more of shipping finance and something of the
relations between the Company and the shipowners. It must be
borne in mind that there was a national shipping shortage at 
the Hestorutlon vi/hich the navigation Act did not remedy, fen 
years later the government had been forced to pass an act, 
laying it dovm that no foreign built ship* even if navigated 
in accordance with the uot of 1660* should enjoy the privi­
leges of lifciglish -And Irish ships, and encouraging tho build­
ing of throe and two arid a half deoAod ships* mounting thirty 
cannon* by giving a rebate of 1/10 of the customs on the
first two voyages of such vessels, as we have seen* the Com­
pany also gave a bonus of EG/- a ton on the first two voyages 
of three -doomed ships from 1668 until 1662, The end of the 
Dutch War in 1674 released ships from the Havy and reduced 
the hazards of trade, and the beginning of interloping had 
shown that the real shortage of ships was over* but the bonus 
was probably maintained because of the increased trade of the 
Company, Apparently during the eighties there were enough 
ships because it was not until the French War that the Com­
pany again gave a bonus* this time on all voyages of the three- 
deckod ships.2*
1. Quoted "in Creori and'digram, Chronicles of tflacteeli. p.l6T 
Moyor hud boon a Committee ox the Compaiiy.
2. F.C. Danvers, Introduction to The jlarine Keoords. pp,lx,x*xl«
<*8
The fluctuations in the rate on tonnage reflect these 
conditions. Three sets of figures ?;ill illustrate this, in 
1674 the rate was £18# 10. on gross goods and £81.10, for 
fin© goods with the bonus* where applicable, in addition; in 
1680, when there was no bonus, the rates were £17 and ££0, 
and in 1693 the Company paid up to £33 on both categories# 
in addition to payment for carriage, the company also paid 
demurrage, payment for remaining in Asian waters over four 
months, and this varied between £11# 10, a day at the bog in­
ning of the period and £1£#2#6# at the end#
Certainly the bills paid by the Company rose consider­
ably during this period# Between 1688 und 1684 the highest 
bill paid was £4,000; in 1690 the highest was £9,000# The 
journals preserved in the Marine Hecords show that to earn 
thoao sums the ships wore a way from j&ngland about twenty- 
ttoeo months#1**
This being so it is obvious that freight was not the 
only source of profit for the owners, £4,000 would not cover 
the wages at 35/- a month and victuals at say 18/6 a month 
for a hundred men for nearly two years# Conversely, when 
the raue of freight was in the region of £36 a ton, a five 
huuurcd ton ship would gross £15,000, not £9,UOO, if it had
1. For freight, see the following Court Boole entries: Ct#Ble#
33,pp.69,73,102. Ct#3»#34#pp#16#18# Ct.Bk#3G,p.S4» The 
rates of freight are ta-con from charter parties in MSS#
ito<l#£.3vj3. It be that the last amount of £33 per 
ton waa excessive and was the recm.lt of individual owners 
1 trying it on1# There is mention in a letter of 1693 of 
£30 as a reasonable freight for that year#
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been entirely taken up. This points to the fact that the 
real profit lay in private trade and freight WiiS merely a way 
of covering the cost for the voyage. Indeed, in 1675 private 
trade under licence accounted for about a third of the Com- 
pony's business and must have taken up that proportion of the 
ships* tonnage.1*
It is olear that the Coop any did not pay an economic 
freight, as we have seen, it abandoned ownership in favour 
of hiring, on the grounds of expense, early in its history. 
Just as its employees in India were expected to supplement 
their meagre salaries by private trade, bo the shipowners 
and ofricers were allowed to make their real profits in this 
way. To facilitate this, the Company only partially loaded 
each ship.
As Carre pointed out, all this was done in the name of 
the Company and the goods were cold at their sales. The whole 
matter of the private trade will be discussed in the next 
chapter, but it is relevant to point out here that this pecu­
liar position of the shipowners vis a vis the joint stock is 
a factor to be considered in the understanding of the ship­
ping policy of the Company.
Turning to the Company's records, it is possible to see 
a pattern in the relationship between it and the shipowners. 
As was said in tho first chapter, the key man in this
1. Hunter, Short History of .British India, p.218. He gives
the following figurest 1
3*98$ xiioenood flrade
Reports ... C.43G, 00C Exports ... £150,000
Imports ... £860,000 Imports ... £300,000
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relationship was the captain. In addition to the normal
business precaution of surveying a ship, the Company also 
interviewed and approved the commander. Tie was almost always 
a prominent shareholder and he end the officers were in the 
best position to profit by the private trade, so the command 
of the ship in the service of the Company was a valuable 
possession Which could be purchased by a qualified man. The 
office began to outlive the ship, for in 1675 there was a 
proposal before the Court to allow two groups of owners ^hose 
ships, 5i<l^ro^jdont and The Anto lope, ware superannuated by 
the Company, to build two others, to bo commanded by tho S'uae 
gap tains, This was agreed to. It was one i first
indications of a tradition growing up of permr-erre of com­
mand for the captain and permanence of bottom or hiring for 
the ovmers. This is something analogous to the tradition of 
•now building1 in the Tudor navy, but the navy, of course, 
was a single permanent fleet, owned by a single authority. 
Vfoile tho CompRnyfs ships were in some ways regarded as such 
a fleet, they remained under private ownership.
For the Company made increasing stipulations. The obar-
terparty of The Eagle, drawn up in 1674, served in part as a
o
pattern for future agreements. In addition to the usual
obligations the owners were to supply twenty men for each 
hundred tons that tho ship was taken for, any seaman dying on
1. H. Tale, Introduction to Hedges* Diary, 111.civ.
2. Cal.Ct./firs.. 1674-6, p.9.
the voyage had to be replaced by the ovmero. How far this 
was complied with there is no means of knowing, but merchant*1 
goods were constantly damaged by ships arriving short-handed, 
and this was the reason for the Company’s stipulation* The 
iiurle was taken for 5U0 tons, so the owners „*©re obliged to 
maintain a crew of luG. An additional clause was inserted, 
stating that for every five tons over 500, presuLiably taken 
up by the Company, and the five per cent, concession allowed 
to tho Captain, officers and ship’s company, the owners must 
take one passenger free. This presumably meiint that if the 
cwner3 brought home goods of their own they must bring home 
one passenger for the Company for every fivo tons of such 
cargo* These two clauses were ordered to be inserted in all 
future charterpartiee•
So while the captains were moving towards permanent em­
ployment through the continuous hiring of their ships ana the 
replacement of ships for them to command for the same 
employers, the Company was more and more regulating its hired 
fleet* In 1677 the number of apprentices was limited, thus 
preventing the muster roll being inflated by non-offectives. 
The Royal navy also at this time had tho same problem and 
dealt with it in the same way, for the taking of apprentices 
was a privilege of ships’ officers which was much abused.
The Company provided for a double cheok, in case extra appren* 
tioea joined tho ship between Gravesend and the Downs.1*
1. Cal.Ct.Mins.» 1677-79,P^*
The payment of seamen was regulated in the same year* 
Wlixle the wages of tho crew viore, of course, found by the 
owners, they were paid through the Company1* Paymaster of 
Mariners to prevent abuses. Owners who objected to the pay­
ment of their crews in the Paymaster’s room, where copies of 
the regulations wore displayed, would bo no longer 'enter­
tained1* Seamen were to reooive four months’ pay in advance 
while eight months’ pay went to their dependants at home.
The balance was paid on their return, for those regulations 
did not override the principle that freight was tho mother 
of wages, although they did muoh, by allowing an advance, to 
mitigate eho rigours of that prinoiple. Tho profits Which 
officers were allowed to make out of selling supplies to the 
men was limited to the generous margin of 50 per cant*1*
in 1679 the commander of The Berko lo;/ Jostle was ordered 
to put ashore six foreigners and take on Englishmen in their 
places and also to make up his supply of boor, Which was 
understood to be ten tuns short, which would be prejudicial 
to the seamen on the voyage*z* As early as 1670 tho Court cf 
Committees had voiced its desire ’that ships in tho Company^ 
service and all people sailing in them should be kept under 
good discipline and in the fear and service of God and be 
well accomraodated for service of life and health’ and laid
1* Cal * Ct ♦.Mina «,1671-73.p»123. Gal * Ct *Mins « , 1677-79. pg»£7S.
279,243. ' The pay of a seaman ££ the company’s service
was 35/- a month - rather above the average*
2* C-.l.Gt* Una*. 1677-79, p*327.
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down that commanders who failed in this should not 1m  ra­
sh, own in the Committoes’ action on the mutiny on board the 
London in 1678. Tha mutineers ware blacklisted and tha pos­
sibility of bringing a case in tha Court of Admiralty was 
discussed, but, at tha sans tine, an enquiry was ordered
In 1677, two years after tha agreement regarding the 
replacement of tha I*resident and the Antelope, the Company 
took steps to gain control over tha officers other than the 
co m  under and probably gave them the opportunity to form a 
semi-permanent oorps. It was laid down that first and second 
mates oust be men of good deportment, whose knowledge of 
navigation had been examined. Owners were to supply tha Coat 
with the names of the first, second and third mates in order 
of seniority to suoosed to tha oommand of tha ship in tha 
event of the death of the captain.
By these regulations the Company was supervising its 
hired shipping and administering it as a single fleet, WhiSh 
it was not. It ««s brought together by contract and tha first 
loyalty of the officers was sot to the Company but to the 
owners. Two incidents emphasise the private nature of the 
fleet.
Charterparties allowed commanders to give one month's
employed. That this was not entirely a pious platitude Is
into conditions on board.
3. Cal.Ct.Hlna.. 1677-79, pp.206,210,218
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notice and then sail for Sftgland with or without cargo if the 
ship was not loaded by SOth Jarr>ary in any year. This was to 
protect then from missing their monsoon. During the Moghul 
v.ar it ?:as proposed to Captain Ilford, then lying at Fort St, 
George, that he should go to Manilla to intercept two Koghul 
ships, *to which he replied that his tine was expired and he 
could not justify his so doing tu hit owners*. # Barlow1 a 
experience in 1696 shows the real control of the owners over 
officers. Barlow brought house the Sent or on tho death of 
the captain rad hoped to succeed to the command, but fnot 
having enough money to buy their goodwill and few friends to 
stand by him, he was disappointed* .s#
in entry in the Court Book in 1680 shows the measure of 
the Company*s control. The question of bottomry h i arisen 
and the Court referred the matter to a Committee. It is sig­
nificant that the Company had been consulted at all, 3incc if 
the ships were private property, the owners could mortgage 
their own shares. In its decision the Company recognised the 
freehold interest, so to speak, by allowing commanders and 
officers to raise money on bottomry within fairly generous 
limits, ranging from £500 to £100 according to rank rad the 
b Izq of the ship, At the sane meeting, however, it was laid 
down that all officers aa well us employees should take up the 
freedom of tho Company. Another 1 compromise* regulation of 
the arae date m m  that commanders should receive freight for
a  fort St.Oooggq . .  x%„. • •• Buok,16S6.pp.S,lS,15.
£* li* barlow, Journal. p*501.
- 89-
private goods in the port to port trade in India and pay it 
over to the Company, receiving a third of the money hack as 
'encouragement'.1 * Whether this was a perquisite of the 
commander or was for the owners is not clear.
This dualism remained all through Child's career. The 
Company were interested in the charterparty owners of a ship 
who were the precursors of the ships' husbands of more modem 
times. The owners had to submit four names from among their 
number from whom the Court ohose two to sign the oharter­
party. These signatories were responsible for the owners’ 
part in the contract and the Court was interested to see that 
they could be held to that. This was in 1683 and, in the 
same year, we see some of the routine of freighting. The com­
manders of the ships hired for that year were ordered to 
attend on a certain afternoon 'to give an aocount of what 
state of forwardness they were in to fall down to Gravesend', 
and it was ordered in the meantime 'to give notice to owners 
to come and seal oharterparties'. Later it was ordered that 
no goods 'be laden in such ships until oharterparties were
g
signed', * There is no evidence that directors Who were also 
shipowners were exempt from these regulations. So, in 1690, 
when two ships in which Child was interested same up for 
charter, Child and John Cooke of Austin Friars were to sign 
for the Resolution and John du Bois and John Cooke of TTaokney
1. Ct.Bk.38. pp.17,84.
P.163.
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were to sign for Tho Charles II. All four were Committees. 
Child and his associates, too, had to tender ships in the 
normal way and the tenders were accepted with the normal 
formula. *That if Sir Josiah Child ... shall build a ship of 
such dimensions as the Committee for Shipping shall agree on, 
the Court will give her employment before any other not 
already entertained, in case they have occasion for her1*1*
Child1 s letters all date from the time of shipping 
shortage in the nineties so we have no first-hand picture of 
his Shipping dealings in the early formative years. These 
letters throw more light on his position in the Company than 
on his personal affairs. It appears that Just as hie per­
sonal holding was vital as a source of ready money, so his 
holdings in ships were important to secure the vessels for 
the Company to maintain and increase its trade in face of 
business rivals and the shipping shortage.
At this time the Company acquired shares in certain 
ships belonging to the Interlopers. This may have been 
because of the shortage of shipping due to the war, or it may 
have been a move to reconcile certain business rivals. At 
all events, Child opposed it on account of expense. He also 
regarded the current freight charges as too high at thistiae 
and used his influence to moderate the demands of other 
owners. Writing to the secretary in 1693, he said that the 
current rate of £30 a ton was enough. 1 Captain Say expects
1. 0t.B3c.32.p.82; Ct.Bk.33.pp.28.218; Ct.B3C.36.P.69.
no more, neither will any friend of nine, nor will I consent 
to any ship whereof I m  an owner should ask or Insist upon 
more*. He was an owner of at least six ships employed by 
the Company that year and was apparently pressed to invest 
in more. He wrote, however, *1 oan neither do that nor any 
other 'business unless the Company pay me my money'. That 
this tardy payment was little inoonvenienoe to him oan be 
seen from the faot that he sent out a permission ship, The 
Little Joslah. in Which he held a half share, in the same 
year.**
In this same letter it is possible to see something of 
the shipping problems of the Company, of tho advantage that 
it gained by having a semi-permanent shipping entourage, and 
the plaoe of Child in it. Re mentioned *a seeming combina­
tion to put hard upon ... the Company at this time of the 
Company's want and soaroity of shipping'. This oould mean 
that the business rivals of the Company were using the ship­
ping shortage to embarrass it, or, and this is more likely, 
that the shipowners were making hay while the sun shone.
Child went on, 'by my interest in shipping and arguments to 
my fellow owners, I moderate these matters to the Company's 
advantage, having always studied to keep an even and indif­
ferent hand between the owners and the Company, and as I Shall 
do now if 1 o o n o e m  myself in any more Whipping, Which I would
1* Home Mis.40. p.170.
not do at the age I am now if it were not purposely to do
the Company a service1
Another light on his activities can be seen in the
2
affair of the Madras, recorded by Barlow. * The ship was one 
part-owned by the Company and was a bad sailer, so she was 
auctioned in 1699 and bought for eight hundred odd pounds by 
Captain Hopfor Bendall. Later in the same year Bend all ten­
dered her on Barlow1 s advice and, so great was the Companyfs 
need, she was accepted. When, however, Barlow was inter­
viewed for the post of captain and found acceptable, Child, 
he claimed, put in a naval lieutenant as commander. There 
are two possible explanations for this. Child may have been 
a part-owner. That does not seem likely, for when Barlow 
taxed him with it, he said that he did not know that Barlow 
fhad the proffer1. Barlow suspected, probably rightly, that 
this was a lie and the reason he gave for so thinking pro­
vides a clue to the situation with regard to shipping at the
turn of the century. ’There were few things done at the Shot 
India House but that he knew. And I do believe that Captain 
Heath had told him that I was designed for the ship1. There 
is no mention of Child being an owner. It would appear, 
therefore, that the Company was becoming more and more to 
regard the hired ships as a private fleet and the commands as 
part of the directors’ own patronage. The officer preferred 
in this case was a friend of Lady Lyttleton, the wife of the
1. Home Misc.40» p.133.
2. 3. Barlow, Journal, pp.501,506 ff.
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Speaker, so there may have been a political motive for this 
particular action. In any case, the unfortunate Barlow, Who 
had been disappointed of a command in the case of the Septer 
because of the owners, lost the Madras because of the Com­
pany, and serves, perhaps, to point the conclusion of this 
matter.
It seems that the command of a freighted ship was a 
valuable possession and to obtain one it was necessary to be 
an influential man among the owners or in the Company# The 
value of it lay not in the wages but in the perquisites. 
Similarly, the value of freighting a ship to the Company lay 
not in the freight but in the possibilities of private trade, 
ufoioh will be dealt with in t^e next chapter. Here we are 
concerned with the relationship between the owners and the 
Company - the two groups that together kept Barlow out of his 
command.
At the end of Childfs career the relationship had been 
worked out in a way satisfactory to both parties. In 1697,at 
the end of the War of the League of Augsburg, it was resolved 
that the Company should invest no more money in buying ships, 
but should rely entirely on hiring them.1* This shows that in 
spite of difficulties in times of shortage, the system was 
satisfactory to the Company and that it had not found its 
experiments in part-owning successful. This resolution became 
one of the early bye-laws of the United Company.2*
1. Ct.Bk.37. p.404.
2. L.S. Sutherland, A London Merchant. p#82#
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The history of the Company’s shipping affairs in this 
period oan probably be summed up in this way# The diffi­
culties in providing ships suitable for the trade led to the 
favouring of a group of people able to provide them# As the 
supply of ships increased, there was, in peacetime at least, 
competition among the owners tendering to the Company and so 
the renewal of the contract was a mutual benefit# Because 
of the importance of the commander in the owning syndicate 
and because of the fact that he was in control of the Com­
pany’s property for two years at a time, there arose a corps 
of officers Who owned a share in their equipment and Who were 
virtually permanent employees of the Company# The other 
officers, too, frequently owned shares in their ships and 
were also probably permanently employed#
More and more control was sought by the Company# As 
many of the regulations were passed after 1677, when Child 
and other shipowners were prominent in the Court of Commit­
tees, it would seem that this control did not run counter to 
the interests of the owners# Fundamentally they oould not 
afford to injure the goose that laid the golden eggs and 
they had to allow the Company a reasonable profit# But there 
was more to it than that. The Company fulfilled a vital 
function for the shipowners; it provided places for the col­
lection of Indian goods, and without them there would have 
been no carrying trade. The Interlopers, even, oould only 
trade by virtue of the existence of the Company, and assuming
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that the real profit from the shipping business came fro© 
private trade, one oan see the importance of the existence
road political nature of the Company to a man in Child* s
position.
fhis explains, probably, the presence of prominent 
shipowners among the Committees and we shall probably under­
stand their deliberations a little more if we remember that, 
in addition to being a joint stock company trading in Indian 
goods, with certain powers and privileges and possessions, 
the Blast India Company contained within itself a regulated 
company of shipowners Who were also trading in Indian goods 
and Who were parasitic upon the greater Company*
DGMI5IGH
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I PRODUCT I OH
The namo of Child is commonly associated with the 
phrase ’Dominion in India’ and this section ie a study of 
the need for, and acquisition of, certain powers of govern­
ment in India Which Child and his contemporaries considered 
to be ’dominion’*
It is clear from a reading of Child’s early book, fho 
Discourse of Trade, that dominion was no a priori theory of 
his. Populating colonies interested him far more than 
governing them* There is, however, one hint of his opinions 
on this matter in the section on companies. He thought 
theBe necessary, as we have seen above, When merchants had 
to operate Where there existed no stable or unified govern­
ment; When, in fact, they had to play & political role, for 
Which the monopoly granted to the Company was compensation* 
A company was not an economic but a political necessity*
The establishment of the permanent Joint stock made 
possible the assumption of this role as the need arose* As 
the Company after 1657 tended more and more to regard its 
freighted ships as its own fleet, 30 it tended to consider 
Europeans within its charter limits and Indians in its toiiB 
as its subjects. It needed to do this partly to out its 
overheads and partly to protect its monopoly.
It will bo convenient to deal with this seotion in two
parts. The matter of the monopoly and the threat to it can 
be fairly briefly dealt with. More complex is the rela­
tionship with Indian powers and European and Asian inhabi­
tants in its territory, since this involved a civic as well 
as a political policy* This will be discussed in the 
second part*
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Charles II1 b interest in trade, part aosidoraie and part 
political, was first manifested in the calling together of 
representative merchants to ait with the Lords of the Privy 
Council in the Council for Trad© and Plantations. This 
bod;; recommended the re-enactment of Cromwell*s Navigation 
Ordinance by Parliament, and the Navigation Acts become 
cornerstones of economic policy* The recognised technique 
of controlling trade was by controlling shipping*
The monopoly of the Bast India Company was always 
based on this* It lay not in a commodity but in a route*
The Company hud always competed in the spice trade wit1 the 
'Tusnia and Levant Companies and in this competition sou^t 
to draw the disputed commodities into its own route, and 
was to pursue the same policy with silk at the end of the 
seventeenth century.
Because the ships, and therefor© their cargoes, wore 
under the control of the Company, the flow of goods could be 
regulated to secure the maximum profit. The business of the 
Company also included the re-export of its goods* The ships 
on which the India goods left the country were not under the 
control of the Company, but the important thing, both for 
the government and the Company, was t^at they were brought to 
London first, not delivered an route. The goods, therefore, 
were subject to duty in this oountry and if they were re­
exported, the Company reoeived a 50 per oent. rebate* In
return the Company received protection in the form of higher 
duties imposed on India goods brought in foreign ships. Muoh 
of the re-exports went to France, So the Company^ shipping 
wn? the point of contact with the Crown, Hho received the 
custom revenue independently of P&rliweeni•
Because one aim of the control of the ships vms the 
control of the flow of goods, it was resolved, when the per­
manent Joint stock was set up in 1657, after Shat mas appar­
ent ly a stormy meeting, that the directors should control 
the trnd* and that private trading b* shareholders should be 
forbidden, Although t^ie was constantly modified by influl- 
C nces, the Company refused to allow any private trade in
i
the commodities on whicv its profit rested. TTenceforward 
joint stock whs an Integral part of the Goiapany*s constitu­
tion and that moant that the ships should be hired by the 
Company, the outward cargo provided by a committee of the 
director* and the investment of that cargo in India dictated 
by them. Persons connected vjiti' the Company could ship pri­
vate goods ®ae~ way, subject to certain conditions Which 
will be examined below. '*
This system sharply contrasted with that in use in the 
regulated Levant Company.^* There also the ships r#ere hired 
by the Company, but the tenders were read in the general Court
1. Svolyn gives an interesting account of the inaugural meet­
ing in his Diary (Everyman Edition), I, ESS.
2* For a disousaion of the Joint stock principle, see Hunter, 
History of British India, I. 138.
s. W o 3 r ; m S 2 £ L  :qS J E £ ^ sM  ra.2iu.211.
and the selection made t^ere* If t*ere was a dispute, a 
ballot was held, in Which owners and part-owners of the ships 
involved were tmable to vote* T^e ships being taken up, 
space was allotted fby the book1 - that is, in proportion to 
Investment for the outward voyage; and for the return voyage, 
members were allowed to lead one ton for each fourteen or 
sixteen woollen cloths loaded outvarris. The cargoes were 
entirely the business of individual members.
The first modification of the Joint stock system 
appeared in the middle 1660s. Although explicit rules were 
laid down In 1666, the growing volume of imports led to more 
ships being employed, and since at least two-thirds of the 
exports of the Company consisted of bullion and coin, there
2was plenty of space on outward vopage for private goods* * 
These private exports wore largely goods for t’-o consumption 
of Europeans in India, but trade goods, bullion and coin 
went too.3# ?roigbt 'vvl to be paid, and on private goods 
returning to England as the result of the investment, and 
’permission1 as well. This permission was a kind of private
1* Those arrangements suggest that Shore was a certain amount 
of suspicion of shipowners In the Levant Company. There 
were shipowners among the directors but there seems to 
have been no ’shipping interest’ in that company. The 
*iastland Company went further in its suspicion and banned 
shipowners from the directorate. (E.^ccksoher, Tferoan- 
tJulisffl. 1,587).
2. fir William Foster suggests t^ia reason for the increase 
in private trade. (Introduction to Cal.Ct.Hins..1S6S-7Q. 
pp.viitViil). For specimen cargoes see SireynWhea Master, 
Il&rles. 1,132, and Ct.Bk.32. p.4.
3. Carro, Travels, pp.683,594. Confirmed by Barlow, Journal.
p.816.
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customs duty levied by the Company, and on goods normally
monopolised by the Company, was sc high that, according to 
Barlow, it did not pay to handle them. This, however* was 
probably modified by inefficiency and corruption* In 1678, 
for example, the Court complained that plenty of iy»an and 
Toniuin silks came home in private trade, but very few for 
the Company* The same letter forbade to private traders 
goods made or mixed with silk, but even so went on to grant 
ladulgenoits.1#
In the same year there was a discussion in the Court m  
the building of ’advisers1 - ’nimble vessels froia 50 to 100 
tons burthen, commanded by knowing and active masters to
p
attend ships into the Downs and report their proceedings’,
A ship’s company in which Barlow served was accused of ’con­
cealing some goods out of the ship In Bye Bay or thereabout# 
imd soma of the crew’s wages wore stopped* Shipping cor­
respondents were maintained at such places as Plymouth and 
they vsforo probably chiefly valuable in that they alerted the 
’waiters’ further up the Channel.
The details of the regulation of private trade varied 
with tho stmts of the market at home. For example, the Jewafll
L* XivB.VU, p # '} m
2* ffaTTct.Mins. 1677-79, p.839.
3. Sarlow*aa a seaman invariably got the dirty end of tho
stick and his Journal is very revealing on maritime custom 
at this time* On another occasion a ship’s company in 
v/hioh he sailed was collectively fined for damage to a 
cargo, but the other ranks brou^it an action in the Court
of Admiralty and. won. (Journal, pp,365,385*}
trade which Fryer discusses from his experience in 1674, 
and which, in liis opinion, did heat in private hands, Where 
incidentally, it kept the agents honest by allowing them a 
profitable business, vas tho subject of lengthy experiment. 
Pizuiionds especially wore useful to the agents in India in 
_ revising them with a means of bringing home their fortunes. 
So, while in 1680, the Court &as writing to Fort 3t. George, 
advising the Governor, who had initiated a trade in rubies 
from Pegu, that it •peradventuro may cheapest bo done by 3U0h 
of the Portoguose you oun confide in who live under your pro­
tect ion1 , it was proposing to restrict the diamond trade and 
allow exchange facilities to employees in India. Three years 
later the diamond trade was thrown open and exohang® facili­
ties withdrawn. Probably the Company preferred to leave pri­
vate traders to take the first plunge and it only appears to 
make regulations as they were needed. For example, in 1684,
1 crattanees and at lasses1 were forbidden to private trade
p
because of *a vast quantity at home and expect®df.*"#
The private trade conducted by the employees in Asia and 
by tho freemen was another matter* Provided that thoir pri­
vate affairs did not interfere with thoir service to tho Com­
pany, employees were expected to supplement their salaries In 
this way. Some of their concerns were pretty large. Mohun,
3
sometime chief at l4aen3ip&tam»haA twelve or ihirte-asi ships at sea.
l. Fry or, gew Agoomt _of j%8t indig .riLjaiiMi*. p. 226.
C v»J&a * ^$ 7  J * loQ i ^ bT •, P P * 7 0 ,1si«
3, S.T#ir.3. II, p.214^
That probably means that he had interests in that number or 
had goods on them, not t*at he owned them outright, but 
nevertheless it armies that he wee a pretty considerable
me r oh ant in hin own right. Hot only did this supplement the 
meagre salaries paid by the Company, but in this way the 
employees, like tho freemen, contributed to the prosperity at 
the settlements and in fact made the investment, for one of 
the perennial problems of the Company was provision of spend­
ing power in India. The uho of the Company's shipping in 
this coastal trade, too, helped to recoup tho demurrage.
There was a tariff fixed in 1673 for goods between Madras and 
Bengal of thirty shillings a ton to Bengal and £3 to Madras. 
But that, too, whs the subject of experiment. In 1679 Bantam 
m s  ordered to coll or send back the tywan and Formosa fri­
gates as t^e Chinn trade if'.s in future to be conducted in 
freighted ships. Apparently this had not been done two years 
later, because they appear or another list of five ships to 
be sent back or sold. In the Instructions to one of the cap­
tains in tve same year, he was ordered to load no private 
goods on the coastal run because this practice wasted time 
and led to ships losing their monsoon; but Surat was told to 
discourage two Company1 s servants from investing in shipping 
on that account, as in 1662 the Company intend col to keep the 
freighted ships on demurrage for a year and they could then 
load their private goods for the coastal tru&e upon them. Fca*
this service freight would bo charged, oi GQurse.~# 
l. S.MasTer7 Biarics ,1,215/ h.XhVI, W .  108, 346,431.
It seems from this that the shipowners were getting 
their share of the profits of the private trade in Asian 
waters. They probably also had the greatest consideration 
in the private trade between Europe and Asia. Throughout 
the period we can see a process of experiment and the evolu­
tion of a system that favoured the shipping interest. In 
1669, the Court remitted a fine of £16 a ton imposed on the 
officers and men of the London for bringing in white pepper, 
and ordered the Committee of 8hipping fto inform oil the 
ship1® company What they may bring home so that none may 
plead ignorance in the future1.1* Ten years later the Court
i **
passed a resolution regulating the position whereby ship­
owners might sond out £800 in pieces of eight for the fahipb 
Joint stock1 and a like sum for the captain and the officer®* 
In the next year it was agreed that private goods not exceed­
ing 5 per-cent# of the tonnage according to ohnrterparty oouH 
be brought home on behalf of fthe owners, adventurers, com­
mander, officers and seamen1. The goods had to be commodi­
ties not specifically forbidden in the oharterp&rty and to 
bo ffairly brought to the Company1 s warehouse without design 
or attempt to conceal1. T^ie whs re-affiroed in 16S2 and in 
1683 all private trade to and from Europe was stopped# ex-
p
oopt for ovmers, oomnandcrs, officers and seamen. Fresh 
regulations v.are issued. Xha owners export ^150 for
every hundred tons according to charterparty. This might he
1. Cal.at.Mins.,1668-70, pp.195,196.
a  *  J iIIa E rZ S g . ,1877-79,1 . Z U  ; at.Eg , > 3 ,1 .6 9 ; ^ 3 ^ .3 6 , p . 26.
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invested in India in non-prohibited goods, the prime oost of 
Which did not exceed that sum, and these could be imported#
If this was exceeded, 10 per cent, of the freight was deduc­
ted. For the crew there was a sliding scale according to 
rank - at one end of the 3oale the commander who could expert 
££00 per hundred tons and at the other the seamen vdio could 
import five pieces of calico.1*
These concessions were generous and the most liberally 
treated was the commander* It would seem, therefore, that 
the Company1!* monopoly benefitted not only the shareholders 
but the shippers - both owners and officers. This probably 
explains the difficulty of obtaining a command, experienced 
both by Barlow and Knox* B*irlow mentions the sum of £100 
being necessary as a gratuity and £200 was paid for the 
'Uadoraes* in 1699.^*
One rather amusing comment on this situation is in a 
revealing minute of 1679* The Committee of Private Trade was 
asked to look into Information received that •certain persons 
under the guise of seamen have gone out annually to India and 
so managed a private trade for themselves and others1 In 
the same year it was ordered that no letter should be delivered
U  b.B.VII* p.4; 0t.ak*33>198.199*
She amounts wore: Owners - £180 per ICO tons; Commanders - 
££00; chief mates - £60; second mates - £50; third mates -
£40; fourth mates and pursers - £30; midshipmen and other 
chief officers, including the boatswain and surgeon - ££5;
and quartermast ers - £10. In the case of Infringement all 
suffered over the out in the freight, since the whole crew 
was responsible for delivering the cargo and earning the 
freight.
2. S.Barlow. Journal, pp.505 ff# 3ven ££00 socme moderate*
3* Cal.Ct*HinaV,T6W-79, p.313.
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by any of the Company’s ships ’but such as 8^  all bo delivered 
by the Agent rnd Council1/ ’ These entries suggest two thinga 
The first one is an indication of the opportunities of crews 
to profit from the private trade and together they show the
need for t^e control of shipping noted In t^e last chapter,
j&von captains and owners might connive at cheating the Com­
pany by carrying mail and taking on hands who wore not genuine
seaman. And for these bogus seamen to face the prospect of 
two years before the mast the temptation was greater than 
that offered by the profit on five pieces of cloth. They 
must either have exceeded their allowance or have been appoin­
ted a® officers. This would suggest that certain owners did 
not identify themselves aa closely with tho Company as Child 
did. As we have seen, his policy us a shipowner was not to 
’bear too hard upon the Comxmny1 and in this system of care­
fully regulated concessions we can perhaps see further evi­
dence of his wor!c in the organisation of the Company.
Adventurers in the ComiJuny also participated in the pri­
vate trade. About 1680 it began to bo considered that their 
•permission1 shouia be in proportion to their holdings.
Child, Who in 1681 shipped out 7,000 pieces of eight and C100 
in gold and silver, made motion to allow a Ur* Godfrey to 
ship £100 in foreign bullion at 1 per cent, freight, and used 
in argument hie own great holding and moderate use of per­
mission* iiater that year Adventurers were allowed to ship
1. L.J3.7I. p.56.
» B k » > p  * 3 £  •
up to tho equivalent of one-fifth of their holdings in bul­
lion in any on* year.1* Two years lator, a* we hare soon, 
private trade was limited to shipowners and offloors; but in 
1684 Adventurers were allowed to ship out bullion equivalent 
to the value of their holdings in any one year, paying 
freight and permission. If they exceeded the allowance they 
paid an extra 3 per cent, out and home.
There was therefore a group of people conducting a pri­
vate trad* with India, and this group was one of monopolists 
parasitic upon the Company's monopoly* They existed by vir­
tue of leaving to the Company the oontrol of the sales policy
The monopoly was probably as muoh protooted by ignor- 
anoe of the possibilities as by royal charter. Child did not 
begin to invest in the Company until 1671. The trade of the 
Coast and Bay had more than doubled between 1668 and 1675, 
being, according to Sartor, worth £34,000 in the former year 
and £85,000 in the latter.3* Writing from Xasulipataa in 
that year, the agent exoused the 'very ordinary* quality of 
the textiles by passing on the explanation of the Indian mer­
chants, that the quantity demanded was greater than they had 
ever been called on to supply before and they had to bring 
in what they could get.4* With such a demand for Indian goods 
it was small wonder that other merchants sought to enter the 
field. Their profits would, incidentally, be greater because
1. 'ct.Bfc.38. 8.114.
2. fft.lc.34, pp.18,19.
?* S^gtnistorv of , p.405.
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they mould not have to pay for tho upkeep of tho factories* 
Further, there had boon a general shortage of shipa. Hot 
only was the Company offering inducements, but Parliament had 
sanctioned & bounty on English built svlps in addition to the 
general protection of the navigation Acts, and this policy 
m s  bearing fruit* The growing trade with India was begin­
ning to attract the growing shipping industry in the mid- 
seventies, and in this situation the discovery that the mono­
poly was relaxed in favour of a group of people who invented 
in the Company or Who were employed by it in its shipping 
business explains the attacks made on it for its refusal to 
issue more stock and its permission of large holdings* It 
led to the attacks on the Joint stock principle and provided 
the Levant Company with allies* But in fact the Company only 
traded in Joint stock as far as the prohibited articles were 
concerned and as an employer of shipping, and a great deal of 
trade went on between England and India for the benefit of 
individuals* Probably, as has been suggested, this was the 
reason Why the Company consistently borrowed money privately 
instead of Issuing more share capital*
The appearance of the Interlopers in Indian waters in 
the seventies was to have a profound effect on the policy of 
the Company and provide another reason for the acquisition of 
Dominion In India. Hitherto the Company had not taken any 
interest in Europeans residing within its charter limits* It 
took requisite powers in Madras and Bombay because there were
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oommunlties there for whioh the Company was responsible and 
the towns fulfilled a function as entrepots, but after about 
1675, When the monopoly was in danger, the freemen who had 
helped to make the Investment might equally make an invest­
ment for its business rivals. There was therefore an inoen* 
tive to oontrol them and by ordering that all those opera­
ting on the Coromandel Coast and in Bengal should live in 
Madras and so oorae under the jurisdiction of the Company,it 
took a step along the road to Dominion. *
The existence of wealthy business rivals with politics! 
connections led to oaution at home, especially in seeking 
new powers. It was the existence of this threat whioh drove 
Child to load the Company into the Tory oaap and commit it 
to a political struggle. Thus early in the histor, of party 
politics the Company' entered the field and decisions taken 
in the City of London about Bengal became bound up with 
events in Westminster.
It was on the issue of interloping, too, that Child met 
the most irreoonoliable opposition within the Company. On 
the first occasion, in 1681, he bought out his opponents.
The second occasion was tho employment of Thomas Pitt, and 
then he was either no longer sufficiently interested to use 
his power or was defeated because he had withdrawn his hold­
ing. As far as one oar know, this was the only issue on 
which Child met with opposition in the Company. There seems
1. Master, Diaries. 1,210.
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to have been general agreement among the original directors 
up till 1681 on the question of joint stock and on the atti­
tude towards the Interloper* until 1698. On the other hand, 
the presence of Sir John Morden, the eminent Levant merchant^ 
on the Court of Committees of the Sast India Company, the 
divided ownership of ships, and the number of people, like 
Sir William Hedges, Who transferred their allegiance to the 
new company, suggest that one aouroe of weakness in the Com­
pany's position lay in the varied Interests of seventeenth 
century business men.
From the point of view of shipowners in the Company His 
Child, even if we presume that he was primarily concerned 
with using the Company for his own ends, it would still be &  
his interest to protect the Joint stook trade. To Injure 
the Company’s souroe of profit - the virtual monopoly of the 
prohibited articles - would be to lose the trading posts in 
India, for example, as well as the freight of the ships.
They mat sink or swim with the Company. Child gave his 
greatest energy to its service, not only for his own immedi­
ate advantage, but ultimately to maintain it.
Jven the Interlopers, if they really sought the des­
truction of the Company, were cutting off their noses to spite 
their faoss. But most of the opponents of tve Company were 
really only seeking on enlargement of the stock or else to 
profit from tue trade While the going was good. In this 
they would find allies among their business associates in the
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Comp&ny itself. Child, as we have seen, was more ooramitted 
and probably less involved outside,
A very typical interloping captain was William Alley,
He appears to hare begun his career as commandsr of a vessel 
belonging to Mohun, ohisf at Masulipatam. He knee and was 
on good tanas with many of the Company's oapt&ins and with 
members of the Counoil at Madras. Provided he and his like 
did not engage in the Burope-Asia trade they were wsloomed 
by the Company and there must have been, in the seventies, 
some fifty suoh vessels sailing in Aslan waters, plying ths 
coastal trade and making voyages as far as China and Persia. 
as it seems olear that the Company's servants often used the 
Company's goods as at least a source of credit and that there 
was little distinction between their official and private 
affairs, men like Alley must have known the Company's business 
pretty well. It must have been clear that the carrying trade 
to Europe was profitable, however much was absorbed in the 
overheads of the factories and dividends to shareholders; and 
with their contacts among the Company's servants, private 
residents and Indian merchants their overheads would be con­
siderably lessened. When Alley turned Interloper his con­
tacts did not let him down. * Dumpier describes a business 
luncheon on board, be it noted, a Company ship. 'This day 
Capt. Alley dined aboard Capt. Lake, of the Prudent Mar.v. 
with Honor, Clarke and diverse Interlopers, making great 
mirth and jollity by firing guns all afternoon*•
Listed in Home Misc. 23 are 44 names of persons involved 
in interloping in the year 1685, as shipowners, commanders, 
supercargoes or Investors. The list includes one peer, 
Richard, Lord Lumley, a number of people like Udmund Harrison 
who were to be associated with the Hew Company, and the 
famous Thomas Mitt. They were involved in seven interloping 
ships and several of the people were involved in two or three 
of those ships. T^us, although there was not yet a new com­
pany, there was a rival shipping interest. In 1695, Child 
was to refer in the Parliamentary enquiry of that year, t#
'a kind of oomraittee of twenty-five persons that sat do die 
in dlea to destroy the Company'. From the point of view of 
tho Company these people were defrauding them by using their 
installations to undercut them; to the shipowners in the 
Company they were much more dose business rivals. It was 
from this element in the situation that the real bitterness 
in the struggle with the Interlopers arose.
The Interlopers could also make trouble in India in a
variety of ways. They were a foil for the Company's enemies, 
both Asian and European. In the season 1682-3 the Governor 
of Bengal was clearly playing Pitt and his colleagues off 
against the Company. The year 1682 had been an unpropitlous 
one for the Company at home. It was in that year that a sub*
oommitteo had been appointed to procure what sums of money fin
members could raise on the Company's bills or on their own
1. Collection of Debates in Parliament, bound in 1*0,Tracts,
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Eaourlty, for whioh they would be indemnified under the oomtaon 
seal.1. It would appear that the oredit of the Company was 
.ehaky in the City. Previously Pitt had managed to get his 
goods out of the oontrol of the Crown by a replevin from the 
Sheriff of London2, and in that year Papillon and the Whig 
shareholders had sold out at £300. It is significant, too, 
that on the appointment of this sub-oommlttee, Child swore 
the members of the Court to seoreoy.
Despite this seoreoy, Pitt was possessed of the informa­
tion, and, landing at Ballaaore in some pomp, with 'guards 
and trumpets', gave out that the Company was in suoh low con­
dition that 'they oould send but two ships to fetch off their 
remains', and that there was a new company formed of Which he 
was the agent, Surat Council wrote home in a shocked tone
3
that 'he gave out that your honours are broke'. *
Pitt then proceeded to Hugll, arriving a little after 
the Company's Agent, Hedges. The latter found all trade under 
one of the perlodlo interdicts of the H&wab - a device for 
extorting money. Salting in this deadlook, Hedges observed 
Pitt's arrival with three ships, his landing in great state, 
his files of soldiers in red coats and great attendance of 
native soldiers. Here Pitt was joined by Vinoent, a 'fallen 
servant' of the Company and perhaps his cousin. They took up 
their quarters with the Dutoh, opened negotiations with the
1, Ct.Bk.33. p.95.
2, lu.BTvi. pp.409,410.
3, fTVole, Introduction to Hedges' Diary. Ill, xi ff.
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Hawab, obtained a parwannah to build warehouses, and made up 
cargoes with the aid of the Company's Indian merchants by 
Vincent's influence. So While the servants of the Company 
were maltreated and blackmailed the interloping ships had 
their cargoes. This was the more galling as the Hawab had, 
the previous year, received 250 pagodas for 'hindering Capt. 
Alley's business'.
Originally the legal redress against interloping lay in 
England. The charter granted the monopoly and left the Com­
pany to seek the protection of English courts. The methods 
the Company had employed were firstly to try to prevent the 
ships sailing. In this they were not successful and it was 
not until 1683 that they established a legal precedent in the 
Sandys Case. In that Sandys' ship was arrested by the King 
in Admiralty, Whereupon Sandya prayed a prohibition in the 
King’s Senoh. The action was fought there and decided in 
favour of the Company, on the grounds, largely, that the in­
habitants of India were infidels and no subject of the realm 
oould trade with them without the King's leave. This was 
really the grounds of the Whole monopoly. But until that 
year a n  attempts had been unsuccessful and the Interlopers 
hud slipped away. When the ships had sailed, at least on the 
occasion of Fltt's voyage to Bengal, the Company hod sent 
one of its own ships to race it and spoil tho market. Cm this 
occasion its intention was frustrated by the attitude of tho
1. See Yule, Introduction to Hedges' Dlar.y. lll.p.xl and 
references quoted there.
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Hawab, m  m  horo noon* Thoy oould also bring sivil aotion® 
on tbeir own aooount tm& information in tho Croum Office* 
In t*ls thoy «cre moro successful and gained a £1*000 fine 
from Pitt. For some odd reason thoy remitted £600 In 1687* 
Child’s governorship marks the beginning of decisive 
action against the Interlopers; and it proved to be costly 
action. The annual present of 10,000 guineas was re-ineti-
o
tutad and a royal proclamation secured. It was in the 
debate on the petition for the proclamation that there 
ooourred the breach between Child and Papillon. It is inter­
esting to note, also, that wh on it arrived at Leadenhall 
Street on December 30th, the proclamation was despatched
immediately with only a covering letter from Child, promising
3confirmation from the other direotors in due course.'"*
The proclamation was a beginning. A frigate was pur­
chased and despatched to Indian waters, while the commanders 
of the freighted ships received the King’s commission. A 
patent was granted for the forfeiture of Interlopers* ships 
and goods to the Crown, from the proceeds of w^ioh the Com­
pany was to receive one third as prize money.4*
The struggle was now to be waged beyond the Cape of Qocd 
Hope, but the legal instruments lay in London, until 1683,
1. H. Yule, Introduction to Hedges’ Diary.III.xiv-xvi.xv1 n.
2. Ct.3k.33. p.161. This entry shows tnat the proscnt was 
for favour in this matter.
3. L.B.VI, p.415.
4. L.B.VI, pp.415,416.
Whan Admiralty Courts wera obtained. In that year tha Sandy.
*
decision secured the legal monopoly of the route based on a 
royal grant. This m s  a decisive year for the Company* It 
was the year of the now charter and of the erection of Adraii** 
alty Courts by the royal prerogative. Now only statutes ootQd 
upset the Sandya decision and terminate the grant of the 
powers Whioh enabled the Company to deal with the Interlopers 
in India. The common interest of the King and the Company, 
which has been discussed elsewhere, was now complete, and 
interloping had led the Company to taics another step towards 
a ’polity1 in India.1*
The policy was not successful and interloping continued 
until the end of Child’s life and the establishment of the 
New Company.
In the failure to oust the Interloper® we see, perhaps, 
a triumph of trade over politics, Pitt was able to find 
allies in the Court of Committees because seventeenth oentuxy 
business men had such varied interests. Samuel Qngley, a 
Committee and Child’s one-time confidant, became Pitt’s man 
of business. Ifhlg opinions or membership of the Levant Com­
pany would not prevent a man speculating in 3ast India stools. 
One factor which led tho Company to purchase the interloping 
ships was probably the shortage; another factor may have bem  
shares held in the ships by Committees or their friends.
1. For a discussion of the Admiralty Courts and the new 
ohartcr, sec C. Fawcett, The First Centura of British 
Justioe^nlnaia, PP.US.IIfTJan^J. jJfiSasST
i i M yMfez .jf e m jatlon, pp. 166-166.
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The end of tho long conflict with Thomas Pitt was 
announced by the Court of Committees In these words: 'the 
concern in the two ships sent out by the Interlopers oalled 
the Edward ... and the TIenr.v. having now, by bargain with the 
most interested, become so our own, we have thought good to 
give you notioe thereof, and to the end that whatever remains 
of their cargoes, or may yet bo left ashore, may be ouraftilly 
looked after
Obviously this was not a possible general solution to 
the problem. It would have laid the Company open to what 
would have been virtually blackmail, had it set out to 
acquire all the interloping ships. A political solution was 
the only possible one in the long run, but the episode shows 
that what oalled forth the politioal solution was a business 
problem.
It seems, too, that the Interlopers were often better 
business men than the servants of the Company, for in 1664 
the Court wrote to Tlugli, inoluding the 'printed cargo of 1he 
Interloper vglillam and John ... that you may see What kind 
of new goods she brought and how they sold here, for your 
government in providing for us suoh as you find turned to 
best account'. Scoldingly the letter went on: 'Upon this 
occasion v,e must tell you that the Interlopers hove in no-
a
thing just cause to boast than in t'is, notwithstanding our 
Councils ore constantly resident upon the place and have
1. H.lhle, Introduction to Hedges* Diary.Ill, xxxl.
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alvays our orders and money beforehand and time to provide 
new and fine sorts of goods, and they (the Interlopers) oorae 
to this bay for a short time and buy by stealth and yet they 
bring v’o:ae more in proportion of these new and desirable
earns Governor Pitt, we find him experimenting in new lines 
negleoted by hie more oonventional predecessors.
This greator suooess in business may have been due to 
the help given by the Company's servants. They tended to do 
bettor for themselves in private trade than they did for the 
Compuny. For example, in 1692, Hr. Yale was able to send 
goods home on his own account that were unobtainable for his
O
employer®. * Mail was transmitted q.uitc openly to London 
from Interlopers by the employees and ships’ captains.It 
would seem that in spite of the venom with whioh, according 
to Barlow, for example, the Interlopers were pursued from
4.Lcadenhall 3trest, relationships were <xuit© amicable beyond 
the Cape of Good Hope,
This situation was implicit in the private trade arrange 
menta and it seems that little could be done within the 
existing framework. This probably explains Child’s attitude 
to the settlements and his insistence that the Company's 
regulations must be enforced in India by the people on the
1. H.Yule, Introduction to Hedges' Diary.III.xiv.
2. Homo Isc • i -v. . P» .-]3«
goods by far than our ships’.** And when Interloper Pitt be-
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spot. A despatch in Child's vigorous style was sent to Fort 
St. George in 1SG2. 'Long experience with a variety of per­
sons and humours hath oonvinoed us of the following truths - 
1st. That long, tedious and orass examinations in India with 
bundles of attestations, aoousations, defence apologies, 
certificates and other suoh like trumpery ... do signify just 
nothing ... 2ndly. That without such ... a wise Agent and 
Counoil will easily after a few admonitions discern whioh 
faotory doth well and whioh not and may shrewdly guess Whe­
ther it be depraved by the malignant influence of the Chief 
or whether the Chief be good and those under him obstinate, 
which seldom happens',1* Child observed that the hut oh Com­
pany was untroubled with suoh abuses and trouble and he 
attributed this freedom to their use of martial law. It was 
not in faot true that the Dutch Company was free from the 
self-seeking of its employees. However, in 1689 Child was 
seeking a Parliamentary Charter which would give the Company 
the same powers that the Dutch had, without whioh 'Unglish 
dominion must certainly and suddenly fall, and the trade soon 
follow after’.
In this connection one sees the inevitability of a 
polity in India. The communities in India could not be con­
trolled from London, because t’ey wore too far away. The 
only possible control was through the Agents and Counoils, Who 
must have power. This explains the Company's attitude to its
1. H.D. Love, Veatirea of Old Madras.1.459.
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employees, the mistrustful nagging of Streynshn® Master, 
corresponding with subordinates b«h tnd ^edges’ backhand the 
promotion of nonentities like John Child* T^a po or glvon 
to the Agents must be legal pover: subordinates did not 
cease to enjoy the privileges of Englishmen beouuse they 
were 6,000 miles away any more than tho Amarioun colonists 
ceased to be English in rights and feelings until the War of 
Independence.
Before 1688, the Crown was the source of that power 
Whioh Child wished to be delegated through the Company. Cer­
tainly tho dependence of the Company upon the fortunes of 
the house of Stuart is noWhore more clearly shown than in 
this connection. As we have soon, the gift to Charles II 
was admitted to be for favour in this, and in 16855 the King 
asked for it to be delivered early because of his ’pressing 
occasions1.1* There is insufficient evidence as to Who took 
the initiative in the political strife within the Company in 
1681. Pspillea and Barnard is tone were certainly deeply in­
volved with the Whigs in the City of London, but it is diffi­
cult to see how the termination of the current Joint stock 
would have helped the Whig cause unless t^e directors had 
already decisively thrown in their lot with the Crown, ^rom 
i apillon’s writing® and t^o fact of their long partnership It 
seems dear that he and Child had no business difference and 
his proposal to terminate the stock, ’brought in1, said Child, 
’to do us an injury’, woo an attempt to dissolve the already
C t. Biy. *35 § p • ' 1 *
Tory corporation - tbe work of Child and his immediate asso­
ciates. 3’#
There was probably no great lore lost between Child and 
the Court. As we hare socn, he was purged from tve Ports­
mouth Corporation an a republican and as lute as 1676 Charles 
had vetoed his election as Governor. The Company purchased 
a delegation of royal po^er to protect its interests; it did 
not wish the Grown to protect it* nor did it want royal ser­
vants in India. This position tsfhiah the Company took up will 
be discussed in t^o next section, but its determination to 
conduct its own affairs is illustrated by the treatment of 
Sir John Wyborne# He was appointed at the instance of Jnmes 
II as Deputy Governor of Bombay and was charged with the 
collection of the Grom's f«oietyf of the fines inflicted 
u on Interlopers. He found himself frustrated throughout
p
his career and eventually frosen out.
The viewa of Child held by Janas H  and tva high Tories 
hare been already noticed and he, on his part, fait no devo- 
tlon for the Stuarts. After t^eir fall he was prepared to 
a?Uce the same businesslike arrangement with WillIan III, 
continuing the annual present and guaranteeing his loans.5*
Meanwhile, When, in 16G9, the prerogatire p ,3sod from 
the Croan to Parliament, the Company only had to proteat its
1. A.F.W. Popillon, Tho^>>,g nplllon. pp.82,83.
2. See his letters to Pagye’in ilfes. iuval. 4.170. Dr. St.John, 
another Tory nominee, will be "Vloalt with in tue noxt
section.
3. 3T. Guttere 1, Brief TTistoriool Relation. I?,92.
gains m  far as power over Europeans in India was concerned. 
Straightway the Company began to work for a iurliamentary 
Charter, and Child, the ex-republio&n and sometime Tory, m s  
prepared onoe again to adapt himself to ohanged circum­
stances. In faot, th© Charter of 1683, confirmed in 1686, 
was again confirmed in 1693, and Child had survived the ruin 
of the plans and the Company began in a Whig world the 
defence of its gains won as a Tory corporation.
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B0LITICA1 ABB CIVIC POLICY
(i) The Company's Situation in 
Seventeenth Century India
Of conditions in the year 1675, Thomas Bowry, an obser­
vant sailor, wrote: 'The Moors have within a very few years 
put many grievous affronts upon the English and Butch Which 
formerly they durst not attempt . Without all dispute we
have occasioned such things by our lowspiritedness and self 
interest, minding that more than any future benefit or 
national good’.1* This makes a good text for the chapter, 
but it needs analysis. Bowry puts two disadvantages under 
which the trade laboured side by side and claims that the 
cause of the first was the second. That would be natural in 
a contemporary observer, but not necessarily true. Never­
theless, the affronts of the Moors and the self-seeking of 
Englishmen were facts, a perennial theme of the Letter Books 
and Factory Records, and together fora the reasons for the 
quest for Dominion. In his writings, Child had constantly 
stressed that the trade was 'national* - that is, in the 
national interest, and this was constantly urged upon the 
agents in India. When he became a Committee he set himself 
to examine ways of securing future benefit and national good 
and the foundation of the trade for the future was the ulti­
mate national good.
The trade depended for its profit upon the monopoly in
1. Thomas Bowry, Geographical Account of Countries round the 
Bay of Bengal, p.88.
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Bngland so that the Company could control the time of the 
sale of Asian products, and the fact that agents were sta­
tioned in India so that it should not he forced to buy dur­
ing the brief period that ships could stay there. Ultimate^ 
it depended on the capt\ire of the carrying trade of Asia 
and between Asia and Europe.
The capture of the carrying trade of Asia by Europeans 
was possible because of certain conditions in Asia, and these* 
were changing during this period and deserve some considera­
tion. An essential factor in the trade of the sub-continent 
was the existence of the Moghul :Eoapire. It had fulfilled 
two functions in the days of its efficiency. It had provided 
stable conditions in Which trade was possible and central 
government could protect merchants against the exactions of 
local officials. In fact the Company's relations had never 
been with the Emperor but with princes of the blood who were 
viceroys of Bengal and Gujerat, but the trade was suffi­
ciently valuable to then and they were sufficiently powerful 
to afford protection.1** The Empire ?*as a land power and ?*as 
dependent on foreigners both for a war fleet and the carriage 
of goods by sea. Thus the rivals of the Company had never 
been Indians but Dutch and lortuguese. Secondly, outside its 
frontiers the Empire was a stabilising force in the peninsular.
This was ceasing to be true. In this connection it is
well to bear in mind Gibbon's axion about institutions: that
1. See Sir William Foster: Iha Embassy of Thomas Hoe end his 
article in The Indian Antiquary. Vol.XL (19tl).
we should not so much enquire why they decay as why they en­
dure so long. The Empire had probably completed the rela­
tively short life cycle of such an organism. It was essen­
tially an opportunist and military Empire, exploiting the . 
land revenue; and conquest tended to take precedence, in its 
military activities, over putting down rebellion, probably 
because new provinces were more lucrative. It was an Empire 
different in character from that of Rome or Britain, Which 
organised territory for permanent exploitation. It more 
resembled that of Charlemagne or Alexander. It was an 
empire in a state of flux, with no boundaries and in a con­
stant process of acquisition. It consisted of a nuclear 
homeland in Hindustan surrounded by provinces, the revenue 
of which supported the administration, the work of Which was 
the conquest and occupation of provinces.
Professor Sarkar has pointed out that the British con­
quest of India was a matter of waves. lacific and organis­
ing Governors General succeeded bellicose ones and nursed the 
country and the Company's finances through the aftermath of 
one war and prepared for the next, while the Moghul’s 
attempts at the conquest of the Deccan were only interrupted 
by rebellions in other parts of their dominions.
Local governors in the Empire were responsible for put­
ting the Army in the field and were paid out of the land 
revenue. As this continuous war proceeded their incomes 
ceased to be enough for the performance of their duties and
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they took to exploiting their subjects and the foreign mer­
chants. The exploitation which the Company suffered in 
Gujerat and Bengal was directly opposed to the welfare of 
the Empire, Which depended fbr the flow of precious metals 
upon foreign merchants, and it was the work of local officials.
Thus the nature of the Empire led to its own internal 
corruption and to instability in the Deccan and through 
India. On the shores of this troubled land were the agen­
cies of the Company.
These differed in their positions vis a vis Indian 
powers and so in their natures. Historically t>»e first
agency was at Surat. Geographically the agency consisted of
cortain buildings within the city, leased from the Moghul 
and nominally protected by him. The Company was not allowed 
to buy or build houses. The agents formed, none the less, a 
vital community, which, according to Hunter, 'had its vital­
ity in itself, apart from1 the Company in London. This com­
munity was integrated by 1657 into the economy of the Moghul 
linpire. It enjoyed certain fiscal privileges, but, by its 
nature as a terminal in a carrying agency, it was a source 
of revenue and, by its pro\uess at sea, fulfilled the func­
tion of police on the route to the Persian Gulf and Arabia. 
It had early won, by a naval victory over the Portuguese at -
Ormuz, the grant of half the customs of Gombroon.1*
The theory Which guided the Company was the 30-called
1. W.Hunter, History of British India.il.68.
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Roe doctrine, the opinion of Sir Thomas Roe, that the Com­
pany's function was to trade and aim at no territorial powen
T*is advice was dictated by conditions that prevailed at the 
beginning of the century. Before the establishment of the 
permanent Joint stock there was no money to develop territory 
if it were acquired. Under the system of separate Joint 
atoeks wound up periodically, the settlements ware regarded 
as an 'eating charge' n^ich was kept to a minimum and was a 
source of financial confusion at the winding up of each stock. 
While the Moghul Empire was strong, political power for pro­
tection was unnecessary, and would indeed lead to trouble, 
and there was no need to seek trade outside Moghul territory 
Gujerat indigo and calico accounted for ssvon-tanths of the 
investment in 1620 and the bulk of the textiles were trade 
goods for use in Africa, America and the East Indies.
Roe's instructions had been merely to negotiate with the 
Moghul Emperor for trading concessions within the Erapirs, In 
fact he only negotiated a firman covering the territory mder 
the viceroyalty of Prince XhurrM, the future Shah Jehan, in 
Gujerat. Gariy in 1616 R>e had, against his bettor Judgment, 
asked for permission to fortify a factory, and this had been 
rejected out of hand, ^e had, before he arrived in India, 
thought of fortification; but very brief acquaintance with 
conditions within the Empire led him to reject this, and he 
only raised the matter on instructions from London. At the 
end of a year he gave the Company sono advice. TTe pointed
out that it was not necessary to keep a permanent ambassador 
at the capital: a vakil at He.1000 would do as well. fA 
meaner agent among these proud Moors could better effect your 
business’. Observation of the Portqguese and Dutch trade con­
vinced him that fortification and convoying of goods from 
outside the Empire were too expensive for the business done 
by the English at this time. For the circumstances in which 
the English Company found itself he summed up his advice as 
follows: ’net this be received as a rule, that, if you will 
profit, 3eek it at sea and in quiet trade; for without con­
troversy it is an error to affect garrisons or land wars in 
India1. It should be noted that his peaceful advice was 
limited to the land; he envisaged war at sea, and in fact 
finally extorted a settlement from the procrastinating Khur- 
ram by a threat of violence and blockade from the expected 
fleet of 1619.1*
Finally, it seems from Roe’s journals and letters that 
he did not expect conditions within the Empire to remain 
stable, but expected a collapse at the death of Jahangir.
What he was warning the Company against was expense. The in­
creasing trade and the permanent joint stock v*ere to invali­
date this in the course of half a century.
Batween 1620 and 1630 the demand for calicoes increased, 
especially for the French market, and those produced on the
1. The Embassy of Thomas Roe fed". W.Foster), pp.liii, 71, 
250,301,477 ff.
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Bastern side of India were preferred,1* It would be con­
venient to have an entrepot on that side of India, there­
fore, and in 1638 Francis Day and Andrew Coggan rented 
Madras for the annual payment of half the custom , and built 
Fort St. George, Madras was outside Moghul territory and 
would need to be fortified and guarded, and the Company, by 
the terms of the grant, was committed to some form of admin­
istration. JSxternally the Council of Madras had to play a 
political role on the Coromandel Coast, talcing into con­
sideration not only tho governments of Golcondah and Bijapur 
and their relationships, but also the frequently rebellious 
officers of these powers and the imperfectly subdued Hindu 
chieftains. The Butch and French Companies were also estab­
lished on the Coast and trade rivalry was complicated in a 
political field of profitable intrigue.
The Company in London was not enthusiastic about the 
acquisition and in 1645 held an enquiry into the action of 
Day and Coggan. It was resolved that it was ’a very indis­
creet action to go about the building of such a fort when the 
Company’s stock was so small. Yet if ever the Company have 
a plentiful stock it may be very commodious and advantageous 
for them*. Rather grudgingly it was agreed that Coggan and 
Day could not be held wholly responsible for this indiscretion
. p
as it was the joint action of the Council of Bantam. *
1. Wilson, Early Annals of the English in Bengal,1,46.
&• Love, VestigeB~bf Old Madras. I,’55.
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Madras was to bo the entrepot of t^s Oosst and Bay
trade, which was growing with tve increasing demand for tex­
tiles in Europe, The saltpetre of Bengal, too, was preferred 
to that obtained on the West Coast and the contrasts there 
were terminated in 1668. In addition Bengal produced opium, 
heap, jute and silk. So, dependent on Madras, were a number 
of factories on the coast of Golcondah and in Bengal, and 1he 
acquisition of the lease narkoff a turning point in the Com­
pany’s affairs that was half perceived at ho no av,d in Bantam. 
It showed the increasing Interest in the trade of the sub­
continent for its own sake, and no longer primarily as a 
source of trade goods for the Spice Islands. Aleo the trade 
of the Spiice Islands had always been carried on against a 
background of Asian anarchy and European rivalry. It was a 
costly business but accepted as such by the Company# Bow 
the increasing trade had led the Company outside the Moghul 
up ire into conditions on the mainland resembling those on
the islands and the Company would ultimately have to accept
the consequences. The Portuguese were already operating,and 
the former hud made Goa the centre of a network of coasting 
traffic and the main port of transhipment to Europe of Indian 
goods. If one accepts Moreland1e view that the activities c£ 
the Jluropean Companies did nothing to stimulate production ta 
India, it was obvious that the only way to defeat its rivals 
was for the Company to establish rival points of attraction#
i. Wilson, the -ttfiilgft ia, I»4«.
P. In From Jucbar to Aurangflob.
Contemporaneously with the establishment of the perman­
ent joint stock in the City of London, the Emperor Shah Jehan 
fell ill and his four sons fought for the throne. The long 
reign of t^e victor Aurungzeb saw the collapse of the Moghul 
Empire. At the outbreak of the civil war, Aurungzeb, as vice­
roy of the Deccan, had been engaged in the war against Bija- 
pur and his war against that state and Goloandah in vtfhich 
Madras was situated, lasted until 1687. So much was he occu­
pied with the war that for the last twenty-five years of his 
reign the centre of government was with the army in the field. 
From 1671 onwards he was engaged in a long-drawn war in 
Rajputana as a result of his aggressively intolerant religious 
policy.
It would be unfair to put the blame upon Aurui^eb for 
the destruction of the Moghul Empire. This was, as has been 
suggested, probably basically due to its nature; his contri­
bution was a reversal of the policy of religious toleration 
upon which a great deal of its early success was based. His 
wars, too, were unsuccessful and brought no profit to the 
Empire. Akbar is estimated to have left £40,000,000 in 
coined money, and Aurur^d), according to Gerald Aungier, 
began to spend this in 1676. '* His financial embarrassment, 
too, led to the constant re-sale of offices, and no official 
knew hew long he had to exploit his territory. Something of 
the result of this uncertainty can be seen in 1672. Rumours
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reached the ears of Shoistnh Khan, Nawab of Bonsai, that ho 
was to bo replaced, and these made him 'more rigorously rook 
the country', getting in all the money he could and taking 
taxes in advance. In faot an illness that made him foar 
death did something to mitigate the rigours on this occasion 
and in any ease the rumours proved unfounded! but the Whole 
is a very fair sample of ltoghul administration at this time. 
This uncertainty also drove officials into trade so that, in 
the same year, it was reported from Hugli that trade was very 
dead 'by reason of almost all governors, great and small, 
turning merchants and using most unreasonably those they deal 
with'.1*
Hxtornally the wurs were also affooting conditions in 
the Carnatio. The Deccan war gave the opportunity for the 
emergence among the Hindu Mahratta people of the family of 
Bhonsle, small landlords, who carved out an independent 
principality and under Shivajl, the second generation head 
of the family, an organised state supported by raiding. This 
was essentially of the same nature as the Moghul aspire - it 
consisted of an army, supplied and supported by a central 
bureaucracy, inhabiting a oentral homeland with a fluctuating 
and tribute-paying perimeter. The Rajputana war gave a 
religious background to the struggle and Shivaji and his 
successors could wage a people’s war and count upon Hindu 
support. So the Moghul situation gave an opportunity and the
1. l.F.Ii.S.li. ap.351.353.
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impulse to the Mahrattas who ranged over Southern India, 
increasing the endemio anarchy of Goloondah and raiding 
Moghul territory, further demoralising Imperial administra­
tion.
Some reflection of conditions in tho neighbourhood of 
Madras can be seen in the increasing military establishment 
in face of the parsimony of the Company. The original 
establishment, grudgingly allowed, was for 25 Snglish, #9 
Portuguese and Eurasians. By 1658 there wore 100 Snglish, 
Portuguese and Surasions and 500 'blades', and by 1674, 150 
.'nglish, Portuguese and iSurasiana - now bracketed together 
as Ohristians - and 600 Indians. By 1659 this foroe had 
already proved its usefulness in a dispute with Goloondah.1,
■vithin Moghul territory the changing situation was 
shown by the two Mahrattah raids on Surat. In 1664 Shivaji 
looted the city and on this occasion the Snglish did not 
suffer as their factory was defended by about 50 sailors.
Tho other merchants, however, wore plundered, and many loft 
the town. This destroyed the value to the Company of the 
factory as an entrepot. Until the Mahrattah raid Surat hod 
been an open city but Aurungz eb, realising the changing situer 
tion and the loss of trade due to look of protection, walled 
it in an attempt to attract the merchants back. The forti­
fications, however, wore insufficient, and Shivaji looted it 
again in 1670. These raids were a portent, for Surat was in
1. Love, Yoatires of Old Madras.I. 169,366.
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Hinduaton, the nuclear homeland of the Empire. *
The first raid led the merehants in Surat to suggest the 
acquisition of some territory which they could defend or at 
all ©Tents a place where they oould trade under the protec­
tion of naval guns. Swally Hoads offered no cover to Surat, 
some miles up the river. This problem was solved for them 
by the acquisition of Bombay from the Crown of England, to 
wvieh it had passed from Portugal on the ooe&sion of the 
marriage of Charles II to Katherine of Braganza.
 .
1, The information on the Moghul Smpire and the Mahrattas 
used in this section is largely from three works - 
J. S&rkar, Moghul, 4  3ho.rt Hlstor-_s 
Aurungzeb, and o.S. 3ardesai. Klstor:, of frllf voTTT.
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Ul). Civic Policy
Both Madras and Bombay gave tho Company responsibility 
for communities living there. In the latter tom the Com­
pany Inherited a eolonial community and powers of government 
which had belonged to t^e Crown of Portugal. In the former, 
however, although there was a community, the Company avoided 
the implications of this as long as possible and solved the 
problems of administration as they arose.
The first major problem was that of justice. The chief 
of eaoh agenoy had enjoyed, by virtue of tho Charter of 1661, 
the right to make regulations for, and with his council jud-e, 
his European subordinates. In Surat, of course, this was 
all that was required, since all Europeans were his subor­
dinates or were no eonoern of his. In Madras, however, Euro­
peans and Indians might be involved in crime. The latter 
were referred to the Indian ruler and justice was exeouted 
oooording to his directions. Then in 1663, a Mrs, Dawes was 
alleged to have killed an Indian servant. Hitherto mur­
derers had, considerately for the peaoe of mind of the Com­
pany, confined themselves to victims of their own r oe. Onee 
previously a soldier had killed an Indian thief and the Com­
pany had oarofully extorted from the leading members of the 
victim's community an admission that he was a thief and that 
the soldier had merely gashed his arm. How no ouch face 
saving was possible and the Company hod to solve a new pro­
blem. It would be unjust and impolitio to ignore the crime
nor could tho case be referred to offioi&ls of the Indian 
ruler. Aoeordlngly the President, Foxoroft, was nominated 
Governor and, with his council, empowered to try Mr*. Howes 
by jury. Kather doubtfully' the court heard the ease and to 
everyone's surprise and relief, Mrs, Hawes was found not 
guilty. Reporting the ease, the Council wrote: 'we shall 
need the direction and advice of a person better skilled in 
the law',1*
when Sir Josiah Child entered the Court of Committees 
in 1674, therefore, he found the principle of trade without 
territorial power still the official view of the Companyj but 
changing demands, waning central power in the Moghul Umpire 
and the ill-temper of Mrs. Hawes were to make it ultimately 
unworkable.
Two problems faced the Company - revenue and justice. 
They would appear, in tho twentieth century, to be bound 
together. To Burke, after the lapse of only a oentury, the 
Company seemed not 'merely a company formed for the exten­
sion of British commerce but in reality a delegation of the 
whole power and sovereignty of the Kingdom sent into the 
Bast'. The emphasis in politioal science in the Seventeenth 
Century, however, was rather upon the residence than the 
nature of sovereignty. But it was probably the very success 
of the trading policy Which, with the increasing anarchy and 
the rising cost of the anarchy, drove the Company along
the road to sovereignty,  ________
1. Love, Yeetlgoa of Old Madras.I. 273 ff.
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Already in 1670 tho cost of liadras had risen. In 1658 
the customs payment had boon commuted for 380 pagodas a yeas 
As the volume of trade grew it i.as only fair that some ad­
justment should be made and eventually, after a troublesome 
negotiation, the sum of 1,000 pagodas was agreed on. * Wi*fc 
growing lawlessness all around, the original installations 
at Fort St. Gteorge would need to be repaired if not extended, 
and the income was insufficient to meet the commitments, 
wMoh were being borne by the trade, not the town. Normal 
business procedure would necessitate some division between 
tho trading account and the operating account of the entrepot.
Heveme certainly dominated Oh lid’s thoughts of India, 
rad he saw the connection between revenue and politics. 
’Polity, politics, government and revenuo make up ten para­
graphs in their general letters from the But oh government to 
their agents, for every one of trade1, the Court wrote,doubt- 
lasn unfl.rChild's dictation, to Bombay.8*
In this connection, the commission of Straynsham Master 
sent out to investigate the trade of the Coast and Bay and 
assume the governorship of Madras in 1675, is important as a 
statement of policy.3* It also reveals something of the 
situation at the time. Master’s appointment had a double 
intention. It was suspected that the Coast and Bay trade was 
carried on inefficiently, and In any case the Court of Com-
1. Love, Vesti;:es of old Madras. 1,265 ff.
2. *p.$4.
3. Master, Maries, 1,212, and x.B.V.» pp.283 ff.
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mittees had little information about It. The trade of the 
hinterland of Bengal, of Benares and Patna# sane tv rough the 
delta of the Ganges, through the hands of agents dependent 
on Madras, This was probably the most lucrative trade of 
the Company and was certainly rapidly expanding. The value 
of exports from Bengal hod risen from £34,000 in 1668 to 
£05,000 in 1675h  but for this very reason the Company sus­
pected that its servants, in their capacity as private tra­
ders, and the Interlopers, were taking ouch of the business, 
and that, but for the sl&oknoBS of the fomor, the trade 
might be increased still more. Finally this trade had to 
bear the cost of Madras, In 1673, Langhorne found that after 
the ships had sailed - seven of them with cargoes worth about 
£73,000 gross - that he had £4,950 left to maintain the fort 
and factory; and this, he remarked, was 'too bare'. In 1675 
the revenue from various sources did not pay the rent. Admit­
tedly this was a bod year for revenue, beoause the distur-
©
banco** In Colcon&ah would lower the income from customs.
Master v-os to overhaul the commercial organisation. He 
was advised by Childt in a private letter, to dismiss any
a^ent he found defective •speedily and smartly1 without fear
3
or favour, and promised full support. Tie was to set up an 
organisation which would keep the Court informed of what was 
done in its name.
1. Sarkar, Short History of .JmrawBMh, p,405.
2. a .F ,H .s ..T i .  p p .^ f .s y :
3. Mast a r. irapern, 10 qu. Diaries. 1.65.
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The Bay trade was carried on in Moghul territory and the 
right to trade there should depend upon some legal right. In 
1352, Shuja, Aurungseb's brother, had been viceroy of Bang; 1 
and had granted the Ungllsh merchants the right to trade in 
return for a lump sum payment of Re 3,000 per annum.1* This 
was a very favourable arrangement, especially in view of the 
growth of the trade; but it was merely a viceregal grant or 
'nishan*. It was not an Imperial Firman, and ended with 
Shuja's vioeroyalty. In fact the Company had no legal right, 
a fact Which the Committees suspected but did not know. 
Master was to arrange a legal basis for the trade.
Finally he was to advance the trade of Madras as a town 
by a civic polioy. Justice was to be impartially adminis­
tered, 'thereby to induoe people to inhabit our said town'. 
Merchants were to be encouraged by 'permitting them a free 
market and civil treatment ... It hath been a great hindrance 
to the trade of the town that sqm have heretofore ingrossed 
the trade to themselves'. Here was a chance for Child to put 
into notion his axiom that people were riches. Master was 
to consider on the spot whether the trade of the town might 
be increased and the customs and the revenue maintained or 
improved by a moderated excise or perhaps a quit rent. The 
intention was to free trade and so increase its volume.
There was nothing in this document Which showed terri-
1. This was tribute - not customs. The Hutch paid customs 
and as we shall sec were worse off in Bengal than the 
Snglish. See e.g. 3.F.3.S.II. p.332.
torinl ambition, nor, indeed, anything which showed any up- 
to-date knowledge of the politieal and military situation.
The theme was the lnorease of trade and the oreation of an 
effective entrepot for the great Bay of Bengal, and the reascn 
for the civic policy was the attraction of people to make 
the entrepot self-supporting.
It was realised that Justice and protection would attract 
merchants. Security from the exactions of government and 
the perils of anarchy was rare in India. Much of the develop­
ment of the oivio policy oan be seen in the history of oourte 
of Justice in the territories, and the progressive acquisi­
tion of legal powers. For this the co-operation of the Crown 
was necessary os it involved a delegation of regal power.
As we have seen, the charter of 1661 had given the 
Governor and his council in eooh settlement the power to 
'judge all persons under them ... in all causes whether civil 
or oriminal, according to the laws of this kingdom and exe­
cute justice accordingly'. When Bombay was transferred to the 
Company in 166C, a new charter was Issued which clarified and 
extended the powers delegated to the Company* It could now 
enact laws Which were 'consonant to reason' and neither con­
trary nor repugnant to the laws of Ungland. The Company
%
availed themselves of this permission by drawing up a legal 
code for Bombay.
A court was set up there that was independent of the 
Company. That is to say, the members of the oounoil were not
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ex officio members, It was, however, Instituted by President 
Aimgier on behalf of the Company. Between 1670 and 1672 the 
Deputy Governor and Counoil had beard oases, but in the 
latter year this Court of Judicature was set up, with a full­
time judge assisted by two Justices. A scale of fees was 
laid down out of which the judge was to pay himself. The
importance of the Send)ay court lay in the early establish-
<• ^
ment of a Judiciary independent of the exocutive, which is 
an attribute of sovereignty, and because the implications of 
rule in India oould not be avoided there. It is not claimed, 
of course, that the significance of the move was realised at 
the time, but the form of the solution to the problem ie 
interesting.1*
When Streynshen Master was sent to Madras, Justice was 
regarded rather os good business than as good politios and 
had already shown results in Bombay. By 1675 it was dear 
that the population of Bombay hod risen. In 1668 the Portu­
guese hod probably handed over 10,000, and in 1675 there 
were, according to Fryer, about 60,000 souls. This success 
may have played a part in the choice of Master, who had been 
at Surat When the Bombay policy had gone forward. In 1678he 
followed the Bombay pattern as for os possible and constitu­
ted the Governor and Council & court of judicature, by reso­
lution of the Council, to try civil and criminal oases by Jury
in accordance with the laws of Kngland. The subordination of
1. fie information on court's ‘in india "is," of "course, derived 
from Sir Charles Fawcett, The First Century of 
Justice in Indi<^ . See espeofully pp.xix,61,201,
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the court's function to the mercantile duties of its members 
is illustrated by an entry' in the Diary and Consultation 
Book of Fort St. George in 1681, which records an adjourn­
ment because the Counoil was too occupied with the arrival 
of the ships from Bngland.1*
By 1678 the Interlopers wore beginning to vex the Com­
pany in Asian waters and in Parliament. They were neit’er 
servants of the Ceepany nor residents in Madras, and were, 
therefore, not amenable to the Jurisdiction of the Company. 
This new problem revealed another need of the Company which 
had not been envisaged in 1668 When the new charter was gftsn- 
that of a court to protect the monopoly. This could only be 
given by a now charter or the oreation of a royal court.
But the directors at home put off seeking new powers. In 
1681 they wrote '... Parliament may take into their delibon* 
tions the trade of India, now that it has beooae so consi­
derable and national, we think fit to desire no new addition
©
to our charter at present?. • In fast the Company dared not 
raise the matter in Parliament at this Junoture and had to 
wait for the defeat of the Whigs and the purge of the muni­
cipal corporations before it could secure Admiralty Courts.
Of these, two were set up in 1683, one at Bombay and 
one at Madras. These were not Company courts administering 
the Company's bye-laws or English law. Maritime law was
1* g1|.^^|-^nsu3^atlqa.^oi£, 1681, p.75.
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Roman or Civil law and the administration of this required 
professional lawyers. Sinoe tvey had Jurisdiction over the 
high seas they were royal courts. This again does not seem 
to have beon part of a long-term policy; it seems to have 
arisen from the needs of the moment and it seems, too, that 
the timing was forood upon the Company by the political 
situations at home.
There was certainly no intention to increase royal powr 
in India. An indication of this is seen in the adventures 
of the two judges sent out to preside over the oourts. At 
Bombay, a Dr. St. John was appointed, apparently at the sug­
gestion of Sir Lsoline Jenkins, the Secretary of State. He 
was a protege of Rochester, brother-in-law of James, Duke of 
York, and probably a Tory. This high Tory group, of whioh 
Sir Leoline Jenkins was one, appeared to despise and dislike 
or, perhaps,just understand Child.1, At all events St. John 
was viewed with suspicion by Child and his colleagues. They 
directed that he should merely sit in Admiralty oases and 
that there should be no amalgamation of the oourts of Admir­
alty and Judicature until * after we have aooount from you of
2
the good deportment of the said Doctor'. *
At Madras, Sir John Biggs, w^o had been for man;' years 
Recorder of Portsmouth, of w’-ioh borough Child had been mayor 
and in which he had business connections, must have been 
known to Child, It is possible, too, that he had a less
F  F a  v‘u * Sor?esjftBgo^ » I I , 60.
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quarrelsome nature. At all events t'e amalgamation of the 
oourts in Madras was carried out very smoothly.1-* That wettt 
seem, on tho whole, to he tho policy of the Company to main­
tain the Company Itself as tho ultimate source of vitality 
for the eommunitlos in India* in the path of whlah Intention 
was the unfortunate bargaining counter of Dr. St. John.
iarallel with the development of Juduoial powers was 
the assumption of authority over all the Snglish residents 
within the limits of the oharter territory. In 1676 they 
wore all acquainted with the Company's order that they should 
live in Madras.*'* Freemen were desirable in that they 
operated the entrepot and explored new fields of trade; but 
since they oould traffic with interlopers they had to be 
under the Company’s Jurisdiction. This order was an early 
expedient to oheoJc interloping, probably an interim measure 
to decrease their contacts until Admiralty courts oould 
curb the interlopers themselves.3*
Judicial powers involved political action at home, but 
in raising a revenue the Company oould meet with no opposi­
tion in London. If, however, a revenue was raised from the 
inhabitants, the Company would have to earn it, and this
1. For t' e troubles of Dr. St.John see Fawcett, First Century
°J arltlah Justloe in India, pp.144,145,150. For Sir 
John 3i0gs see p.£03.
2. Master, Piaricr, entry 15.12.76, 11,72.
3. Something should be said about Martial Law sinee the
enemies of the Company made mao' of it. It will bo dealt
with in an appendix to this seetion.
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vvould involve, ultimately, tho ereotlon of a sovereignty, 
legally based on a dolocation of royal power. There is, 
therefore, a little of the same backward glancing from 
Leodenh&ll Street to Westminster. • The reluotanee and 
ineffioienoy of the agents also hampered this development. 
The balance sheet of Fort St. George shows that the expen­
diture oould be four times the income even in January 
1680-1.2*
This polioy had two sides - the encouragement of 
settlers and the payment of the oosts of the plaoe by the 
inhabitants. Settlors for Bombay were encouraged from St. 
Helena. In 1675 indentures were drawn up, allowing free 
planters to reside there and allowing them tho same damages 
in the Europe trade as factors were allowed.'** In the pre­
vious year Aungiar had oonvened a representative meeting of 
the inhabitants and agreed with them a fiscal system to 
supercede that of the Portuguese. Their quarter payment of 
t' a produce of the land was commuted for a fixed sum of 
£1,656, subject to military service for those Who had held 
diroot from the orown of Portugal. In Bombay, of course, 
the Company had inherited a colonial community established 
before the town was handed over to Charles XI.4*
In Madras, the administration of Streynsham Master put
1* «*S. „B,0.9,j£ IX. p. 171.
|. ;&nagtation Jagg. Jflgj,. P.6.
4* jHj&SiL?f JtejtjJh M i*. 11,218, and
IIt 46 IXe
the affairs of tbs town on a buninasslike footing. Some of 
M s  civic enactments ware rudimentary and one wonders how 
the community h?id managed so long without them. In this 
category come the provision of aocont hooks for ammunition 
and garrison aooounts and registers of wills, christenings, 
marriages and burials. The settlement of the oourt has 
been already noted. Sew departures were the Institution of 
a house tax, the appointments of a soavenger and Clerk to 
the Market, and the regulation of punch houses and taverns. '
It seems oleor that Master’s administration was a con­
solidation on the eastern side of the peninsular. No terri­
torial acquisition or military preparation wore envisaged. 
The aim was a prosperous town which Should attract inhabi­
tants and relieve the trade of the cost of the agency.
Master was seleoted because he was a good book-keeper who 
knew India. In these early enactments his character played 
some part. His diary gives the impression of a staunch, 
rather straightlaoed Anglican, an accountant rather than a 
proconsul, who would provide account books and scavengers 
and limit drinking hours.
A later expedient to raise a revenue at Madras was the 
creation of a corporation there. It was a revealing episode 
Child appears to have been active in the scheme. He insisted 
that the ohi-rter of incorporation should be sent out under 
the Company’s and not the royal seal, and the Charter was
1. Master, Diaries. 1,59-74.
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that of Portsmouth, of w'iah borough ho had boon mayor and 
Briggs recorder, 7hs Company insisted on tho representa- 
tion among tho aldermen and burgesses of all tho raolal 
groups that inhabited Madras, and it was hopod that beoanse 
of that they would tho more willingly contribute to the 
ravonuo. In f&ot, this attempt to stimulate the flow of 
rerenue was a failure, but it rise to a mayor’s eourt
and so another stone was laid in tho edifice of dominion 
in India,1*
1. I'ove, Vestiges of Old Madras. 1,500.
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The failure of the corporation of Madras may hare been 
due in part to lagk of enthusiasm of the men on the spot; 
but the Whole oonoeption shows a great ignorance of local 
conditions on the part of its aut'ors. The Court of Somutt- 
teos ucJcnowledged a wont of information in Master’s eon- 
mission but it was more ignorant than it knew. Master had 
been instructed to find out by what legal right the Company 
traded on the Coast and in the Bay, and if there was no 
contract, to establish one. The directors were naturally 
quite Ignorant of the meaning of conditions which were then 
prevailing, random glimpses of which they would get from 
their correspondence. The majority of the faotories depend' 
ent on Madras were in Moghul territory and the hindrances in 
the trade shat were reported to them would appear to oall 
for a new negotiation on the pattern of Boo’s.
In the minds of Child and his associates tore would 
appear to be a failure to realise that conditions on the 
mainland were non approaching those of the Spice Islands, 
Vihere it was always recognised that defence was part of the 
costs of the business and where the Putoh system so much 
admired by Child was the aocepted practice. So, while in 
November, 1678, wo find the Court congratulating Bantam on 
the acquisition of territory and urging its fortification,'L* 
in the following year it was writing to Madras vetoing any
!• &.3.VI. P.l.
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expenditure on now installations -until a sufficient stool: 
had been built up to defray the eost. In the same year 
Jurat was forbidden to erect a fort at Caroapol and told 
that the Company ’did not desire a trade that must be main­
tained by blood*.1.
Sine© the 5capany was prepared to envinoge bloodshed 
in the Spioe Islands where it was unavoidable, t'-is would 
appear more a financial than a humanitarian soruple. It 
has to be remembered that the nargin of real profit was, 
until about 1370, very small, and as the volume of trade 
rose, the Company ran into costly political trouble at home, 
Professor 3arkar has estimated that the volume of trade 
was worth about £100,000 a year, and when one realises that 
such unavoidable expenditure as that on St. Ttelena hod to 
be met, for ishioh there was no possible return, one oan 
undor3tand the reluctance of the Company to embark further. 
Fryer, writirg of affairs in 1672, estimated that the trade 
just about balanced accounts.2* In 1673 Bombay hod eost 
the Company £20,000 and the balanoe sheet of the town drawn 
up in the August of that year showed assets of £1,994. In 
tho autumn of that year the ships leaving Surat had cargoes 
of over £100,000. In 1677, a good year, two ships took away
1. l.B.YI. pp.432,561.
2. Fryer, Haw Aooount. eto., p.212.
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oargoes of 1,412 tons worth £917,£82.1 • The high tonnage
suggests, however, that aomothing like a third of this was 
private trade, as the Company usually took ships for 500 
tons - that is, Sou tons of capacity in the ship, never­
theless, the textile market and the inoreusinvolume of 
trade would enable the Company to take the next step When 
Indian affairs made it necessary.
By 1677 Uaster had net progressed in the establishment 
to a logoi right to tho trade of Bengal. The Vioeroy, 
nhaintah Khan, was the unale of Aurungzeb, apparently/ a loyal 
and effioient offieer, to Whose good government, perhaps, 
the increasing vuluo of the trade was in part due. TTe and 
his subordinates were determined, in view of tho uncertainty 
of the times, to exact a share of the profits. The practise 
arose of extorting a road patrol charge, Whioh was virtually 
an internal customs duty, and a fee on legal transactions 
within the territory. Both the governor and hie officials 
demanded presents in oash and in kind. They also resorted
1. ^ 1 ^ ,  pp.S31.fi74.
The trade fluctuated very much as a an be soon from these 
figures taken from the Factory Hacords;
Madras
1674-5 
Surat 1671
1672
1673
3 £83,309
7 £70,309
1 £36,000
4 £102,077
7 £104,160 (ins. the Madras ship)O & A15741675
1676
1677
S £24,000
3 £47,000
2 £917,583 (due to collection
of old debts)
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to a to raof pre-emption, irtierob ygoods wore opened In tran­
sit and art io la a ware taken at prices fixed by the ’pur­
chasers’. Frequently tho agents of the Company had the 
mortification of seeing these goods sold in the market in 
competition with their own, and at lower prices.1"*
These ware all legal exact ions and it was believed that 
the establishment of a legal right would put an end to them. 
In addition to these, Shaistah Khan, daiming that the agree* 
aent with Shujah was at an end, demanded a per sent, ad 
v Alorem customs duty, in accordance with a firman of Aurung- 
zeb of 1663, fixing tho customs of the aapire at that figure. 
In the hope of extracting more favourable terms, the Council 
at Madras urged the niehan of Shujah against the asperor’s 
firman and oontiixued the annual payment, wv ioh was aeoopted.
Tho issue of the oustoms was, indeed, confused. Shais­
tah Khan aould with Justice claim that Shujah»s nishan oouM 
not tako pracedenoe over the imperial firman, and in any 
case Shujah was no longer Viceroy and the agreement with him 
was at an end. On the other hand, two experienced agents of 
the Company, Ghurnook and Vinoont, were oonvlnoed that the 
demand would never have been made if Shaistah Khan had 
received certain presents he had been led to oxpaot. There 
is no evidence that the Emperor specifically ordered the 
I£nglish to pay customs in Bengal. Certainly the subordinate 
officials seemed to accept the nishan and only sought to
1. Sarkar, ghgrj ,7|ls|oi^ ,.o.f J X B E g l&». P*404
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profit from the merchants, disregarding it when It suited 
them. Maybe Shaistah Khan was being more considerate for
1the imperial treasury: maybe he was trying to get his present.
As soon as he arrived, Master tried to raise the matter 
with the &np©ror through a vakil; but two unlucky accidents- 
a chance remark of a bystander and the subsequent death of 
the vakil - fdasht all the business*
In 1677 Master was still negotiating for a firman with 
money and a threat to withdraw the trade. In the meantime 
Madras was threatened by Shivaji. The K&hratta army passed 
within seven miles of the town in a thrust into the Carnatic 
in alliance with Goloondah* In fact Madras was not molested, 
but Master would have been failing in his duty if he had 
not repaired the crumbling fortifications of the town. The 
Court agreed to the necessity of repairs and sanctioned the 
expenditure but expressly forbade new erections until *a 
stock be raised for defraying the charge thereof*.3* Later 
in the same year, the Committee recorded their opinion 
that * it is not our over many great guns and chargeable 
fortifications that must support our trade in these parts, 
but a fair compliance with the King of Goleondah and his 
chief ministers* In fact tho remarks about the King of 
Coloondah were completely beside the point. He had been
1. B+F.K.S. II, 409.
2* Bee £}.rf7K.S. II, p*410 and note.
&« See STOT T T  II, pp. 187,190. Sartor, Short History of 
Aim m g s eb, p.£30.
4. j^ oveT Vestiges of Old Madras. I, 432.
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drawn into 3hivajifs quarrel with the Moghul and it required 
much t&ot on tho part of Master to evade t>'o Mahratta re­
quest for gunners and sappers. And the King of Qolcondah 
was frequently as little able to control his officers as 
Aurungzeb. In 1673, for example, the governor of Masulipa- 
tom had laid an embargo on all trad© there in despite of 
the King as well us the merchants.
Tho pattern of events in Bengal in 1677 can bo seen in 
the fate of th© investment in the spring of that year. The 
chief at Hugli, tho seat of a Moghul deputy governor, was 
authorised as usual to make use of bribes at discretion to 
got the goods away dovm river. This seems to have been a 
routine opening to the season* In this year he obtained for 
Re 500 a terax^ or&ry licence for the goods to pass dovm river 
without weighment, provided th© description oi the goods v*ae 
registered. This was on January 2nd. Five days later the 
boats were halted at Kasimbazor by th© harbour-master. Who 
disregarded the licence. The Company apparently took no 
action raid some of tho goods were allowed to proceed. Be H>0 
was demanded as customs on the remainder. The Company was 
prepared to bribe, but not to pay customs, presumably be­
cause this would oreuto a precedent. To encourage the Com­
pany to pay up, the harbour-master arrested the Company*© 
banian, and the vakil who was preparing to eet out for Dacca, 
the viceregal seat, to straighten matters out. These two 
wore eventually released and *hQ. Company fs factory at Kasin-
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bazar was blockaded. Finally orders were received fro® T>mm
to duspend the demand e for on stone pending the pleasure of
Aurungzeb being made known. § D i goods passed down river
on Key 1st. In the autumn it was time for the treasure to
pass u* river again with th® sum® rigmarole beginning again
with the issue of new passes. It la a story of annoyance
and the exaction of small bribes. It was not enough to moke
the trade not worth while, but humiliating and irksome.
xhe re-imposition oT the Jisssia by Aurungzeb in  1679
raised the whole question of customs duties paid by foreigners
2*
-n the Impure. Eventually it was agreed that the Company 
should pay a consolidated duty of 3i per cent, ad valorem 
duty - £& per cent, customs and 1 per cent. JizEii as the 
merchants were not Moslems. This agreement, as were all 
agreements, was purchased, and in Job Ch&mook1!? view wa3 a 
waste of money. In say case the exactions continued in spite 
of the firman,
The Company at home seems not to have realised that the
issue of customs and the exactions and other grievances were
tw© distinct questions. Tho firman of 1679 exacted a customs 
duty, but the laws of the ilapire expressly forbade the taking 
of internal tolls, presents and legal fees and the practice 
of pre-emption. In demanding the duty Shaistah Ahan was act­
ing legally; but the Company, olsteing rather speciously that
1. This story is told in B.F.ff.S.XI. pp.417-427.
2. Sartor, Short Hist or: o? ^nrnmzob, p. 410.
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P ay sent of customs at Surat exempted them from farther duty
within the impiro, refused to pay* The Viceroy, accordingfr, 
stopped tho saltpetre boats and the whole business begm 
again.
Job Ohujroook, who had been serving the Company in India
for twenty years, vividly' expressed oontompt for the Whole
proceeding* He wrote of the firman that it was a wants of
money* Hod it boon bought of Shah Jehun, Whose edicts were
of *suoh grout foroe *«. that none dare offer to make the
least exception against any.of them, it might b<3 somewhat
reasonable,but with this king Aurungzeb, none of which in
the least carry fear with th© people, all his government
\
making *a&ll account of them, ’tin tho oontnur^', * Ho had 
hoon convinced of this over a jporiod of oifi^ t yours. By
I ,
16C0 he could see, as we can now, the divergonoe in interest 
between Aurungzeb and his officials* Iftinning through Moghul 
official correspondence *is an insistence on the duty of 
officers to foster tho sources of revenue, and the constant 
repetition is an indication that the central government knew 
that this wo® not curried out* The Emperor Irapoaed light 
duties on foreign trade because of the supply of precious 
matule which the ;3ur©pean merchant© brought; the Company 
brought in between £60,000 and £90,000 worth a year*3* When
I* Quoted in Yule, Introduction of Hedges* Dlur^.II.xlvi.
Z» Bee Sartor, Moghul Adoinistration» Ohayters v and IX*
3* according to V«K«r a toial of £137|0GG in bullion came 
into Madras in 1670 and £87,000 in 1674. Ha estimates the 
average flow into Bengal at this time at about t^e latter 
figure. See also his Hog^ul Administration.
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therefor* the supervisor of the Mint at Ttugll impeded the 
Company's coining by detaining some of the gold, he was not­
ing not on behalf of the government but in hie own interests.
Chamook appears not to have understood tvis in 1672, 
for in that year he advised an appeal to the itaporor When he 
was foroed by the Rawab of Patna to buy a quantity of decayed 
saffron from him in return for a olearanoe for the saltpetre 
boats. Ho paid for it, regarding it merely as a demand for 
a bribe, and at first he refused to take delivery. However, 
and this reveals the relationship of the Company to th* 
Moghul authorities at this time, he had to take delivery 
boo raise the Hawab regarded the refusal as an affront.
In the following year the Counoil at Hugli wrote home 
that the imperiousness and the oppressions of inferior 
governors led them to suspeot that all was not well at 
jvurungzeb's oourt and t*>ey blamed the trade diffio ilties on 
'the reign of a fakir king and the regenoy of a deerapit and 
covetous Jfawab' (Shaistah Khan), 'a great favourite of the 
King and muoh addicted to study, Which gives tve officers 
the occasion to oppress the people'.1. However, in 1674 
Gharnook opened negotiations through Thomas Roach, an EngUh 
gunner at Agra, and sent a vakil with authority to spend up 
to Re. 5,000 in bribes. The events of the next five years, 
however, caused him to change his opinion on the possibility 
of Imperial action.
!• II, pp. 353,354,360.
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Chamook, incidentally, was is private correspondence 
with Child and he always bore a high reputation with th* 
Court, yet in 1683 we find the same tentative approach on 
the part of the latter in face of his advice. The idea had 
boon put forward by Chamook and some of the returning ships' 
captains that the only way to seoure the Bengal trade was 
the seizure of an island in the Canges delta. The objections 
put to this by the Court are interesting. First, the cost 
would be very slowly reimbursed: secondly, it might irritate 
the Moghul, who could seize the Company's goods at Surat; 
and finally the Dutch might 'wind themselves into th* quar­
rel*. The Court t*en went on to discuss other proposals.
They believed the Company oould do mors damage from Bombay, 
Which was less vulnerable since it did not itself 'give 
trade*. From there they oould cut off the Moghul's communi­
cations with Mecca, Persia and Arabia. They did not, in 
fact, order, or even sanction this; but that it should be 
considered shows a failure to understand that it was not 
Aurungzeb, but Shaistah Khan, who was their enemy. Continu­
ing in the same confused vein, the Court suggested that it 
might sanation t*e acquisition by grant from the Smperor of 
an island, 'Which, if settled under English laws, oan give a 
revenue and furnish a residence for the Agent and Counoil*. 
The Committees wore 'positively resolved first or last to 
assert our right due to us by the King's firman purchased by 
us at sundry times to our eost of 2150,000'. They toyed with
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the idea of seizing Chittagong, but while they preferred 
this, said they would delay. Finally they ordered Gyfford 
to take down two companies of soldiers and use hie discre­
tion as to What use he should put them. Re might even go 
so far as to seise the Moghul's salt vessels after the 
•petre boats were safely down river'.1*
This letter affords a good opportunity to analyse the 
directors' minds in 1683. They were clearly temporising, 
partly because they were unwilling to embark on further ex­
pense and partly beoause they were awaiting events in Europe. 
Some years later than Charaoek they had oome to realise the 
uselessness of waiting for Imperial protection. But they 
saw more implications in th* situation than he did. The sho 
to their state of mind is th* anxiety about the Dutch.
Charles 11, like James XI, had links with France ether 
than the ideological links stressed in text books, as we 
hare seen, he had received tonnage and poundage for life,and 
on* source, therefore, of non-Parliamentary income was foreign 
trade. Re and his advisers were no doubt aware that the 
real danger to English interests in economio and maritime 
affairs was not Franco but Holland, and they could see with 
equanimity the victory of Xiouis XIV in Europe.''* The desire 
of the Country Party to bring this country into an alliance
against France had twice allowed Charles to receive a pension
1. A* documents "on 'Which this section is "bona.f will be "found' 
in Yule, Intro, to Hedges' Diary IZ,xxii ff.,xlvi,lxxiii.
2. This is the view of Dr. Arthur Bryant. See his Psd-vs. Man 
In the Making. Carre confirms this view as far as the 
Annin. tr-^ le Was concerned in his depressing account of the 
French Company. See Travels, pp.142,381,
from Louis for proroguing Parliament and their suspicion 
that he would use any money voted for a French ear to estab­
lish absolute rule and Catholicism in England bad* fair to 
bring the administration of th* country to a standstill. The 
crisis of the conflict came in 1679 and 1680 and the mis­
handling of the Oxford Parliament by Shaftesbury, Who by 
truculence and bringing his supporters armed into the city 
forfeited much of his popular support, gave the Xing his 
opportunity. At this point the initiative passed to Charles 
and he set about re-oodoiling the borough charters to secure 
Tory majorities thereafter. The East India Company's inter­
ests marched with the king's. The neutrality of England 
would ultimately spell the ruin of Holland and th* removal 
from India of the rival company. Any move Which would expose 
the Company In India arust await the triumph of Charles, and 
that would not appear absolute in 1680.
At the same time as the King's purge of the corporations, 
Child carried out a more merciful and fino.noial purge of the 
East India Company's directorate by buying out the Milg Com­
mittees. Papillon, Child's erstwhile partner, was certainly 
involved with the Whigs in the City of London and perhaps in 
the Popish Plot. He had either lent an ear to the tales of 
woe told by Interlopers from India or he believed that the 
basis of the stock should be broadened for financial reasons. 
As we have seen in Chapter II, after a crucial debate in the 
Court in Hovembar, 1681, on Whether the present Joint stock
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should bo terminated, PapiUon, Barnardlstons and others two 
bought out. Throe years later, as the result of an notion 
arising out of the eleotion of Thoms Pritohard as Lord Mayor 
of London, Papillon fled to Holland.1*
It is impossible to say whether this transaction marked 
the triumph of & faction in the Company or the prevailing of 
Child*s personal views. At all events, rising politically 
and in the Company was Sir Benjamin Bathurst, Treasurer to 
the Duke of York. He was as muoh ooomitted to the Tory cause 
as Papillon was to the Whigs. Henoeforward he and Jeremy 
Sambrook, another staunch Tory, Who had seen service at 
Madras, were to remain closely associated with Child.
when the Puke of York became King, the Parliament which 
met in 1685 was proof that the polloy of Charles IX had been 
successful. The Company then felt free to act and embark on 
the war against the Moghul aspire, and its notion was the 
responsibility of Child and his group.
Beading an account of the Moghul war,2,one does not gain 
an impression of a determination to acquire territory. It is 
doubtful whether it was directed to any end except by show­
ing the saperor that the Company was powerful in India, to 
extort trading privileges. It was a move in the confused 
gome of extortion between the Company and Moghul officials. 
Three considerations can be submitted. First, there was no 
attempt to establish sovereignty over Masulipatam, Which was
1. A.F.W. FupuHon,
2. In e.g. Sarknr, Aurunffgab. pp.405 ff.
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than In Moghul hands and loosely held, and which was valuable 
to tho Company* Second, Aurungzeb had granted the Company a 
firman and the quarrel lay with his servants. Thirdly, there 
was a parsimonious lack of preparation. The ’General*, John 
Child, had been promoted over the heads of Petit and Oxenden, 
not as the agent of a vigorous forward policy, but because 
he had no traffic with Interlopers. His antics, recorded by 
Hamilton, and his pathetic crl de ooour: ’What I shall do, 
if you Quarrel with the Moghul, 1 cannot see', do not lead 
us to suppose him the heaven-born general needed to support 
Captain Heath in the Bay of Bengal with 308 men against the 
Moghul aspire.
In Western India no attempt was made at any seizure of 
territory, but the military operations were confined to an 
armed demand for the redress of grievances, and attacks on 
Indian shipping. It was the Governor of Surat Who opened 
hostilities in reply to the demand for redress. One part of 
the preparations was the intended withdrawal of the Company's 
factory from Surat to Bombay. In fact the Company was frus­
trated in this, but that kind of action was quite in keeping 
with the pattern of contemporary Indian polities. In Bengal, 
Heath was restrained by his colleagues from seizing Chatgaon. 
The Company acted almost entirely in aooordanoe with the ad­
vice of Thomas Roe - to fight at sea. Finally, it was tacitly
1. A good account of John Child’s life and character is in 
R. and 0. StraShey, m ^ i n* s Jle ball ion.
2. Hamilton, A Hew Aecount of the ^ asFlMies, p. 187.
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adnitted that it was a war against viceroys and peace was 
concluded separately for Sastern and Western India.
Cn the positive side tho war marked a realisation that 
the policy of Moghul officials was to annoy and exploit the 
Company by all means short of war, and that the amperor 
oould not protect the merchants, Who must look after them­
selves. The Company learned, incidentally, that if the 
Bmperor oould not protect the merchants, he oould control 
them. But he still needed them and the terms were humili­
ating rather than harsh. At the prioe of humility and John 
Child’s honour they were reinstated, and their position was 
clarified.
The Company was certainly not oast down by the costly 
war nor the humiliating conditions of peace, nor was there 
any retreat after the contemporary revolution in England. 
Their oommroial interests had not suffered during hostili­
ties. Slihu Yale had traded as a private merchant with the 
Company’s investment to prevent the Dutoh winding themselves 
into the market.1. Henceforward military strength was an 
acknowledged charge on the revenue. 'Keep Madras strong and 
put all our former orders about the improvement of our re­
venue into full and effectual exeoutlon*. Further, writers 
and English servants were to be exercised in arms.
The tone of the correspondence had not changed, but 
there was a realisation that money had to be spent. In 1689,
1. L.B.K.. p. 104.
Bombay was bidden to go ahead with the projected fort at 
Hetorah, because 'although we are at peace nit’-’ the Butch 
now, we must provide in peace for defenoe in war, for to Bve 
and trade by courtesy in India makes a very silly figure', 
The Council was, however, to inorease the revenue, because 
"tis that must maintain our force When no accidents oan 
interrupt our trade; 'tis that must make us a nation in 
India; without that we are but as a great number of inter­
lopers united by His Majesty's royal charter'.1* The Court 
also announced its intention of making Bombay the centre of 
the trade, 'the magazine centre', rather than Surat, so long 
the seat of government of the Company's affairs on the west 
ooast, and expressed a desire to 'people Bombay with SngliSh? 
and offered assisted passages from St. Helena for all over 
fourteen. * This emphasis on Bombay indicates the end of 
any notion of Moghul protection*
At this time, too, the Company acquired Calcutta as the 
centre of the Bengal trade and its importance as in the oase 
of Bombay was that it could be protected by naval guns. Much 
more than either Bombay or Madras, Calcutta was the creation 
of the Company, since it took over no community other than 
the two villages of Sattanati and Calcutta, In Bengal, too, 
the Company had won better terms, returning to the old agree­
ment and paying Re.3,000 a year in lieu of customs for their 
Whole trade. This time, however, it took no chances, but
1. See -U.3.IX. pp.8,19,20,64, and Love, Yestipres 1,513,530.
2. Ijv, p.32.
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set about building a defensible fort.
Assuming that the Company was awaiting security of its 
political position at home and was gaining increased powers 
through its alliance with the House of Stuart, it had taken 
its opportunity just in time. By the end of 1688 its oppo­
nents had triumphed. Hot only was there a change of dynasty 
but the prerogative, the residuum of power, had passed from 
the Crown to Parliament. The royal prerogative w^ioh gran­
ted and protected the charter oould now only be exercised ty 
consent of Parliament, Which, within the foreseeable future, 
would have a aihig majority. And the Company was oommlttedi 
it had a polity in India, and When it was assailed that was 
one of the reproaches. On the other hand, during the 
struggles of the eighties it had acquired new powers to deal 
with its rivalb and its growing responsibilities, and in the 
struggles of the nineties these were defended by Child as 
part of the fabric of the Company. It was protected, too, 
by the unwillingness of William III to be & party king and 
his desire to maintain os much as possible of the royal pre­
rogative.
Much thought at this time was given to emulating the 
Dutch population policy. The period after the Revolution 
saw the contract made with the Armenians. This was on Child’s 
initiative entirely. His was the contract with Jean Chardin, 
Agent for the Armenian nation in bigland, and with Coja 
Panous Calendar. By the agreement the Armenians were to hare
religious toleration and equal rights of offioo in th* Com­
pany1 s settlements, permission to trade within tho charter 
limits and to travel in the Company's ships. They were to 
rank with Snglishmen for indulgencics and to pay slightly 
higher freight charges. The aim of this was to divert the 
great volume of Armenian trade between Asia and birope to 
pass through England, and link the Company's trade with the 
Armenian contacts through Asia. The Armenians could trans­
port wool to 'Usbeok Tart aria and the bookside northward of 
India and China'; they oould also divert the silk trade from 
Turkey and the hands of the Levant Company to Bombay and 
those of the Bast India Company. In addition to increasing 
’ ngllah navigation and our customs of Bombay', this agree­
ment would hove the effect of endearing the Company' to the 
government, as it was a very real national service. The 
ramifications of the Armenian trade were mentioned by Carrs, 
Who wrote of meeting Armenian merchants in Leghorn in 1672, 
Whom he know in India. The Armenian community was prepared 
to purchase the Company's goods in bulk by the shipload.
They paid £20,QUO for the cargo of the Kin/? ./111 lam in 1690. 
To attract residents from among th* less prosperous members 
of the community, it was agreed that When fifty Armenians 
settled in a town they should receive a grant to enable them 
to build a church. Child maintained his interest in them to 
tho end of his life and his friendship with Coja Panous. 
Anncsly believed himself to have been dismissed by the Company
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towards the end of the century on the instance of Child, 
ho cause he 1 was not kind enough to the Armenians* .
Other aspects of population received attention. Fort 
St. George was upr&ided for not importing skilled workers 
during the famine as tho Dutch had done at Ketchlepatam, 
and an the commission to Sir John Goldsborough in 1691-2, 
he was ordered to consider the import of Madagascar 
1coffreys* as labourers and guards to relieve the need for 
European troops. He was advisod to keep them under strict 
discipline with their families in a compound 1 as the Dutch 
have uone in Hat avia1. The notion was referred to again m  
1694 and 1695 and the Court advised Fort St. George thatt
the coffrays should speak no Portuguese and it was stressed
that their great value lap in their having no affinity with
2the Indians. *
1. For t*e Armenian contract see h.B.IX, pp.20,113,114,163; 
Carre, I ravels, p.I3; and home ilisc.40, pp. 123,130,143.
2. Yule, Introduction to HedgesT Diary,fT, olviii and
, p . 1 %j .
(iv) Dominion
Child has been for long associated with the phrase 
’dominion in India1. It was at this time, after the Moghul 
War, that the Court of Committees wrote its famous letter 
asserting that without revenue dominion would soon fall to 
the ground and the trade after it.1* It is worth analysing, 
therefore, r/hat was meant by ’dominion1 that Child consi­
dered that the Company had achieved in 1689.
First, it consisted in the right to govern Bombay and 
Madras and, later, Calcutta. In these places the Company 
was the sovereign authority, maintaining military power and 
performing legislative and judicial funotions. The military 
power was to protect the goods of the Company; the legisla­
tive and judicial powers were to make the town3 self-support­
ing and to oontrol the trade. As far as possible the goods 
of the Company were withdrawn from the ISmpire and the power 
of Moghul officials. To maintain this position the Company 
now realised that it must be prepared to be embroiled in 
violence, both with Indians and with Interlopers. The Hawab 
of Bengal, for example, was threatened with a resumption of
o
hostilities if he countenanced Interlopers.The Committees 
were not prepared, however, to countenance any extension of 
territory, because the Company held sufficient for the neecte 
of the trade and they knew that territory had to be subsidised.
1. ii.B.Il, p.59.
2. Yule, Introduction to Hedges’ Diary, III, xviii.
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But ^il e  dominion, by definition, meant military, 
legislative and judicial power, it had certain connotations. 
Th© term no doubt invited contemporaries to a comparison 
between the English and iXitc^  companies and in making a com­
parison nov; we may be able to see more what the term meant. 
The Dutch Company as a body had enjoyed the powers which 
gave dominion since 1602 but if the nature of those powers 
was the same, the origins of them were different and so were 
the structures of the two companies. The attitudes of the 
two companies towards their political powers also differed 
and it would seem that tho differences in attitude were 
caused by the differences in the structures of tho companies 
and in the origin of their power. 3omo examination of the 
butch Company and its attitude to dominion may be helpful, 
therefore, in understanding the position and views of the 
English Company in 1689.
The butch Company had the vigour of confidence and this 
probably arose initially from its close integration into the 
political fabric of the country, which mode it immune to 
criticism from politicians and shareholders. The Company 
consisted of six Kaxaeras, each a company with its own share­
holders, directors and system of accounting. In 1602 these 
Kameras had been amalgamated with the Amsterdam Company 
holding a half interest, Zeeland a quarter, and Delft, 
Rotterdam, Hoorn and jinkhaisen one sixteenth each. The com­
bine was directed by a committee of seventeen, virtually
controlled by Amsterdam, the members of which held office
for life and were appointed by the nomination of three can­
didates by the City Council of the Kamera concerned, of 
Which the committee itself chose one. In this position the 
butch Company was free from the constant fear of criticism 
and frustration that haunted the English Company.3**
The monopoly was much more strict. There were no free 
’burghers’ on tvc peninsular in tve seventeenth century and
y
private trading in spice was, according to Barloi?, * a hang­
ing matter. The butch Company seems, at least on one occa­
sion, to have enforced a penalty of life imprisonment on a 
private buyer of spice. On the Whole, however, they seemed 
just as powerless as the English Company to prevent private 
trading among its employees, since everyone was involved.
While it tried to maintain a tight economic control 
over its servants in the East, the Dutch Company was prepared 
to allow them far more initiative in political matters. Only 
Ceylon corresponded directly with Holland; all the other 
factories and ’gouvemoments’ corresponded with Batavia, 
which had always enjoyed full powers of government including 
the right to make peace or war.
Hot only did the Dutch Company take for granted the use 
of force but it was prepared to leave the decision to the 
discretion of the ’gouvemement’ of Batavia. The English 
agents realised the lack of initiative allowed them. Hedges
1. Cambridge rIi&»ior^  ox India.?.31.57.58. E.HeeJfcsher,
H ^rTnrnlitlisraT'TVggS'.-------
2* Journal, pp.511,512.
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noted in his diary that people on the spot should be given 
more latitude * and in 1674 Surat wrote the but oh had humtflafl 
the governor because ’they oould proceed boldly and without 
control from their superiors’.^ * Even when the Company 
came bo accept the fact what force might be an instrument 
ox brude, it was no more disposed to allow initiative to its 
agents in the iiast than it was dxsposed to allow them much 
discretion in matters oxx trade. This was partly due to mis­
trust and partly due to a tradition of supervision.
The tradition of supervision was due partly to this 
mistrust and partly to the custom of the Company to control 
the investment very firmly and to give exact directions. 
Government was to sustain the trade and whoever controlled 
the commercial policy had also to control the political.
When in 1676, Gerald Aungier had been censured for ’grandeur?, 
he was reminded that ’our business is trade and what govern­
ment we have is the better to carry on and support that’.411* 
It was the same fifteen years later.
In any case, the communities in India were in no sense 
colonies. At no time did the Company regard its servants us 
domiciled in India, but they were allowed to come and go 
almost as they pleased, and in fact they had to get permis­
sion to stay on, alter their service was completed. The 
Dutch, on the other hand, would allow no passages home under
1. Hedges, Diary,I,139.
. JJ . J-' . . •-> . I , p .  24 b •
3. g.T.T.irr I,pp. 135,136.
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twenty-fiv© years’ service and many of their servants died 
in Asia. In this way they hui.lt up an Asian community that 
ms, in fact, a colony. This does not ever seem to have 
boon envisaged by the English Company. As we have seen, 
the compact with the Armenians was commercial, not political. 
The Armenians were thought of, not as colonists, hut as an 
Indian community with special privileges.
Another factor m s  the insecurity of the Company’s 
position at home. This was perhaps the most fundamental 
difference between the English and Dutch Companies and may 
have been the decisive factor in the pattern of Dominion.
The English Comptiny was always sensitive to political events 
in England and whoever was conducting the political campaign 
at home had to have effective control over all the Company’s 
activities.
Dominion* therefore, was really a development of the 
Company’s policy, in accordance with its traditions; it was 
a response to a situation which faced the Company in Europe 
and Asia. It was no revolution or volte face.
It is frequently said that the period of Child’s domi­
nation of the Company^  saw the abandonment of the Eoe dootrineb 
But, as we have seen, the doctrine was really advice for 
certain circumstances which had ceased to stand by the end 
of the century, and was, in any case, confined to trade 
within the Empire. The only part of Roe’s advice that had
1. The differences between English and Dutch methods will
bo discussed in an appendix to this section.
been neglected m s  that about land \irarfare, sines 300 odd 
soldiers had ‘boon involved in Bengal and the Conp my in- 
voluntarily fought on land at Surat* It must he remerfberod, 
too, that Hoe had "been impressed with Mog1 ul power in 1619 
out had not expected it to last. If the Company under­
estimated Moghul powere in 1687, so had Hoe in 1617, He 
had been concerned with profits and the expense of forts 
and garrisons. The permanent Joint stock and tve increased 
trade had made his specific advice obsolete from that point 
of view. The trade had shown itself able to carry theco 
charges. What happened in the 1680s was not an abandonment 
of Roe’s advice but a development from the same promises. 
There was no Child doctrine to oppose to a Eoo doctrine and 
this itself is an interesting and negative proof of Child1s 
part in directing the Company. It is impossible to find axy 
preconception in his writings about an ideal policy for the 
Company. He only committed himself in justification after 
the event. It would seem, therefore, that the acquisition 
of ’dominion1 was defensive. Tho apparently purposeful policy 
was really an adaptation to changing circumstances to keep 
the Company in existence. This would be all that would be 
required of the Company by shipowners in Child’s position.
The next of the Company’s history was a success­
ful rearguard action. The success can be measured by the 
fact that it survived the throwing open of the trade and 
the foundation of the new company. It can he said that the 
Company lost its battles and won its war. it could not end 
interloping nor prevent the new company!s charter hut the 
latter enterprise gave it a single rival and that rival was 
powerless, since without the installations and contacts of 
the Company it could not operate. That,, in the history of 
the Company, is the importance of the policy discussed in 
the preceding pages.
At home the position of the Company had been greatly 
weakened. Its leaders were compromised by the payment of 
the illegal taxes and the gifts to James II, by serving him 
as sheriffs and in the City of London, and the prerogative 
had passed to Parliament where its enemies were strong. Bri­
bery in an oligarchy tends to be expensive and the results 
unpredictable.
Two examples of Child adapting himself to charging 
conditions have already been noted: the purchase of the 
Buke of Bolton’s lead and the gift of a command to a friend 
of the Yiiife of the Speaker. These are clearly two among 
many acts of obligation. Kaeaulsy has described the sordid 
struggle over the renewal of the charter and the enquiry 
into corruption, mentioning the sum of £SG,GuC paid out in
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bribes, while Evelyn has described the exodus of the Com­
pany’s supporters from the House before a crucial vote in 
1698, tc see a tiger baited by dogs.~* The Stuarts had been 
much cheaper and more reliable friends.
However, Child probably directed the bribery towards 
the entourage of William III. He spoke in a letter of heap­
ing from ’people abroad with the King1, and Hunter suggested 
that the Company probably forfeited its charter deliberately 
in 1693 so that the matter could be dealt with by the Privy 
Council, of which the corrupt Carmarthen was Lord President, 
before Parliament could re-aasemble.
In Asia, if all was not well, there was development, 
especially in the Companyhs relations with the Moghul Empire# 
At sea piracy in Indian waters had increased, probably as a 
result of interloping and the Moghul vfar, and the Company 
found itself held responsible. The Emperor wished the Euro­
pean trading companies to undertake officially the policing 
of Indian waters; the governor of Surat wished to profit by 
the situation. Accordingly the factors were imprisoned 
until they agreed to do this and give a bond of indemnity. 
Failure to prevent the depredations of Captain Kidd and the 
machinations of the new company’s agents lad to further im­
prisonments until Butch reprisals upon shipping lad.to the 
release of the Surat factors, and then the English, Butch
1. fvel;n, Picry, p.572.
2. Hunter, Hist or;/ of British India, 11,310.
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and French companies undertook Jointly the patrol of the
western approaches.On land, the fortification of 
Calcutta in Moghul territory was expressly permitted by the 
Nawab of Bengal in 1696 after the rebellion of a Hindu raja# 
For the first time the Company gained the concession yf->ich 
Hoe, eighty ye >rs before, had failed to get and pronounced 
an unnecessary expense. Bow its necessity was agreed by 
the Nawab.^*
So, by the turn of the century, the Company, "by use of 
soa power an advocated by Hoe and by being prepared to face 
the cost of fortification, of which later experience had 
taught the necessity, was becoming integrated into the 
political as well as the economic structure of the Empire.
The Surat factory remained in the circumstances 
arranged for It by Hoe, and at the mercy of the governor of 
the city, but the trade depended less and less upon it.
Trade depended upon Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, the fruits 
of the olicy of ’Dominion1, and the control of them was the 
Company’s chief weapon in its struggle with its enemies, 
Because of them the Company endured, as Child said it would, 
18.s long as our youngest grandchild shall live1.
1. Sarkar, Short Hist or; of Aurungaeb, pp.414-418.
2. Ibid, p.422.“ .......
-176-
A. THE COMPETENCE OF THE AGENCIES ON THE
 ----- TSSIST "mTBEf ~
The matter of the competence with which the trade of 
th e  Coast and Bay was carried on raises a number of points 
w hich have a b e a r in g  on the policy pursued during Child’s 
g u idan ce of the Company’s fortunes. Two charges commonly 
made a g a in s t the agents were the neglect of the Company’s 
a f f a i r s  for their own, and the use of the Company’s money 
and goods for their own private trade. This was at first a 
m a tte r  distinct from Interloping and traffic wit^ Inter­
lopers and was a problem which other companies trading over­
seas had to face. It was, for example, the practice for 
th e  c a p ta in s  employed by the Africa Company, W^o had the 
perquisite of being allowed to carry slaves on their own 
account, to consider that all slaves who died on the voyage 
v*ere the company’s.
Jearsey, who had been chief at Masulipatam from 1662 
'until 1669, had definitely neglected t^e Company’s business 
f o r  h is  private trade and used its stock for his own pur­
poses. When he was replaced, his successor, Mohun, was, at 
first, ’mighty exact and just1, but having taken over with­
out any accounts for the previous five years, he soon fell 
in to  Jearsey’s ways, and in 1674 Langhome, at Madras, with­
drew the funds from  him, suspended him and seized Jearsey’s 
s h ip s  in  case he should dispose o f his goods to  the detri­
ment o f  th e  Company. Mohun and Jearsey remained at Masuli-
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patam, a w a it in g  an e n q u iry  th a t  n e v e r to o k  place and taking 
part in  the q u a r re ls  w hich wrecked th e  fa c to r y .
These q u a r re ls  were probably a source of inefficiency. 
They seemed to a r is e  la r g e ly  out of private trade and dis­
p uted  s e n io r i t y .  On both these scores the Company a t  home 
vvas to  some extent to blame. The Committees wore always 
prepared to listen to tittle tattle from junior employees, 
and u n t i l  the time of Stroynsham Master no rota of seniority 
was kept. It seems probable that th e s e  s n a i l  bickerings did 
more damage to  the t ra d e  th a n  W in te r ’ s seizure o f power at 
M ad ra s .
An example of listening to tittle tattle ’was the case
o f  Saw oer. He was a linen draper sent out by the Company to 
sort c lo t h .  He appears to  have been a trouble-maker and 
accused Langhorne, the agent at Madras, of selling cheap and 
b u y in g  dear from the Indian merchants with whom he wished 
to  s tand  well for his own shipping activities, and of using 
the Company’s money for his own investment. This seems to 
have been untrue in the case of Langhome, for the Indian 
m erchants under his jurisdiction complained of ’strict sort 
ing’, and S i r  Charles Fawcett is inclined to acquit him of 
a llo w in g  his own business to interfere with the Company’s,
On the o th e r  hand, the concerns o f some o f  the Com­
pany’s em ployees were p r e t t y  la r g e .  Mohun had twelve or 
t h i r t e e n  ships at sea and he was suspected, probably with 
re a s o n , of borrowing the Company’s money to freight them and
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of putting off his private creditors until the arrival of 
the Company’s ships, When he would he able to pay his debts. 
Apparently he also sent the Company’s broadcloth to Goleon- 
dah on his own account, and if he feared a bad market, laid 
it to the Company’s. He did not deny these accusations but 
merely urged the precedent of previous chiefs. There were 
also general complaints that the goods of commanders and 
officers of ships were disposed of before the Company’s. 
Without a strict register of goods landed it would have been 
impossible to check abuses like these, and even in 1677 the 
Council of Madras urged that such a register was impracti­
cable. To accusations they replied somewhat evasively that 
the Agency had no debts ’either long or bad’.
This situation was the background to interloping and 3n 
this the Company was completely in the hands of the agents 
on the spot. Indeed, one interloping captain, Alley, began 
his career as master of the Adventure, a ship belonging to 
Mohun, While the latter was chief at Masulipatam. Alley 
appears to have been sufficiently well thought of to com­
plain of the harbour facilities at Madras to tve Council 
there.
The visitations of Puokle and Master seem to have made 
little improvement and it is doubtful whether the Company 
could expect to be better served bv w^at were in effect 
P&rt-tirae servants. In small communities, in a hot climate, 
with everyone concerned w ith  his own advantage, there were
- 179-
bound to be quarrels Which decreased the quality of the ser­
vice rendered. But the volume of trade m s  increasing in 
spite o f  this and in spite of the rapacity of local governors 
in  Groloondah and Bengal and theaiarohy of weak and warring 
c e n t r a l  governments and external enemies. And the Dutch, it 
must be remembered, were from a political point of view in a 
far stronger position. During the Dutch wars, the military 
establishment at Madras, barely adequate for protection 
against Indians, was quite useless against Europeans.
When in 1674, nanghorne reported fa poor year1, the 
cause was political. Three ships had been captured by the 
Dutch the year before, so he had only one to load, and he had 
been undersold in woollen goods, ironically with the cargoes 
o f the captured ships.
It would seem that the faotiousness, interest in pri­
vate trade, friendship with Interlopers and haphazard hand­
ling of the Company’s money on the part of its servants 
justified the suspicion of the Committees. There were, too, 
some dishonest men among them, like Jearsey and Vincent. But 
neither these factors, nor the difficulties under which the 
trade was carried on, nor, it should be added, the Commit­
tees’ ignorance of conditions and determination to keep con­
trol in their own hands, could prevent the trade growing.1*
B»F.N.S. II, pp.xiv,4,127,181,214,376.
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3 . MARTIAL LAW 
The m a tte r  o f  Martial Law seems to have loomed very 
large in  the minds of the opponents o f the Company and Child 
c e r t a in ly  advocated its use. This, however, seems to have 
been one o f the matters in which he did not have his own way* 
One has to remember that feeling about it very high 
i n  England about 1688; the xords had about the same emotional 
c o n te n t that the words 1 concentration camp1 have today.
Much was therefore made of the use of it by the Company and 
of Child’s urging of it upon the agents in the East.
The Company claimed that the charters of 1603 and 1686 
gave them the right to use Martial Law, and it was used at 
S t .  H e le n a  and advocated by Child at Bombay.1* But the 
ag en ts  on the spot did not act upon this rather dictatorial 
a d v ie e  to use Civil and Martial Lain, probably remembering in 
t h is  politically conscious age, the fate of those who flouted 
th e  Common Law. They were even chary of applying it to the 
g a r r is o n ,  although the Company had had the power to apply it
p
to  soldiers from the beginning. *
Altogether it would seem that a little fire gave off a 
lot of smoke.
1. L.B.VIII. p.168, and Child, Discourse of Trade (especi­
a l l y  the East India Trade). ££81. p.11.
2. t X O Y  I. PP.34.35.99.^9n; B.F.H.S. II, pp. 11.12.
C. DUTCH AMS ENGLISH METHODS IN INDIA
An example of the difference between Dutch and English 
methods is seen in the purchase of pepper on the Malabar 
coast in 1675. The Calicut factory found that no Indian 
merchant dare comply fully with the contract and the supply 
came in very tardily owing to ’Dutch villiany’. The chief 
merchant with whom they dealt was Sheikh Meroar and he would 
not ship any of the pepper 'until we got Captain Chamberlain 
(Commander of the New London) to come ashore in *rreat state 
as our Commissary or Overseer and threaten them if our con­
tract is not punctually performed1. This stratagem brought 
out the pepper that was there but the rest cajne in very 
slowly with the price rising all the time. The governor also 
demanded bribes before pepper could be shipped, and alto­
gether only about half the required amount was loaded and 
that at dearer rate3 than formerly. This was xmfortunate for 
Calicut as the Company had been complaining about the price 
and threatening to leave the Malabar coast altogether unless 
pepper could be got cheap enough to cost Sjd. a pound or 
less. The Calicut factory replied that they bought pepper 
as cheap as any other merchants and that the Company could 
never expect to get it as cheaply as the Dutch unless they 
followed their example in building and maintaining forts and 
castles.
The same was found to be the case with cinnamon, of 
which the Company asked for about 400 bales that year. It
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was Impossible to get any fit for Europe, as the Dutch had 
uprooted all the trees they met with at Cochin to get a 
better market for their Ceylon cinnamon. One of the argu­
ments for the proposed fort at Carnopoly was the bettor 
prospect it would offer for obtaining this commodity. But, 
they wrote, the merchants would only be welcomed fif they 
came with swords in their hands and a resolution to make a 
firm and durable residence’. Under these conditions pepper 
would cost only 2-1 d. a pound, including the cost of eighty 
soldiers, the trading staff and the building of the factory. 
They could probably also plant cinnamon there.
The attitude of the Company towards this proposal has 
been noted elsevfoere. It was too parsimonious and suspicions 
to trust its agents, yet these servants of the Company were 
behaving 'according to, and advocating the later admired 
Dutch system.1*
In any oaso, the Dutch were no more able to cope with 
the situation in Bengal than the English. In 1672 they were 
equally exploited over the customs, had to bribe very 
heavily and buy a consignment of Malik Khan’s rotten saffron. 
The Dutch agent was in no way bettor off than Chamook. In 
1674, in fact, the Dutch Company was worse off than the 
English. In that year the next Dlwan of Patna, either igno­
rant of the exemptions that had been granted to the English 
and Dutch, or, more likely, seeking to profit from their
1. These episodes are recounted in E.F.N.S.I, pp.344-347.
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trade, wrote privately to the Emperor to ask for instruotiona
Ke was told to find out fif the King v.as wronged1, Whereupon 
he called on “both parties to prove that they had paid cus­
toms elsev;here. The Dutch agreed since they paid Re.30,000 
to He.40,000 a year at Kugli and asked for a certificate. In 
fact, they got one, hut only after some &dditionul bribery. 
The English avoided all this by relying on their receipt for 
He.3,000, thoir annual tribute.1-
In fact, the English were trading in Bengal on far more 
favourable terms, in the same year the English Company 
extricated itself from the case of Kaghu Poddar, a shroff 
murdered by one of its Indian merchants, perhaps with the
2.
connivance of one of the English merchants, for 13,000 rupees, 
1Q,QGU of this being a bribe. The Dutch, more bellicose and 
standing on justice, took a similar case to Dacca and had to 
pay Re.£00,GOG. - It would seem, therefore, that the trade 
within the Empire was carried on in circumstances that made 
any notion of dominion irrelevant, and the only respect in 
which the English agents felt themselves ut a disadvantage 
was in the matter of the initiative allowed them. Outside 
the Empire, on the other hand, the Dutch were more successful.
1. S.g.g.S.II, pp.374,375,
2* ti^.h.sVlI. p.382, Hedges said later that the Company
must on no account pny customs, hut must stick to bribery 
and tribute. See Hedges’ Diary, 1,139.
3* B.F.y.S.ITt pp.346,347. This Included tvo removal of a 
hostile official.
CQB0LU8I0B
Latterly In this thesis, and perhaps significantly, the 
name of Child has teen seldom mentioned. The historian seek­
ing tangible evidonoe of his activities is like the unfortun­
ate dun mentioned by pollexfen in the Sandye ease. 'But this 
invisible 3ast India merohant, this invisible body, subsist­
ing only in .intelligentla legjs. a body politic without a 
soul or oonsoienoe* Whioh engrossed the trade for a handful 
of monopolists, Who wen at one time so powerful 'that aoaroe 
any man oan oontend with them; so invisible at another time 
that a dun oonnot find them'.1, This is a fair dssoriptlon 
and provides a hint to serve as a starting point in the 
assessment of the role of Child.
Be was undoubtedly one of these monopolists and he was 
in a sense the oreation of the corporation, of the body poli­
tic and its constitution. As one re-reads these pages, the 
event that appears to loom largest in the history of the 
Company is the establishment of the permanent joint stock in 
1657. It was upon that event that Child's position in the 
Company and aaah of its subsequent policy depended. It was 
the permanence of the investment and the constitution of the 
directorate which in the first place allowed Child to exert 
his influence on the Company. Once he and his associates had 
acquired their holdings they had only to prevent the winding
e
up of the stook or the issue of more shares.
1. Howells, StatA Trlule. X.430.
It wan the permanence of the stock Which enabled the 
Company to survive the unprofitable sixties, to maintain its 
installations in India and ultimately extend them. It 
allowed the development of permanent oommand and bottom, the 
foundation of the peculiar semi-independent branch of the 
Company's business. It was the profit of the joint stock 
enterprise that paid the expenses, by paying freight, of 
this inner group of shipowners; and Indeed this profit made 
the private trade possible by maintaining the entrepots.
The permanent joint stock had, in fact, solved the com­
mercial problem of buying goods in India and finding a mar­
ket is Europe by the time Child orue upon the scene. It had 
also allowed the Company to develop its administration and 
by its very existence had transferred the source of vitality 
from India to Leadenhall Street.
All this had been an inevitable process, but the pro­
blem of the seventies and eighties had to be solved with 
reference to the world outside the Company and called for a 
policy rather than a process. Put another way, the Company 
could organise its office in London and its factories in 
India without reference to anyone but the shareholders and 
the country powers. It could as a corporate body sue in the 
Unglieh courts but could not set itself up as judge, nor 
assume the attributes of sovereignty in India without author- 
ity. It needed this authority and could afford to pay for 
it at a time of troubles for the King and at a time When it
was unpopular itself.
Put in yet another way, the Company was achieving in 
the seventeenth century the organisation and powers Which 
the Dutch last India Company had enjoyed since 1602. The 
greatest step in this direction had been the establishment 
of the permanent joint stock. This had made possible the 
issue of the Charters of 1661 and 1668 because there were a 
permanent set of shareholders able to use the powers granted 
in then, with that the Company was, for a time, content. A 
new set of problems made the Company seek solutions in terms 
Of power rather than organisation; to find, in fact, a poli­
tical solution to What had been thought a problem of com­
mercial organisation.
The three problems of Child's time Involved the joint 
stoek and the solutions depended upon its continued exist­
ence. The decisions hod to be taken in London, since the 
permanence of the joint stoek had shifted the source of 
vitality from India to Leadenhall Street. At a tine When 
changing conditions in India were forcing the Company to 
attend to its entrepots and take some positive action to 
bring its notions of, and its relations with, the country 
powers up to dote, the monopoly Which the Company enjoyed 
was in jeopardy. An aspect of the attaok on the monopoly 
was the attempt, from within the Company, to wind up the 
joint stock. This would destroy Child's personal position, 
prevent the Company from playing a role in Snglish politics
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and arrest its development in India* Child's action in pre­
venting the termination of the stock was perhaps his most 
important contribution to the development of the Company.
The crisis of 1681, the outoome of which was the continuation 
of the original stock, was the second turning point of the 
Company. It determined that the process of development 
should continue and that the initiative should remain in the 
same hahds. It determined, in fact, that the solution to the 
Company's problems should be a political one.
Child's contribution to the nature of the solution is a 
matter of speculation. The evidence lies more in the qualtty 
of his mind than in direct evidence of his activities, WS 
have to ask ourselves how far the stamp of his mind is upon 
the form of the Company at the end of the period of his 
association with it.
Be was a political person. In the first plaee, he had 
a political mlndt his writings were concerned with trade and 
the state. He was not, however, a party politician. Start­
ing life as a republican and rehabilitating himself after 
the Restoration, he lived to come to terms with William III. 
But although he rehabilitated himself and was closely linked 
with the Court in the 1680s, he was never, apparently, popu­
lar there, nor did High Tories flourish in the Company. He 
was political in another way. Before he began his work in 
the Company, it was essential for him as a purveyor of ships' 
stores to be on good tense with government, since his largest
potential customer was the Navy. He was one of those 
capitalists whose business depended on oontaot with people 
in the government• It was in this way that many business 
enterprises were bound into the political fabrio of the
country.
The Sast India Company had always been in this position. 
The period of Child's influence in it was contemporary with 
a change in the political scene. To maintain its oontaot 
with government, the Company was forced to decide w’ioh 
group would form the effective government and ohoose a side.
It is clear from the Discourse of Trade that more than 
ten years earlier Child had recognised the political nature 
of a joint stock company. It is arguable, therefore, that 
he realised the importance of maintaining the permanent stock 
in order that the Company could play a political part In 1681.
The trace of his mind is seen, too, in the use that the 
Company made of its period of influence. Child and his asso­
ciates called the development the erection of Dominion in 
India. An analysis of this phrase will show how much the 
policy was a reflection of his ideas.
In the first place, the Dutch model was always much in 
his eye* It is significant that his first work was on inter­
est, and he then, and later, urged the adoption in England 
of the low rate that was legal in Holland. All his proposds 
for English trade depended on government action. Government 
regulation of economic life was accepted in the seventeenth
century, but in Holland the government made 'trade easy and 
necessary* Whereas in Itegland the regulations were all too 
often restrletive os en expanding economy. This was because 
in Holland a merehant community had set up a state While 
England was still ruled by the landed interest, and the trad­
ing olass was still slowly esquiring political power. At 
the Restoration representative merchants had been co-opted 
as members of the Council of Trade and Plantations, and for 
a long time merchants had been Xembers of Parliament. Child, 
however, had a different solution. He suggested the dele­
gation of authority by government to groups of people 
charged with particular economic Amotions. Thus, he advo­
cated a self-porpetuating corporation, set up and protected 
by government to administer the Poor Law. The only possible 
solution within the English framework, to the frustrations 
of trade, was the protected but self-governing corporation.
The Bast India Company at the Revolution was just such 
a corporation. It was in a position to make and enforce its 
own regulations by virtue of powers delegated once and for 
all by government. In the Company's past the Crown had 
acted on its behalf, as When James I sent Thomas Roe as 
ambassador to the Moghul, but by 1688, royal power was dele­
gated, not directly exercised. The Madras Charter, for 
example, was Issued by the Company, not by the Crown.
This creation was, as we have seen, almost certainly 
Child's idea, and was put into operation through his agency.
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It throws light not only upon his political views, but upon 
his conception of the civic role of the Compare'» His inter­
est in population was the result of hie redaction upon the 
sluggish movement of labour in ajgltmd, due to the operation 
of the Poor Law and the Clarendon Code. Re contrasted this 
with the free circulation of labour in Holland, Whore there 
were no tests of religion or solvency.
The disadvantage from a business point of view of the 
English corporate town was its exclusiveness. Child recog­
nised this and When the Company ceased to regard Madras as 
a costly necessity and began to take a positive view of its 
funotlon, an attempt was made to attract merchants and 
craftsmen and build up its population and prosperity, partly 
at least through the way in which it was governed, This and 
the attempts to raise a revenue and to give all communities 
a place on the body Whieh conducted the civic business of 
the town, show a rsJiavtion that people were riches, 'properly 
managed'.
One ohsraeteristio, however, the English Company did 
not Shore with the Butoh. That was decentralisation. Child 
scans to have assumed that initiative would always lie in 
Hnglnnd. For one thing, the Company must always remain very 
sensitive to political events at home, W ’ile the Dutch Com­
pany had nothing to fear in Holland, In any case, Child had 
no great opinion of Date'’ colonial policy and methods in 
Asia. For had he any good opinion of the Bnglish Company's
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servunta in Asia; he mistrusted their honesty, efficiency 
and Judgment. But more fundamental than this, he conceived 
of the Company as wielding political power for commercial 
ends, not as creating an empire in Asia. The purpose of the 
Company's towns was still to act as entrepots for goods 
ordered by the direetorc in London;the agents in India tftse 
duties might include cone administration and fighting, were 
still servants of a trading company. The Court of Commit­
tees, who controlled the commercial policy, controlled the 
political policy, because it was a method of trade.
It could be argued that those developments in the Com­
pany were the logical outcome of the situation and not the 
conscious work of Child. It is true in so far that Child 
obviously did not look round for an outlet for his political 
aspirations and choose the Company. His interest in poli­
tics and the community arose out of his interest in trade.
He was interested in prosperity, not power. He was politi­
cal in that he saw relationship between trade and the state; 
he was interested in the community as a community of economic 
non.
It is clear, however, that the Company did make deli­
berate decisions. There were two possible solutions for the
problem of the Interlopers. The Company could cither wind 
up its stock and lot them in, or it could stand firm, regard 
its stock as permanent and make terms with the executive.
The terms Which were made were not the only possible ones.
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The Company oould have allowed the Crown to do its political 
business for it. It oould have allowed the Admiralty Courts 
to function unchecked} it oould have accepted of floors with 
the royal commission. This latter proposal was expressly 
rejected and the Company maintained control of its own offtoc.
It is equally true that Child did not start with any 
theory about the future role of the Company. There is no 
evidence that he wished to substitute a 'Child doctrine' for 
Roe's principles. He was the leader of a defensive action, 
not of a forward policy. Those decisions which the Company 
took were solutions to problems that faced it. It changed 
its methods and developed its structure under Child's guid­
ance and leadership, but its ends remained the same. In 
other words, Dominion was to maintain and increase the trade 
under changed conditions, not an end in Itself.
I!he question of Child's motives still remains unanswered, 
and a discussion of them must find a place in any study of 
him. Xt is a platitude to say that motives arc never pure.
Xt is none the less true, and any dlsoussion of motive must 
be superficial.
It is probable that in Child's nature there was a streak 
of self-assertiveness that found an outlet in controlling 
the fortunes of a great company. Maybe he liked intrigue as 
come like the exhausting practice of the law. Perhaps he 
was a social climber. There is some evidence that he w&e 
dictatorial and contemptuous of the abilities of most other
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men; but men in Child1 a position usually are* There is 
evidence of his pleasure in his daughter’s marriage to the 
Marquis of Worcester and annoyance at his 3on’s marriage to 
the daughter of a goldsmith* But these were incidentals* 
High-handedness and intrigue were means to an end and a 
connection with the peerage a marie of success* TTis inter­
est was in trade and it is most probable that his prime 
motive was commercial*
His connection with the Company probably arose throutft 
his shipping business and through a realisation that the 
Company’s stooJc was a good investment. To the shipowner,os 
we have seen, the Company offered a number of inducements* 
The freight paid by the Company paid the costs of a voyage 
to the Indies and the private trade provided a profit* It 
might provide credit for building ships and, most important 
of all, its organisation and expanding trade provided a 
steady demand for ships. This was very apparent by 1670.
The Company was paying good dividends, averaging 25 per cent* 
and in constant need of tonnage*
The advantage of connection with the Company is indi­
cated not only by the fact that the right of hiring ships 
was becoming permanent, but also by the presence in the 
Court of Committees of prominent shipowners. They undoubt­
edly represented syndicates outside and sometimes members 
wore associated with each other in the same syndicates.
There is no evidence of these shipowners acting in concert
and it woulA seen that with all of then the connection was 
partly a natter of investment for capital and partly a 
brunoh of their shipping business.
If wo assume that his connection with the Company was 
motivated by hie intercut in shipping, then his political 
nation follows logically. In fighting for the Company he 
was fighting for the carding trade and the political struc­
ture that protested and nourished it. There was more to the 
earn ing trade than merely hiring ships to tho Company. The 
real business of the Company itsolf m i  carriage omd its 
fundamental task woe to attract Asian goods to lta route.
So the Company was more than a good and steady customer. It 
performed a function that no syndicate of shipowners could 
perform, fh.ey wore hold together by the life of a ship, 
While the Company was, or oould be made, permanent.
hot all the shipowners in the Company saw this. PapiBcn 
and Bumardisteae wore as involved in shipping as Child, His 
wisdom lay in his realisation that neither a regulated oom- 
jany nor an interloping syndicate could maintain the trade. 
The latter gave only short term profits and the ineffectual­
ity of the former war to be shown in the history of the Hew 
Company. Child was concerned with the establishment of the 
trade in perpetuity, and the measure of his success was the 
endurance of his fabric an the foundat-ana of the United 
Company, nhen Burke spoke of a great office in the guise of 
a counting house he was describing Dominion in India.
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SCHB iU£SaULuS
This stud,7 has produced little that is new about Child 
and the thesis cannot olaira any originality in Interpreta­
tion of the Company'b polioy.
Macaulay diaouased Child's political role and haa giver, 
some .ao count of the way in Which he worked in the crises of 
the last two deoadas of the seventeenth century. He saw 
Child as a renegade Whig Who desorted to the Tory camp to 
save his 2ast India fortune, and dwelt much upon the struaJe 
with the Interlopero. His method was impressionist, and 
rending his account in eonJunction with the pamphlet litera­
ture of the seventeenth oentury, one is filled with envy for 
the apparent faoility of the interpretation of contemporary 
opinion. It remains, however, an impression, and one is 
reminded that however obsessed Victorian novelists were with 
money, they seldom portray a character earning it realisti­
cally. 3o Macaulay hints at obscure origins and a career of 
self help but dose not examine the source of Child's wealth. 
Child is, of course, a minor character in Macaulay's narra­
tive but the picture of him as the politician of the East 
India Company is a valuable one.
A longer study of -Child, also largely drawn from the 
literature of the time, is that of Dr. S.A, Tffran in ffiio Bast 
India ?r*dc in the .Seventeenth Century. He was the first 
writer to examine Child's contribution to the development of 
the Company, examining Macaulay's assertion that he dominated
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it, and the opinion commonly held that the period of his
domination saw a charge of policy from one of peaceful trade 
to one of territorial acquisition* Dr. Xhan finds* by an 
ingenious, but* X think, valid argument from the similarity 
of style in the correspondence of the Company at that time 
and in Child’s published and unpublished writing* that 
Maoaulay1 s assertion was true* He shows that the apparent 
territorial expansion was a business development rather 
than a political policy.
In his two relevant chapters he is concerned to show 
the effect of the East India trade on English political and 
economic theory* While I agree that the controversy over 
the future of the Company made English writers look again at 
the theories Which t^ey held about bullion and free trade* I 
think that is only half the story. For one thing* the events 
in England reacted upon the East India trade* For another 
thing, there was almost as much controversy in the polemical 
economic xvrlting of the time, upon the French trade, as upon 
that of the East Indies*
A better account of the development of political eeonaqr 
at this tine is given in Sir William Ashley’s Surveys* His­
torical and Economic, especially in the chapter on The gory 
Origins of Free Trade* This is a valuable estimate of 
Child’s place in the field of political economy that the 
passage of half a century has done nothing to Invalidate* 
Apart from a not very interesting or reliable account
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in l*ox-Bourne’s Baalish Herohants, there ia no other study
of Child.
Ihe other matter that 1 hare sought to look Into ie the 
history of the polioy and organisation of the Company durtag 
the sarenteenth oentury. Policy has been dealt with 
supremely well by Sir William Hunter in his Hint or:, of Bri­
tish India, igaln the passage of time has produoed nothing 
to invalidate hie interpretation, and anyone following 
Hunter with an account of the Company in the seventeenth 
century oon raoroly dot a feu *i’s and orona few ’t’a.
The eumo is true of Mins Sutherland's work on the 
internal organisation of the Company and its relations with 
the Crown. In the first ohaptor of her 2$aat India Ooaoanj
. Aqafrg g , aftUSltt* sh0 points out that the 
United Company inherited from the Old Bast India Company 
a sound administration, ’couples: but fluid* relationships 
with its own servants, the Indian powers and the government 
at home, as well as oertain territorial powers and responsi­
bilities. She shows that both in policy and organisation 
’the Seventeenth Century developments laid down inescapable 
conditions for the future*.
The primary sources, therefore, hod been well worked 
over end it remained for me to work over them again, not so 
much to see the history of the development of the Company as
to answer certain question* about Child.
I. i.g.Sutherland. frre Hoot' 'India 'Cu'aJan:: and Ei/»TeoHih, 
Century loUttog. p. 18.
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The first question, naturally, was Whether or not he
dominated the Company. The first task was to try to break 
dovm the established hypothesis. Ideally the method would 
have been to have cleared one's mind entirely of tradition 
and the secondary sources and examine the story of tve Com­
pany at this period as told in the primary souroos. One 
might then have found sosao dominating personality and sought 
his idantity, or Child's role might havo bean thrust upon 
one’s attention. This was, of oourse, impossible, and I fel 
baok upon the nore pedestrian method of seeking vestiges of 
Child uhioh related to his position in the Company and try­
ing to assess this position dispassionately.
The form in which the raoorda were kept allows one to 
know very rarely Who initiated decisions. Occasionally a 
proposer is mentioned, but not often enough to drew any con­
clusions. In any ease, Child could hardly have done his 
business by blatantly proposing every resolution in open 
oomiaittee. A group of twer.ty-four men who hod invested 
enough money to become Committees would hardly have allowed 
their affairs to have been managed in this way. There must 
have been a fair measure of agreement on policies that Child 
may or may not have supplied. His most probable methods
V
were those of the pressure group and of steering natters 
into the hands of t sub-eomaltteo Where he and those Who 
thought like him might be delegated to reach decisions to 
present to thoir oolleagues.
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Therefore the most profitable use of the Court Minutes
was to s©@jc the personnel of th© committees and the ante­
cedents and associates of any person nsraed as an initiator 
of policy* lareryone conrcctcd with Child on committees was 
pursued alon# the usual tracte of the Xjlot lonar ; of HationajL
M £25Sudte. Btt. J |lB t« U ^ IS a B « g ig ll.AgBLU%Aga
the ’gossip writers*, Burnst and Lutteroll, and the diariste. 
A disadvantage in the fora in which the Minutes were kept is 
that only late in the period, in 1695, did th# practice 
arise of recording a list of the members of the committees. 
One is therefore forced for crush of the timo to seek isola­
ted entries whan committees were appointed for some specific 
purpose.
Broadly speaking, this phase of the Investigation was 
inconclusive, and revealed only one contact group, the mem­
bers of whioh wore interesting but elusive.
A slight shifting of the enquiry was to find out the 
functions of the committees upon which Child was known to 
have sat. It wss apparent from the Court Books that some 
had policy-making and others purely executive functions. 
Child wus associated with the former. For example, he was 
on two seorot committees and on the committee for writing 
letters which wrote the directives to the extents in India* 
His work upon the latter oonsaittee is illuminated by 
the two small collections of his letters. These show that 
he wrote or revised a number of, if not all, the letters
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sant out at the time covered by the collections. Unfortun­
ately, they cover only a part of hie career.
But the letters do store than this. They provide on 
hypothesis upon whioh to consider Child's motives. They not 
only make it fairly certain that he w consulted at least an 
the letters sent by the Company to Asia, but they reveal hie 
interest in shipping. It became apparent from the Adven­
turers1 Lists that he had bought his position in the Company
%
and from his oorrespondenoe and the Court Minutes that he 
was devoting to the Company far more of his time that his 
contemporaries normally did to a single undertaking. He must 
have had a powerful motive. The recurrence of the theme of 
shipping in his oorrespondenoe revealed a likely' one.
At this point, too, another fact beoatae obvious. The 
somewhat disappointing haul of letters was the culmination 
of a long search for a body of material which would bring 
Child to life and make possible a biography. It was now 
clear that the story must be told in terms of the history of 
the Company, and the postulation of this motive nude possi­
ble an examination of the development of the Company from 
another point of view. ,
The documents so far would allow one to assume that 
Child played an important part at leant in the despatch of 
the famous ’dominion’ letter and in the war against the 
Moghul. If one could find out why, it would not only 
strorigthan the assumption but be of enormous interest in
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ltsolf. This 'forward policy* night hare boon based on an 
a priori theory of Child, or it might hero boon forced upon 
rim. The Indian side of the Company’s poliey was only one 
part of the stor? at this time, however. A considerable 
part of its energy m s  spent in dealing with the Interlope**. 
A study of Child’s motive night reveal whether the Inter­
lopers presented a fortuitously contemporary pi ablest or 
whether there m s  some way in which they could be linked 
with the forward poliey.
I knew, of course, of the power of the shipping inter­
est at the end of the eighteenth century and I remembered the 
view of tf.K, Moreland that the business of the European oora- 
1 anise in Asia m s  really carriage, since the production of 
India scarcely rone at all throughout the period. The Inter* 
loporc, therefore, offered a direct threat to the people Who 
supplied the Company with ships. In this struggle with the 
Interlopers, then, might have arisen the first shipping 
interest.
From Miss Sutherland's A London Merchant it m u  clear 
that permanent command and bottom, upon which depended the
existence of a shipping interest, both started in the seven­
teenth century. It might bo possible to show that the Whip­
ping interest arose or. a preseure group to nerve the Company
to fight for its own trading monopoly and the shipowner*’ 
parasitic monopoly. Perhaps the struggle with the Into risers 
could be shown to be really a struggle between two rival
gvem>» of shipowner*. The suppliers of the Company's ships 
would, if the ’forward policy’ was really a nove to defend 
the Company's trudi’jg poets and maintain the ohannels of Its 
trade, be interested in seeing this poliey vigorously
carried out.
Here, then, vmaa thIrd hypothesis upon s^ioh to base 
an interpretation of the Company’s poliey. Briefly, it was 
this. A number of shipowners W»-o were acquiring a peroiawpt 
right to hire ships to the Company saw a rival group break­
ing into the Company’s shorter territory which they regarded 
hb their preserve. Perhaps, combining to act upon the Oon- 
y&ajy to prevent this, they also saw that the Company would 
have to take steps to strengthen and expand their towns and 
protect their trade as the Dutch had done in the Sploe 
Islands. The hypothesis would be the more reasonable since 
it postulated a group of people rather than a single person 
us the controlling influence in the Company .
The next step was to go through the Court and Letter 
Books collecting information under three heads - shipping, 
the monopoly and the Interlopers, and the 'forward policy*, 
in addition, the third volume of file’s Introduction to 
Hedges’ Maa*/. Whioh consists of a collection of material 
for a life of Thome litt, provides am addition source of 
information on the Interlopers, and atreynshart Mnnter’s 
Diorion and Ten. le’a Introduction do the Rime for the * for­
ward policy’•
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Most disappointing in results was the truest for in­
format ion on shipping. Seeking in the first place for the 
ships in vfttioh Child had Shores, I found that the Court Book 
only records the Charterporty owners, those Who had to sign 
oharterparties with the Company* Altogether nine ships in 
whioh he had shares oould he traced and these wore spread 
throughout his oareer. It oould not he said that he had
shares in nine ships at any one time.
:ooondly, in order to sustain the hypothesis it was
necessary to prove that the profits of shipowning were con­
siderable. The conditions upon Which the ships were token 
up oould he found in two printed oharterparties in the Haw- 
1inson US3., and from various regulations laid down from 
time to time hy the Court of Committees and recorded In the 
Court Books. The owners found wages and victuals for the 
voyage and received freight at the end of it. The cost could 
he oaloulated from Barlow’s Journals and contemporary naval 
records. The number of men to he carried per hundred tons 
was laid down hy the Court of Committees and the gross freight 
paid was recorded in the minutes. From a consideration of 
this information it become clear that the matter was not so 
simple aa had at first been supposed. These figures by them­
selves did not reveal any great margin of profit.
A chance discovery of a hanking account at Blackwell’a, 
now in the possession of Olyn Hills Bank, in Which two share­
holders in a Ship taken up hy the Company left their dividends
to he paid into the hank revealed a profit of £37 on a £100 
share. Assuming a voyage to last two years, this shows a 
profit of 18j per oent. Ho sush figure was revealed from a 
study of the freight and expenses, however.
Another source of information on shipping was The 
aanam..9.£ .V\WV* .33W.» He huilt, managed and lost a per­
mission Ship in the first deoade of the eighteenth oentury. 
In his ease, too, the estimated profit was high, although in 
faot the ship was lost. The papers are ohiefly interesting, 
however, for the light they throw on the methods of raising 
money for the building of a ship and on the role of the 
partners in the enterprise. Bowry's vessel in any ease was 
a permission Shlpi that is, one in Whioh the owners managed 
the cargo. His papers reveal the motives of the Interlopers 
rather than those of Child mid hie associates.
Furthermore, in reviewing the notes taken from the Court 
and Letter Books Whioh related to shipping, a pattern was 
diseemahle in the regulations made hy the Company. While 
the rate of freight fluctuated with the supply of ships, 
Whioh depended after about 1S70 on Whether Bngland was at 
penes or war, the Company was making more stringent regula­
tions about the suitability of the officers and conditions 
on hoard. It would appear, therefore, that the shipowners, 
so far from controlling the Company, were being held to con­
ditions of employment.
This might have disposed of the hypothesis hut for a
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pattain discemable in the regulations with regard to primate 
trade. I had extracted all these regulations from the Court 
Book in the collection of information on the Interlopers. 
From this it was apparent that two groups of people were 
allowed to carry on a private trade between Asia and Europe, 
as opposed to the country trade. These were shareholders in 
the Company and the owners and officers of the ships. In 
addition to personal allowances for private trade there were 
suns of money allowed ’for the ship’s joint stock’. It 
neoosd likely that the 18& per oent. profit cone in part ftcm 
this source and this also threw some light on how the totals 
of freight money paid by the Company were arrived at. 
Obviously only part of the tonnage of a ship was hired by 
the Company.
If the real profit came from private trade, one could 
then wonder Why the shipowners troubled to freight port of 
their ships to the Company and Why they did not beoome 
Interlopers. One would have thought they would have at least 
threatened to do so, and raised the freight. I had dis­
covered from Hr. C.K. Fayle's Short History of the World’s 
Shipping Industry that the Company had found early in its 
history that it was too expensive to own ships. The Company 
was to a oertain extent, therefore, in the hands of its ship- 
owners.
At this point What was almost the sole personal state­
ment in Child’s letters became significant. He said on one
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ooaaBion that he was asking only a moderate freight himself 
and was seeing to moderate the demands of other owners so 
that they did not ’hear too hard upon’ the Company. These 
considerations made the hypothesis of a shipping interest 
oonposed of 'soonoaio men1 unsatisfactory as a possible 
reason for Child’s notions. If he was Interested solely in 
freight he could have got more; if he was interested in pri­
vate trade he oould have turned Interloper.
I allowed the hypothesis of the shipping interest to 
stand, however, While I looked for ways in which it night 
operate and in which Child’s influence might work through it 
Looking for members of the pressure group I was hampered by 
lack of vestiges of seventeenth century shipowners. Barlow’s 
Journal is the only record of a life spent at sea at this 
time and serves as a touchstone upon Whioh to test soattered 
references. But he is useful on customs, not on people*, 
nowhere was it possible to find a complete list of the owners 
of any ship in the Company’s service. The Interlopers were 
better served. There is a complete list for one year of all 
the Interlopine s^lps and all the owners in the Home Miscel­
laneous K3S.
I was therefore driven to consider again ways in Whioh 
his will oould prevail in the Company, but this time I looked 
at finanoe rather than administration. The size of his 
holding, from the Adventurers' Lists, his possible use of 
the committee system and his relations with the secretary
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ware administrative methods of control. But his letters 
reveal two other ways of influencing the Company, There is 
a reference to his leaving money in the hands of the Conpaiy 
to ’serve their occasions’. He made, in fact, short-term 
loans. It is clear, too, that at least in war-time he served 
the Company by taking Shares in ships so that it oould hire 
them. Since a shortage of ready money was a perennial 
source of anxiety to the Company and it depended on short­
term loans to avoid the issue of more stock whioh might loser 
the dividend and upset the controlling group, these seemed 
very likely methods of influencing the sotions of the Commit­
tees. Further, both the Adventurers' Lists and the Transfer 
Books, in the hands of the Bank of England, Show that he had 
trust and personal holdings is the Company and therefore 
attached some importance to his financial arrangements.
As 1 looked at this small collection of Child’s letters 
more closely X realised that it was important far beyond its 
size in providing clues to his methods of working, but I was 
no nearer the motive for his actions. The letters revealed 
nothing of his Character, beyond a little conventional piety, 
an enterprise to translate the Gospels into Portuguese at 1he 
expense of the Company and a concern for the impoverished 
weavers of Halstead Where he had an estate. He suffered a 
twinge of sooinl conscience, perhaps whioh he soothed at the 
Company*8 cost.
The next step, therefore, was to coutnlne the extracts
from the Letter Books on the ’forward poliey*. Once again 
the form in Whioh the letters are recorded preeludes a cer­
tain knowledge of their authorship, hut it is possible to 
see the working of the collective mind of the Court of Com­
mittees. It has to be remembered that the letters were 
statements, not of fact, but of aspiration and opinion* The 
instructions were frequently not oarried out. The Commit­
tees go into the reasons for their instructions fairly fulls 
but there is no evidence that the interests of the ship­
owners were anywhere dirootly considered. To sustain the 
hypothesis of a Shipping interest, therefore, it was neces­
sary to consider in What way the Implementing of the orders 
would benefit the Shipowners.
From the Letter Books two impressions emerge. Firstly, 
the eivio poliey was very important to the Comittees for 
fInaneial reasons, and secondly, that there was an element 
of timing in political actions of the Company.
He-reading the section Which X have written on this 
aspect of the subject, X find that much of the material comas 
from the English Factory Series. However interested the Com­
pany was in events at Whitehall and Westminster, the reasons 
for its actions lay in India. It is this series Which re­
veals What actually happened there and s' ows that the ’for­
ward policy* was really a defensive action. It was clear 
that all English trade in India was oarried out through the 
same Channels leading to the same places. There was no
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attenpt by the Interlopers to set up rlrol entrepots. If 
the Company went down the shipowners would be left with no 
trading posts from Whioh to operate. It did not really 
matter whether they derived their profit from freight or 
private trade. Any permanent prosperity depended on the 
existenoe of the Company.
The hypothesis of the Shipping interest had been useful 
as a starting point from Whioh to reaSh this conclusion. It 
oould not, however, be said to be proven, nor did the evi­
dence implicate Child very closely wLth all this. Isolated 
passages in the Letter and Court Books show him active in 
civic affairs and matters of populating the entrepots.
So, if Child was to remain the central figure of this 
study, it was necessary to traoe his hand in the pattern of 
the Company's policy. I set out to examine What was meant 
by the word 'Dominion*. The Company had accepted the policy 
of Dominion and believed it to be achieved in the 1680s. I 
had to see Whether the stamp of Child's mind was upon it.
I now returned to his published works. They, apart from 
his letters, are really his only authentic remains. I had 
read them with a mass of contemporary works on political 
economy early in the investigation. How I turned to them 
again, trying to Isolate Child’s attitude of mind.
The word ’dominion* obviously had a special meaning in 
the context. Dominion was a solution to a seventeenth cen­
tury problem by means of a relationship between government
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and a private trading company. In Child's views on the 
role of government in the eoonomio life of the country it 
is possible to see, not an original theory, but a certain 
point of view. In this point of view it is possible to see 
explanations of his relationship with the executive and of 
the isolated incidents in his political life. His interest 
in population connected him with the oivio aspect of 
Dominion and his attitude to companies made me realise that 
he had grasped the political importance of the permanent 
Joint stock Which oould wield power both at homo and in 
India.
This seemed to be the reason why he stuck to the Com­
pany as a shipowner and Why he fought so long for the main­
tenance of the stock. This was the significanoe of the 
crisis of 1681. If the stock had been wound up the Company 
would not have been able to play the political part that 
saved the trade.
Uy respect for Child rose in the course of these 
refleet ions, with the realisation that I oould not hope to 
find the footprints of an intriguing business man but would 
have to look instead for the creation of an ingenious mind. 
The doouments can provide a background to Child and a pic­
ture of the predioament of the Company and its emergence 
from that predicament. They can provide a few glimpses of 
Child at work, but these glimpses are like stills from a
film that has been lost* His writing provides a oluo to 
the Whole, not because he held a priori theories whioh he 
put into practice, but because he had a certain approach 
to political and econoaio problems Whioh was the same as 
that of the Company. It is upon this rather intangible 
evidence that the conclusions of this thesis are based.
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